It must be continuous for the whole pe riod. If one trespasser enters and leaves, and then another trespasser, a stranger to the former and without purchase from or respect to him, enters, the possession is not continuous; Schrack v. Zubler, 34 Pa. 38; Christy v. Alford, 17 How. (U. S.) 601, 15 L. Ed. 256; Stout v. Taul, 71 Tex. 438, 9 S. W. 329. But a slight connection of the lat ter with the former trespasser, as by a pur chase by parol contract, will be sufficient to give the possession continuity; Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355 ; 1 Term 448. And so will a purchase at a sale or execution; Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126; Cleveland Ins. Co. v. Reed, 24 How. (U. S.) 284, 16 L. Ed. 686. To give continuity to the possession lay successive occupants, there must be privi ty of estate; Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 15, 38 Am. Dec. 384; Ang. Lim. § 414 ; and such a privity that each possession may be referred to one and the same entry ; as that of a tenant to his landlord, or of the heir of a disseisor to his ancestor ; King v. Smith, 1 Rice (S. C.) 10. It is not essential that one and the same person shall have been all the while the ad verse holder, if the latter succeeds to the as serted rights of the preceding holders or occupants as grantee or transferee; Black v. Coke Co., 85 Ala. 504, 5 South. 89.
An administrator's possession may be con nected with that of his intestate; Moffitt v. McDonald, 11 Humphr. (Tenn.) 457; and that of a tenant holding under the ancestor, with that of the heir ; Williams v. McAliley, Cheves (S. C.) 200. In some states, how ever, it is held that whether the possession be held uniformly under one title, or at dif ferent times under different titles, can make no difference, provided the claim of title is always adverse; as in Connecticut; Fanning v. Willcox, 3 Day (Conn.) 258; and in Ken tucky ; Shannon v. Kinney, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 4, 10 Am. Dec. 705.
The possession must be adverse. If it be permissive ; 2 Jac. & W. 1; or by mistake; Comegys v. Carley, 3 Watts (Pa.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 356; or unintentional; Burrell v. Burrell, 11 Mass. 296; or confessedly in sub ordination to another's right ; 5 B. & AId. 223 ; Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 241, 6 L. Ed. 81; Jackson v. Denison, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 558; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Pa. 210, 47 Am. Dec. 455 ; it does not avail to bar the statute. The possession of a life tenant and those claiming under him, or subject to his control, is not adverse to those entitled in remainder ; Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E. 207. If the occupation is such and by such a person that it may be for the true owner, it will be presumed to be for him, unless it be shown that the adverse claimant gave notice that he held adversely and not in subordination; 1 Batt. Ch. 373; 5 Burr. 2604. And this notice must be clear and unequivocal. If the act of the tenant or adverse claimant may be a trespass as well as a disseisin, the true owner may elect which he will consider it, regardless of the wishes of the trespasser, who cannot be al lowed to qualify his own wrong ; 1 Burr. 60 ;
Proprietors of Tp. No. 6 v. McFarland, 12 Mass. 325 ; Prescott v. Nevers, 4 Mas. 329, Fed. Cas. No. 11,390. So that if the adverse claimant sets up his trespasses as amounting to adverse possession, the owner may reply they are no disseisin, but trespasses only ; while, on the other hand, the true owner may elect, if he please, for the sake of his reme dy, to treat them as a disseisin ; Bryant v. Tucker, 19 Me. 383. This is called a disseisin by election, in distinction from a disseisin in fact,—a distinction which was taken for the benefit of the owner of the land. When ever the act done of itself necessarily works an actual disseisin, it is a disseisin in fact : as, when a tenant for years or at will con veys in fee. On the other hand, those acts which are susceptible of being made a dis seisin by election are no disseisin till the election of the owner makes them so ; Jack son v. Rogers, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 36.
Evidence of adverse possession must be strictly construed and every presumption is in favor of the true owner ; Fairfield v. Bar rette, 73 Wis. 463, 41 N. W. 624. The stat ute does not begin to run in favor of the possession of public land until the title pass es from the United States ; Cummings v. Powell, 97 Mo. 524, 10 S. W. 819 ; Skipwith v. Martin, 50 Ark. 141, 6 S. W. 514; there is no adverse possesSion against the state; Hurst v. Dulany, 84 Va. 701, 5 S. E. 802.
The claim by adverse possession must have some definite boundaries ; Munshower v. Patton, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 334, 13 Am. Dec. 678; Hapgood v. Burt, 4 Vt 155. There ought to be something to indicate to what extent the adverse possessor claims. A suffi cient inclosure will establish the limits, with out actual continued residence on the land; Johnston v. Irvin, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 291; Brown v. Porter, 10 Mass. 93. But it must be an actual, visible, and substantial inclo sure; Smith v. Hosmer, 7 N. H. 436, 28 Am. Dec. 354. An inclosure on three sides, by a trespasser as against the real owner, is not enough; Dennett v. Crocker, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 239; Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256, 59 Am. Dec. 115 ; nor is an unsubstan tial brush fence ; Hale v. Glidden, 10 N. H. 397; nor one formed by the lapping of fal len trees ; Coburn v. Hollis, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 125; Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 230. Natural barriers may be a sufficient inclosure ; Goodwin v. McCabe, 75 Cal. 584, 17 Pac. 705. And where the claim is by pos session only, without any color or pretence of title, it cannot extend beyond the actual limits of the inclosure ; Watrous v. South worth, 5 Conn. 305; Hatch v. R. Co., 28 Vt. 142; Bell v. Longworth, 6 Ind. 273. And this must be fixed, not roving from part to part ; Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 53, 9 L. Ed. 624. Possession and occupancy of land not enclosed by a fence may be adverse ; Beecher v. Galvin, 71 Mich. 391, 39 N. W. 469.