Where it is necessary to prove that an actual entry has been made upon the land within a certain time before bringing suit, such entry must be proved to have been made upon the land in question; Robison v. Sweet, 3 Me. 316; Shearman v. Irvine, 4 Cra. (U. S.) 367, 2 L. Ed. 649; Harbaugh v. Moore, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 283; unless pre vented by force or fraud, when a bona ride attempt is equivalent ; Jackson v. Schoon maker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 390. If the land lie in two counties, there must be an • entry in each county ; though if the land be all in one county an entry upon part, with a dec laration of claim to the whole, is sufficient; Co. Litt. 419 ; Jackson v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 115. The intention to claim the land is essential to the sufficiency of the entry ; and whether this intention has existed is to be left in each case to the jury; Holtzapple 4 Wash. C. C. 367, Fed. Cas. I. 6,648 ; Dillon v. Mattox, 21 Ga. 113 ; e v. Reynolds, 27 Ala. 364. An entry may be made by the guardian for his ward, by the remainder man or reversioner for the tenant, and the tenant for the reversioner or remainder man, being parties having privity of estate ; 9 Co. 106 ; McMasters v. Bell, 2 Pen. & W. Pa. 180. So a cestui que trust may enter for his trustee ; 1 Ld. Raym. 716 ; and an agent for his principal ; Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Pa. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536 ; even without original authority, if the act be adopted and ratified; Hinman v. Cranmar, 9 Pa. 40. And the entry of one joint-tenant, coparcener, or tenant in common will inure to the bene fit of the other ; Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Pa.) 296, 36 Am. Dec. 176.
Adverse possession for the necessary stat utory period gives title against the true owner ; but it must be open, uninterrupted, and with intent to claim against the true owner. The possession must be an actual occupation, so open that the true owner ought to know it must be presumed to know it, and in such manner and under such circumstances as amount to an invasion of his rights, thereby giving him cause of ac tion; Abell v. Harris, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 371; Jackson v. Huntington, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 438, 8 L. Ed. 170; Somerville v. Hamilton, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 230, 4 L. Ed. 558 ; in Pennsylvania this rule has been announced with special distinctness. "The owner of land," says the supreme court in Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts (Pa.) 341, "can only be barred by such pos session as has been actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile or adverse." See Paldi v. Paldi, 95 Mich. 410, 54 N. W. 903 ; Murray v. Hoyle, 97 Ala. 588, 11 South. 797 ; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720, 36 L. Ed. 532; Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 6 S. W. 843, 5 Am. St. Rep. 71; Gildehaus v. Whiting, 39 Kan. 706, 18 Pac. 916 ; Haffendorfer v. Gault, 84 Ky. 124; Col vin v. Land Ass'n, 23 Neb. 75, 36 N. W. 361, 8 Am. St. Rep. 114.
Adverse and exclusive occupation for the statutory period of a railroad's right of way does not prevail against the railroad since it is for a public purpose and the statute does not run against it ; Southern Pac. Co. v.
Hyatt, 132 Cal. 240, 64 Pat. 272, 54 L. R. A. 522.
Title by adverse possession for a period such as is required by statute to bar an ac tion is a fee simple title, and is as effective as any otherwise acquired; Cox v. Cox, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 1. See Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720, 36 L. Ed. 532. A possession not actual, but constructive, not exclusive, but in participation with the owner or others, falls short of that kind of adverse possession which deprives the true owner of his title; Ward v. Cochran, 150 U. S. 597, 14 Sup. Ct. 230, 37 L. Ed. 1195.
Adverse possession must be open, so the owner may know it or might know it. Many acts of occupation would be un equivocal, such as fencing the land or erect ing a house on it; Jackson v. Huntington, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 402, 8 L. Ed. 170; Tourtelotte v. Pearce, 27 Neb. 57, 42 N. W. 915; actual improvement and cultivation of the soil ; Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 156; building on land and putting a fence around it ; Poignard v. Smith, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 172; digging stones and cutting timber from time to time; 14 East 332 ; Boaz v. Heister, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 21; driving piles into the soil cov ered by a mill-pond, and thereon erecting a building; Boston Mill Corp. v. Bulfinch, 6 Mass. 229, 4 Am. Dec. 120 ; cutting roads into a swamp, and cutting trees and making shingles therefrom ; Tredwell v. Reddick, 23 N. C. 56; and setting fish-traps in a non-naviga ble stream, building dams across it, and us ing it every year during the entire fishing season for the purpose of catching fish ; Wil liams v. Buchanan, 23 N. C. 535, 35 Am. Dec. 760. But entering upon uninclosed flats, when covered by the tide, and sailing over them with a boat or vessel for the ordinary purposes of navigation, is not an adverse possession; Drake v. Curtis, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 395; though the filling up the flats, and build ing a wharf there, and using the same, would be if the use were exclusive; Wheeler v. Stone, 1 Cush. 313; McFarlane v. Kerr, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 249; nor is the enter ing upon a lot and marking its boundaries by splitting the trees; Woods v. Banks, 14 N. H. 101; nor the getting rails and other tim ber for a few weeks each year from timber land ; Bartlett v. Simmons, 49 N. C. 295 ; nor the overflowing of land by the stoppage of a stream ; Green v. Harman, 15 N. C. 158 ; nor the survey, allotment, and conveyance of a piece of land, and the recording of the deed ; unless there is open occupation; Thay er v. McLellan, 23 Me. 417. As a rule the nature of the acts necessary to constitute adverse possession varies with the region and character of the ground. If the latter is un cultivated and the region sparsely populated, much less unequivocal acts are necessary on the part of the adverse holder.