A statute extending the period within which claims against a railroad company for damage due to change of grade may be prosecuted is constitutional, and under it claims previously barred can be prosecuted ; Dunbar v. R. Corp., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 916; but in Slover v. Union Bank, 115 Tenn. 347, 89 S. W. 399, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528, it was held that a statute limiting actions for usury to two years will not affect rights which accrued prior to its passage.
Whatever may have been the disposition in the past, the courts are now inclined to construe these statutes liberally, so as to effectuate their intent; they are little inclin ed to fritter away their effect by refinements and subtleties ; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 360, 7 L. Ed. 174 ; Ang. Lim. § 23. The statute of limitations is a statute of repose and does not rest merely on presumption Of payment ; Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U. S. 231, 7 Sup. Ct. 1229, 30 L. Ed. 1156.
Courts of equity, though not within the terms of the statute, have nevertheless uni formly conformed tO its spirit, and have, as a general rule, been governed by its provi sions, unless special circumstances of fraud or the like require, in the interests of justice, that they should be disregarded; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 242; Dean v. Dean, 9 N. J. Eq. 425; Harris v. Mills, 28 Ill. 44, 81 Am. Dec. 259; Scheftel v. Hays, 58 Fed. 457, 7 C. C. A. 308 ; Barnes v. Born, 133 Ind. 169, 30 N. E. 509, 32 N. E. 833; 17 Ves. 96; Parker v. Dacres, 130 U. S. 43, 9 Sup. Ct. 433, 32 L. Ed. 848; Switzer v. Noffsinger, 82 Va. 518; Butler v. Johnson, 111 N. Y. 214, 18 N. E. 643. Courts of equity will apply the statute by analogy; Willard v. Wood, 1 App. D. C. 44; Norris v. Haggin, 136 U. S. 386, 10 Sup. Ct. 942, 34 L. Ed. 424 ; and in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, they are bound by the statute which governs actions at law ; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Despatch Co., 149 U. S. 436, 13 Sup. Ct. 944, 37 L. Ed. 799 ; Baker v. Cummings, 169 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 367, 42 L. Ed. 711. Some claims, not barred by the statute, a court of equity will not enforce because of public policy, and the difficulty of doing full justice when the transaction is obscured by lapse of time and loss of evidence. This is termed the doctrine of laches (q. v.); Sullivan v. R. Co., 94 U. S. 806, 24 L. Ed. 324; Bisph. Eq. § 260.
But in a proper case where there are no laches where there is fraud undiscov ered till the statute has become a bar, or it is the fault and wrong of the defendant that the plaintiff did not enforce his legal rights within the limited time, courts of equity will not hesitate to interfere in the interest of justice, and entertain suits long since bar red at law ; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. (U. S.) 503, 11 L. Ed. 1076; 11 Cl. & F. 714 ; Bisph. Eq. § 203 ; L. R. 8 Ch. App. 398 ; Mead er v. Norton, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 443, 20 L. Ed. 184. But here, again, courts of equity will proceed with great caution; Stearns v. Page, 7 How. (U. S.) 819, 12 L. Ed. 928; and hold the complainant to allegation and proof of his ignorance of the fraud and when and how it was discovered ; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. 390, Fed. Cas. No. 2,437; Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts (Pa.) 401; and the stat ute cannot be taken advantage of by demur rer even though the face of the bill shows a cause of action which is barred; Hubble v. Poff, 98 Va. 646, 37 S. E. 277.
And courts of admiralty are governed by substantially the same rules as courts of equity ; Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mas. 91, Fed. Cas.
No. 17,679 ; 3 Salk. 227 ; Southard v. Brady, 36 Fed. 560; Bailey v. Sundberg, 49 Fed. 583, 1 C. C. A. 387, 1 U. S. App. 101; The South wark, 128 Fed. 149. And, although the stat ute does not apply in terms to probate courts, there seems to be no reason why it should not be applied according to the principles of equity; Paff v. Kinney, 1 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 1. It is so applied in Pennsylvania by the orphans' court.
As TO PERSONAL ACTIONS. Generally per sonal actions must be brought within a cer tain specified time—usually six years or less —from the time when the cause of action accrues, and not after; Hall's Lessee v. Van degrift, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 374; Stewart v. Dur rett, 3 T. B. -Mon. (Ky.) 113; and hereupon, the question at once arises when the cause of action in each particular case accrues.
Cause of action accrues when. The rule, that the Cause of action accrues when and so soon as there is a right to apply to the court for relief, by no means solves the diffi chlty. When does the right itself so to ap
ply accrue? Upon this point the decisions are so numerous and so conflicting, or, per haps more accurately speaking, so controlled by particular circumstances, that no inflex ible rule can be extracted therefrom. In general, it may be said that in actions of con tract the cause of action accrues when there is a breach of the contract. It is also said that whenever there is a plaintiff who can sue and a defendant who can be sued, the statute begins to run ; Lyles v. Roach, 30 S. C. 291, 9 S. E. 334; and a tribunal for such suit ; Collier v. Goessling, 160 Fed. 604, 87 C. C. A: 506. • When a note is payable on demand, the statute begins to run from its date; 2 M. & W. 467; Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 488; Caldwell v. Rodman, 50 N. C. 139; Young v. Weston, 39 Me. 492; Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio 9 ; Laidley v. Smith, 32 W. Va. 387, 9 S. E. 209, 25 Am. St. Rep. 825 ; Mills v. Davis, 113 N. Y. 243, 21 N. E. 68, 3 L. R. A. 394; Dar by v. Darby, 120 La. 848, 45 South. 747, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1208, 14 Ann. Cas. 805. If payable immediately or when requested or called for, it commences to run immediately ; Sanford v. Lancaster, 81 Me. 434, 17 Atl. 402. The deposit of securities as collateral to demand notes does not prevent the run ning of the statute from the date of maturi ty of such notes; Hartranft's Estate, 153 Pa. 530, 26 Atl. 104, 34 Am. St. Rep. 717. The rule is the same if the note is payable "at any time within six years ;" Young v. Weston; 39 Me. 492 ; or borrowed money is to be paid "when called on ;" Darnall's Ex'rs v. Ma gruder, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.) 439. But this is not true of a premium note payable in such portions and at such times as may be necessary to cover losses. There the stat ute only runs from the time of loss, and the assessment thereof ; Howland v. Cuykendall, 40 Barb, (N. Y.) 320; and,the statute runs in the case of an ordinary bank note only ' from demand and refusal; F. & M. Bank of Memphis v. White, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 482, 64 Am. Dec. 772. Until a demand is made for funds deposited in a bank the statute does not begin to run; Starr v. Stiles, 2 Ariz. 436, Pac. 225; and so a demand must first be made by the owner of bank stock for divi dends ; Bank of Louisville v. Gray, 84 Ky. 565, 2 S. W. 168. If a note be payable in certain days after demand, sight, or notice, the statute begins to run from the demand, sight, or notice; Wenman v. Ins. Co., 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 28 Am. Dec. 464; 8 Dowl. & Ry. 374 ; Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487, 24 Am. Rep. 605; demand of a note payable on demand should be made within, the time limited for bringing the action on the note; else a note limited to six years might be kept open indefinitely by a failure to make a de-. mand ; Cadman v. Rogers, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 120. Demand of a bill payable "after sight" or "after notice" should be within a reasonable time; Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mas. 336, Fed. Cas. No. 17,096 ; 9 M. & 506. And when the note is on interest, this does not become bar red by the statute till the principal, or some distinct portion of it, becomes barred; Fer ry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 92. Demand up on a note or due bill, payable on demand, is not a condition precedent to a right of ac tion; Appeal of Andress, 11 W. N. C. (Pa.) 294. The rule, that a promissory note pay able on demand with interest, is a continu ing security, does not apply between holder and maker ; Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581, 1 Am. Rep. 461. If the note be en titled to grace, the statute runs from the last day of grace ; Pickard v. Valentine, 13 Me. 412; Kimball v. Fuller, 13 La. Ann. 602. The indorsement of a promissory note past due, for a valuable consideration, is a new contract, and the statute begins to run in fa vor of the indorser only from the date of the indorsement ; Graham v. Roberson, 79 Ga. 72, 3 S. E. 611. The statute begins to run in favor of the drawer of a check at latest after the lapse of a reasonable time for the presentment of the check; Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644, 56 N. W. 208, 22 L. R. A. 110, 40 Am. St. Rep. 520. Where money is deposited with a person for safe custody, a right of action does not accrue until demand is made therefor : [1893] 3 Ch. 154.