A captain who barratrously loses his ves sel is freed from his liability to the under writer in six years after the last act in the barratrous proceeding ; 1 Campb. 539. Di rectors of a bank liable by statute for mis management are discharged in six years aft er the insolvency of the bank is made known ; Hinsdale v. Lamed, 16 Mass. 68.
In some states a distinction has been taken in cases where a public officer has neglected duties imposed on him by law, and the statute is in such cases said to run only from the time when the injury is de veloped; Bank of Hartford County v. Wa terman, 26 Conn. 324; but see Betts v. Nor ris, 21 Me. 314, 38 Am. Dec. 264; Owen v. Western Say. Fund, 97 Pa. 47, 39 Am. Rep. 794 ; and it has been held that if a sheriff make an insufficient return, and there is in consequence a reversal of judgment, the stat ute runs from the return, and not from the reversal of judgment; Miller v. Adams, 16 Mass. 456. So where a sheriff collects money and makes due return but fails to pay over, the statute runs from the return ; Governor v. Stonum, 11 Ala. 679; or from the demand by the creditor ; Weston v. Ames, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 244. If be suffers an escape, it runs from the escape; 2 Mod. 212 ; if he takes in sufficient bail, from the return of non est in ventus upon execution against the principal debtor ; Mather v. Green, 17 Mass. 60; Har riman v. Wilkins, 20 Me. 93 ; if he receive money on scire f acias, from its reception; Thompson v. Bank, 9 Ga. 413; if he neglects to attach sufficient property, on the return of the writ, and not from the time when the insufficiency of the property is ascertained ; Garlin v. Strickland, 27 Me. 443. The statute runs on a cause of action for wrongful at tachment from the time thereof ; McCusker v. Walker, 77 Cal. 208, 19 Pac. 382; Garrett v. Bicklin, 78 Ia. 115, 42 N. W. 621. An ac tion by a sheriff upon the bond of his deputy for a default accrues when the sheriff has paid the debt occasioned by the default; Ad kins v. Fry, 38 W. Va. 549, 18 S. E. 737; Ad kins v. Stephens, 38 W. Va. 557, 18 S. E. 740.
The same principle applies in cases of torts pure and simple ; Rogers v. Stoever, 24 Pa. 186 ; Lathrop v. Snellbaker, 6 Ohio St. 276.
An action against a recorder of deeds for damages caused by a false certificate of search against incumbrances on real prop erty, must be brought within six years from the date of the search, and not from the date of the discovery of the lien•overlooked, or of the loss suffered by the plaintiff; Owen v. Saving Fund, 97 Pa. 47, 39 Am. Kep. 794;
Russell & Co. v. Abstract Co., 87 Ia. 233, 54 N. W. 212, 43 Am. St. Rep. 381.
A covenant against encumbrances is not broken until eviction or the actual suffering of damage, and no right of action accrues until such time and not until then does the statute begin to run ; In re Hanlin's Estate, 133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189, 126 Am. St. Rep. 938; Seibert v. Bergman, 91 Tex. 411, 44 S. W. 63; and so on a warranty deed; Brooks v. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. 931, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195, 124 Am. St. Rep. 628.
The statute only begins to run as against a surety claiming contribution when his own liability is ascertained ; [1893] 2 Ch. 514.
In cases of nuisance, the statute begins to run from the injury to the right, without reference to the question of the amount of the damage, the law holding the violation of a right as some damage ; 8 East 4; Bo livar Mfg. Co. v. Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. (Mass.) 241; Pastorius v. Fisher, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 27; Lyles v. Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 95, 11 S. W. 782. And so when a party having a right to use land for a specific purpose puts it to other uses, or wrongfully disposes of property rightfully in possession, the statute begins to run from the perversion ; Rogers v. Stoever, 24 Pa. 186. In trover, the statute runs from the conversion ; Melville v. Brown, 15 Mass. 82; 5 B. & C. 149; in replevin, from the un lawful taking or detention. The limitation, in the statute of James, of actions for slan der to two years next after the words spoken, applies only to cases where the words are actionable in themselves, and not when they become actionable by reason of special dam age arising from the speaking thereof; 1 Salk. 206 ; Pearl v. Koch, 32 Wkly. Law Bul. 52. The limitation . extends neither to slander of title ; Cro. Car. 140; nor to libel; Arch. Pl. 29. In cases of trespass, trim. con., etc., the statute runs from the time the injury was committed; Sanborn v. Neil son, 5 N. H. 314.