A nonsuit is in some states held to be within the equity of the statute; Long v. Or rell, 35 N. C. 123 ; Haymaker v. Haymaker, 4 Ohio St. 272 ; but generally otherwise ; Harris v. Dennis, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 236; Ivins v. Schooley, 18 N. J. L. 269 ; Swan v. Little field, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 417. If there are two defendants, and by reason of a failure of service upon one an alias writ is taken out, this is no continuance, but a new action, and the statute is a bar ; Magaw v. Clark, 6 Watts (Pa.) 528. So of an amending bill introducing new parties ; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 61, 8 L. Ed. 320. A dismissal of the action because of the clerk's omission seasonably to enter it on the docket is for matter of form, within the Massachusetts statute, and a new suit may he instituted within one year thereafter ; Allen v. Saw telle, 7 Gray (Mass.) 165; and so is a dis missal for want of jurisdiction, where the action is brought in the wrong county ; Woods v. Houghton, 1 Gray (Mass.) 580. In Maine, however, a wrong venue is not a mat ter of form ; Donnell v. Gatchell, 38 Me. 217. The statute is a bar to an action at law after a dismissal from chancery for want of jurist diction ; 1 Vern. 74 ; Barker v. Millard, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 572. Upon the dismissal of an action the court cannot extend the statu tory period of limitation for bringing a new action ; Humphrey v. Carpenter, 39 Minn. 115, 39 N. W. 67. The dismissal of an action to recover for personal injuries because of failure to file a declaration does not prevent the bringing of a new action within the time allowed after failure of a former pro ceeding, although the statutory period has run since the accident occurred ; La Follette Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S. W. 178, 11 L. It A. (N. S.) 478. Where the original petition states no cause of action whatever, and an amendment is filed after the statute has run, the cause of action is barred; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Bagley, 65 Kan. 188, 69 He. 189, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 259.
Lew fort governs. Questions under the statute are to be decided by the law of the place where the action is brought, and not by the law of the place where the contract is made or the wrong done. If the statute has run against a claim in one state, the remedy is gone, but the right is not extinguished ; and therefore the right may be enforced in another state where the remedy is still open, tlW time limited by the statute not having expired ; 15 East 439 ; Flowers v. Foreman, 23 How. (U. S.) 132, 16 L. Ed. 405; Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray (Mass.) 535. So if the statute of the place of the contract is still unexpired, yet an action brought in another place is governed by the lew Pori, and may be barred ; Nash v. Tupper, 1 Cai. (N. Y.) 402, 2 Am. Dec. 197 ; 5 Cl. & F. 1; Thomas v. Clarkson, 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658. But statutes giving title by adverse possession are to be distinguished from statutes of limitation. Adverse posses sion gives title; lapse of time bars the rem edy only. And a right acquired by adverse possession in the place where the adverse possession is had is good elsewhere ; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 361, 6 L. Ed. 495 ; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. (U. S.) 407, 13 L. Ed. 194 ; Story, Conti. Laws 582. In Pennsylvania, by a later statute an action is barred whenever it is so by the law of the state where the cause of action accrued. So by statute in Kansas; Bruner v. Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 Pac. 165, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775, 123 Am. St. Rep. 172, 14 Ann. Cas. 39. Such a statute has reference only to the primary and original jurisdiction in which the action arose, and does not contemplate other jurisdictions in which a cause of action may arise because a defendant takes up his domicil therein ; McKee v. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780, 125
Am. St. Rep. 82 ; where the action in the original jurisdiction is not barred, but is barred by the statute of another state of which the defendant is a resident, the orig inal action is not barked in a third state which has a comity statute ; Doughty v. Funk, 15 Okl. 643, 84 Pac. 484, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1029.
A court of the United States, whether sit ting in law or equity, must give effect to the statute of limitations of the state where it sits; Dupree v. Mansur, 214 U. S. 161, 29 Sup. Ct. 548, 53 L. Ed. 950.
Public rights not affected. Statutes of limitation do not, on piinciples of public policy, run against a state or the United States, unless It is expressly so provided in the statute itself ; U. S. v. Insley, 130 U. S. 263, 9 Sup. Ct. 485, 32 L. Ed. 968; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 13 Sup. Ct. 418, 37 L. Ed. 259. So a claim against a hospital which is an agency of a state ; Eastern State Hospital v. Graves' Committee, 105 Va. 151, 52 S. E. 837, 3 L. R. A. (N, 746, 8 Ann.
Cas. 701; but not of a foreign government suing for the benefit of an individual; French Republic v. Spring Co., 191 U. S. 427, 24 Sup. Ct. 145, 48 L. Ed. 247; but the United States is entitled to take the benefit of them ; Stan ley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 13 Sup. Ct. 418, 37 L. Ed. 259. No laches is to be im puted to the government; U. S. v. Hoar, 2 Mas. 312, Fed. Cas. No. 15,373 ; People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 228. But this principle has no application when a party seeks his private rights in the name of the state ; Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210; but see Glover v. Wilson,, 6 Pa. 290; U. S. v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 8 Sup. Ct. 1083, 32 L. Ed. 121; U. S. v. R. Co., 142 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. 308, 35 L Ed. 1099. Coun ties, towns, and municipal bodies have no exemption; Armstrong v. Dalton, 15 N. C. 568; City of Ft. Smith v. McKibbin, 41 Ark. 45, 48 Am. Rep. 19 ; City of Bedford v. Green, 133 Ind. 700, 33 N. B. 369 ; but see City of Cincinnati's Lessee y. Presbyterian Church, 8 Ohio 298, 32 Am. Dec. 718. And it is held that municipalities are excluded from the operation of the statute as to the soil of streets; Kopf v. Utter, 101 Pa. 27; but it is said that municipalities may be estopped from disputing title where justice and equity so require ; Dill. Mun. Corp. § 675. But it is held that the exemption extends to coun ties, cities, towns and minor municipalities in all matters respecting strictly public rights ; Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 224 111. 184, 79 N. E. 579, 115 Am. St. Rep. 146, 8 Ann. Cas. 96 ; this rule applies to the collec tion of taxes;. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okl. 761, 98 Pac. 1002; and to highways; Norfolk & W. R. Co. •v. Board of Supervisors, 110 Va. 95, 65 S. E. 531; Quinn v. Baage, 138 Ia. 426, 114 N. W. 205; alsd to a suit by 'a state university ; Cox v. Board of Trustees, 161 Ala. 639, 49 South. 814; and to a suit brought by a county for the collection of school funds; Delta County v. Blackburn, 100 Tex. 51, 93 S. W. 419 ; contra, Clarke v. School Dist. No. 16, 84 Ark. 516, 106 S. W. 677. The statute has been held to run against a county relatively to land bought by it, but not needed, for jail purposes ; War ren County v. Lamkin, 93 Miss. 123, 46 South. 497, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 920. A state statute is no bar to the United States; U. S. T. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, 25 L. Ed 194; U. S. v. Fitts, 197 Fed. 1007. if, however, the sovereign becomes a party in a private enter prise, as, for instance, a stockholder in a bank, it subjects itself to the operation of the statute ; U. S. v. Buford, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 30, 7 L. Ed. 585; Bank of The U. S. v. Mc Kenzie, 2 Brock. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 927. See, generally, Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 13 Sup.' Ct.' 418, 37 L. Ed. 259.