Adverse possession of personal property gives title at the expiration of the statutory period after the possession becomes adverse; Stevens v. Whitcomb, 16 Vt. 124; Mercein v. Burton, 17 Tex. 206. But one who holds by consent of the true owner is not entitled to have the statute run in his favor until denial of the true owner's claim; Lucas v. Daniels, 34 Ala. 188; Ang. Lim. 304, n. ; Baker v. Chase, 55 N. H. 61. But different adverse possessions cannot be linked together to give title; Moffatt v. Buchanan, 11 Humphr. (Tenn.) 369, 54 Am. Dec. 41. The statute acts upon the title to property, and, when the bar is perfect, transfers it to the adverse pos sessor ; but in contracts for payment of mon ey there is no such thing as adverse posses sion, the statute simply affects the remedy, and not the debt ; Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. 248.
A three years' limitation was applied in contempt proceedings; Gompers v. U. S., 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed.
Computation of time. In computing the time limited, much discussion has been had in the courts whether the day when the statute begins to run is to be included or excluded, but without any satisfactory re suit. It is most generally held that when the computation is from an act done, the day upon which the act is done is to be in cluded, and when it is from the date simply, then if a present interest Is to commence from the date, the day of the date is includ ed; but if merely used as a terminus from which to compute time, then the day of the date is excluded ; Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cra. (U. S.) 104, 3 L. Ed. 671; 3 Term 623; Barber v. Chandler, 17 Pa. 48, 55 Am. Dec. 533; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193; Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 605, 14 Am. Dec. 521. This rule, however, of including the day upon which an act is done, is to so many exceptions and qualifications that it can hardly be said to be a rule, and many of the cases are wholly irreconcilable with it. It has been well said that whether the day upon which an act is done or an event hap pens is to be included or excluded, depends upon the circumstances and reasons of the thing, so that the intention of the parties may be effected; and such a construction should be given as will operate most to the ease of the party entitled to favor, and by which rights will be secured and forfei tures avoided; O'Connor v. Towns, 1 Tex. 107; Ang. Lim. c. VI. Fractions of a day are not regarded, unless it becomes necessary in a question of priority ; In re Richardson, 2 Story 571, Fed. Cas. No. 11,777; 8 Ves. 83; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Den. (N. V.) 12; Ken nedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray (Mass.) 316; and then only in some cases, usually in questions concerning private acts and transactions ; In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653, Fed. Cas. No. 17,407. See FRACTION OF A DAY; DAY ; TIME.
Exceptions to general rule. If, when the
right of action would otherwise accrue and the statute begin to run, there is no person who can exercise the right, the statute does not begin to run till there is such a person ; Richards v. Ins. Co., 8 Cra. (U. S.) 84, 3 L. Ed. 496; for this would be contrary to the intent of the various statutes. Thus, if a note matures after the decease of the prom isee, and prior to the issue of letters of ad ministration, the statute runs from the date of the letters of administration unless other wise specified in the statute ; 5 B. & Ald. 204; Wenman v. ins. Co., 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 28 Am. Dec. 464 ; Levering v. Ritten house, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130; Hobart v. Turn pike Co., 15 Conn. 145; and there must be a person in being to be sued, otherwise the statute will not begin to run; Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 129, 6 L. Ed. 575.
But the courts will not recognize exemp tions, where the statute has once begun to run; Douglas v. Irvine, 126 Pa. 643, 17 Atl. 802; Northrop v. Marquam, 16 Or. 173, 18 Pac. 449. So where the statute begins to run before the death of the testator or in testate, it is not interrupted by his death; 4 M. & W. 43 ; Frost v. Frost, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 733 ; Handy v. Smith, 30 W. Va. 195, 3 S. E. 604; Hardy v. Riddle, 24 Neb. 670, 39 N. W. 841; nor by the death of the adminis trator ; Pipkin v. Hewlett, 17 Ala. 291; nor by his removal from the state ; Lowe's Adm'r v. Jones, 15 Ala. 545; nor by the subsequent mental incapacity of a party; De Arnaud v. U. S., 151 U. S. 483, 14 Sup. Ct. 374, 38 L. Ed. 244. So an insolvent's discharge as effectual ly removes him from pursuit by his creditor as absence from the state ; but it is not an exception within the statute, and cannot avail; Sletor v. Oram, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 106; Sacia v. De Graaf, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 356; Col lester v. Halley, 6 Gray (Mass.) 517. A creditor's absence makes it inconvenient for him to return and sue; but as he can so do, be must, or be barred; 17 Ves. Ch. 87 ; Peck v. Trustees of Randall, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 165. And it has ever been held that a statutory impediment to the assertion of title will not help the party so impeded; McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 25, 4 L. Ed. 175; but when a state of war exists between the govern ments of the debtor and creditor, the running of the statute is suspended ; Ross v. Jones, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 576, 22 L. Ed. 730; Bell v. Hanks, 55 Ga. 274; McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140; and it revives in full force on the restoration of peace. See Chancy v. Powell, 103 N. C. 159, 9 S. E. 298. The courts cannot create an exception to the operation of the statute not made by the statute itself, where the party designedly eludes the serv ice of process ; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 320, 9 Sup. Ct. 537, 32 L. Ed. 953.