World War

The Somme.

Great as was the influence of Brusilov's offen sive on German strategy, its effect on the Verdun situation was less immediate, and on June 23 the Germans almost reached the Belleville height, the last outwork of Verdun. Petain made all , ready for an evacuation of the east bank of the Meuse, though to his troops he showed no sign of anxiety, and ever repeated the now immortal phrase, "On les aura!" But on July 1, the long-planned offensive on the Somme (q.v.) began, and from that day on the Germans at Verdun received no new divisions, and their advance died away from pure inanition. Nevertheless, although the Germans at Verdun had fallen short of their object, moral and material, they had so drained the French army that it could play but a slender part in the Allied plan for 1916. The British had now to take up the main burden of the struggle, and the consequence was to limit both the scope and effect of the Entente strategy.

On July I, after a week's prolonged bombardment, the British 4th Army (recently created and placed under Rawlinson) at tacked with 15 divisions on a front of 15 m. north of the Somme, and the French with five divisions on a front of 8 m., mainly south of the river, where the German defence system was less highly developed. The unconcealed preparations and the long bombardment had given away any chance of surprise, and in face of the German resistance, weak in numbers but strong in organiza tion, the attack failed along most of the British front. Owing to the dense and rigid wave formations that were adopted the losses were appallingly heavy. Only on the south of the British front, near Fricourt and Montauban, did the attack gain a real footing I in the German defences. The French, with slighter opposition, and being less expected, made a deeper advance.

This setback negatived the original idea of a fairly rapid pene , tration to Bapaume and Cambrai, and Haig adopted the attrition method of limited advances aimed to wear down the German strength. Rejecting Joffre's desire that he should again throw his troops frontally on the Thiepval defences, the attack was resumed on the southern British flank alone, and on July 14 the capture of the Germans' second position offered the chance of exploita tion, which was not taken. From now onward a methodical but costly advance continued, and although little ground was gained the German resistance was seriously strained when the early onset of winter rains suspended operations in November. The effect, however, can be exaggerated, for it did not prevent the Germans withdrawing troops for the attack on Rumania. But in one re spect the Somme shed a significant light on the future, for on Sept. 15 the first tanks (q.v.) appeared. Their early employment

before large numbers were ready was a mistake; losing the chance of a great strategic surprise, and owing also to tactical mishan dling and minor technical defects they only had a limited success. Although the higher military authorities lost faith in them, and some urged their abandonment, more discerning eyes realized that here was a key which, when properly used, would unlock the trench barrier. The Somme offensive had a further indirect effect, for its relief to the Verdun pressure enabled the French to prepare counter-strokes, carried out by Mangin's corps on Oct. 24 and Dec. 15, which regained most of the lost ground with small casu alties. These economic successes were due to a revival of surprise, to a more elastic use of the limited objective method, and to a high concentration of artillery, with a minimum of infantry, to occupy the defences crushed by the guns.

The Conquest of Rumania.

Rumania, sympathetic to the Entente cause, had been waiting a favourable opportunity to enter the war on their side, and Brusilov's success encouraged her to take the plunge. Her command hoped that this success, combined with the Allied pressure on the Somme and at Salonika, would draw off the German reserves. She might have fared better and contributed more if she had taken the decision earlier, when Serbia was still an active force and Russia a real one. The two years of preparation had doubled the numbers of the Rumanian army, but in reality reduced its relative efficiency, for while other armies had developed with experience, Rumania's isolation and the incapacity of her military leadership had prevented the trans formation of her army from a militia of "bayonet men" into a modern force. He io active divisions had only a low proportion of machine-guns, 5 of the 13 newly formed divisions had none at all, the artillery was inadequate and the air force negligible. She had only six weeks' supply of ammunition at the start and her allies failed to fulfil their guarantees of supply. Moreover, her strategical situation was another source of weakness—her terri tory forming an "L" reversed with the bottom section, Wallachia, sandwiched between Transylvania and Bulgaria, while the length of the frontier was out of all proportion to the depth of the country, with a shortage of lateral railways and the capital within 3o m. of the Bulgarian frontier. Further, she had in the Dobruja, on the other side of the Danube, a "back-yard" strip which offered an easy way of access.