Thus, at the end of September, the Russian retreat, after a nerve-racking series of escapes from the salients which the Ger mans systematically created and then sought to cut off, came to a definite halt on a straightened line, stretching from Riga on the Baltic to Czernowitz on the Rumanian frontier. But the Russian armies had gained this respite at a ruinous price, and their West ern allies had effected little in repayment of Russia's sacrifice on their behalf in Allied Offensive in the West.—For the Franco-British re lief offensive of Sept. 25 had been no more fruitful than its predecessors. The main blow was launched by the French in Champagne (q.v.), in conjunction with a Franco-British attack in Artois, on either side of Lens. One fault was that the sectors were too far apart to have a reaction on each other, but a worse was that the command tried to reconcile two irreconcilable fac tors—they aimed at a break-through but preceded it with a pro longed bombardment which gave away any chance of surprise. Joffre's plan was that the break-through in these two sectors was to be followed by a general offensive on the whole Franco-British front which would "compel the Germans to retreat beyond the Meuse and possibly end the war." The unquenchable optimist! The British attack at Loos (q.v.) was undertaken against the opinion of Haig, whose 1st Army had to carry it out. The Brit ish resources in artillery were still much less than those of the French, and Haig, after personal reconnaissance, reported that the sector was unsuitable for an attack. But Joffre, with the en chantment that distance lends, declared that it was "particularly favourable ground." Sir John French vacillated as usual, but finally ordered the attempt under pressure from Kitchener. The latter, in this reversal of his own previous attitude was apparently influenced by the grave situation in Russia, as well, perhaps, by his reaction from the disappointment at the Dardanelles. But as he had long since declared his view that the Western front was impassable, it is difficult to see how he could feel that a hope less offensive there could bring fresh hope to the Russians. Both in Champagne and Artois the attacks penetrated the forward German positions without difficulty, but the delay in bring ing reserves forward allowed the German reserves to close the gaps, a task simplified by the narrowness of the attack front age. The slight gains of ground in no way compensated for the heavy price paid for them—the Allied loss was approximately 242,000 against 141,000 Germans. And if the Allied commands had gained more experience so had the Germans, in the art of de fence. The British share in this offensive is, however, notable as marking the appearance in strength of the New Armies; at Loos they were "blooded" and if inexperience detracted from their ef fectiveness, their courage and driving force were an omen of Britain's power to improvise a national effort comparable with the long-created military machines of the Continent.
The direction of this effort inspired less confidence, and Sir John French gave place to Sir Douglas Haig as commander-in chief, just as already in September the Russian command had been transferred from the Grand Duke Nicholas, nominally to the Tsar, as a moral symbol, but actually to a new commander-in chief, Gen. Alexeiev, the newly appointed chief of staff.
salient pointing to Austria and flanked on the north by the Aus trian Trentino, on the south by the Adriatic. Bordering on the Adriatic was a stretch of relatively low ground on the Isonzo front but the frontier then followed the Julian and Carnic Alps in a wide sweep round to the north-west. Any advance eastwards inevitably suffered the potential menace of an Austrian descent from the Trentino upon its rear.
Nevertheless, the eastern front, though difficult enough, seemed to offer more prospect of success, besides threatening a vital part of Austria, than an advance northward into the Alps. When Italy was preparing to enter the war Gen. Cadorna, who assumed com mand, drew up his plan on this basis of an offensive eastwards and a defensive attitude in the north. The overhanging menace of the Trentino was mitigated by the expectation of simultaneous pressure upon Austria from Russia and Serbia. But on the eve of Italy's declaration of war this hope faded, the Russian armies falling back under Mackensen's blows, while the Serbs, despite requests from the Allies, failed to make even a demonstration. This enabled the Austrians to despatch five divisions to the Isonzo from the Serbian front, these being relieved by three newly formed German divisions. Even so there were only some eight divisions in all available to oppose the Italians, who had a numerical superiority of more than three to one.
In order to secure good covering positions on the north a limited advance was made into the Trentino, with success, but another into the north-east corner of the frontier salient—towards Tarvis in the Carnic Alps—was forestalled. This local failure was to have unfortunate results later for it left the Austrians with a good strategic sally port into the Tagliamento valley. Meantime the main Italian advance, by the 2nd and 3rd Armies, had begun at the end of May, but out of their total of 14 divi sions only seven were ready. Bad weather increased the handicap, the Isonzo coming down in flood, and the initial advance soon came to a standstill. The Isonzo front crystallized, like the others, into trench warfare. The Italian mobilization, however, was now complete and Cadorna mounted a deliberate attack, which opened on June 23. This first battle of the Isonzo continued until July 7 with little gain to show. A fresh series of efforts after a ten days' pause were hardly more effective, and the front then relapsed into the spasmodic bickering characteristic of trench warfare, while Cadorna made preparations for a new and larger effort in the autumn. When it was launched in October he had a two to one superiority in numbers but was weak in artillery. This defect coupled with the superior experience of the defender rendered the new offensive as barren as its predecessors. It was sustained perhaps too obstinately and when finally broken off on Dec. 5, the Italian loss in the six months' campaign totalled some 280,00o —nearly twice that of the defenders, who had shown on this front a fierce resolution which was often lacking when they faced the Russians.