Ever since the abortive Turk ish attempt to invade Egypt early in 1915, the British had kept large forces there, even when the Dardanelles expedition was cry ing out for troops. When Gallipoli was evacuated, the release of the Turkish forces threatened a fresh move on Egypt. To antici pate this by gaining command of the Sinai desert, Sir Archibald Murray advanced in the spring of 1916, defeating the Turkish forces, freshly arrived, at Romani, Magdhaba and Ra fa. The rate of advance was governed by the time taken in extending a railway and pipe-line (for water) across the desert. This new "Exodus" inspired the British Government to carry out an invasion of Pal estine, at as cheap a cost in troops as possible. The towns of Gaza, on the coast, and Beersheba, 25 m. inland, guarded the ap proach to Palestine. Murray attacked Gaza on March 26, but the attempt fell short when on the brink of success. By nightfall Gaza was practically surrounded but the victorious position was given up bit by bit, not under enemy pressure but on the orders of the executive British commanders, through faulty information, misunderstandings and over-anxiety. Nor did the harm end there for Murray reported the action to the Government in terms of a victory, and without hint of the subsequent withdrawal, so that he was encouraged to attempt, without adequate reconnaissance or fire support, a further attack on April 17-19 which proved a costlier failure against defences now strengthened. (See further PALESTINE, OPERATIONS IN.) The Capture of Gorizia.—The Austrian offensive in the Tren tino had interrupted Cadorna's plans for a renewed effort on the Isonzo, but when the former was halted, Cadorna switched his reserves back to the Isonzo. In preparation for this offensive the whole sector from Monte Sabotino to the sea was entrusted to the Duke of Aosta's 3rd Army, under which 16 divisions were concentrated, against six Austrian divisions. Following a prelim inary feint near the sea on Aug. 4, the attack opened well two days later. North of Gorizia Capello's corps swept over the long impregnable Monte Sabotino, which guarded the approach to the river, and, crossing the river on the night of Aug. 8, occupied the town. This compelled an Austrian retreat on the Carso sector to the south, but attempts to exploit the success eastward failed against fresh positions of resistance. Three more efforts were made in the autumn and if they imposed a wearing strain on the Austrians they caused greater loss to the attackers. During the year Italians had suffered some 483,000 casualties and inflicted 260,000.
1915-16.—Germany's first submarine cam paign—associated by Allied opinion with the name of Admiral von Tirpitz, the exponent of ruthlessness—had been a signal fail ure, both in its meagre results and the disproportionate ethical damage it did to Germany's cause. A series of Notes exchanged between the American and German Governments, culminated in April 1916 in a virtual ultimatum from President Wilson, and Ger many abandoned her unrestricted campaign. The deprivation of this weapon spurred the German navy to its first, and last, attempt to carry out the initial plan on which it had begun the war. On May 3o, 1916, the British Grand Fleet left its bases on one of its periodical sweeps through the North sea, but with reason to expect a possible encounter. On May 31, early in the morning, the
German High Sea Fleet also put to sea, in the hope of destroying some isolated portion of the British fleet.
For such an encounter the British admiral, Jellicoe, had formu lated an outline plan in the early months of the war. Its basis was the cardinal necessity of maintaining the unimpaired suprem acy of the Grand Fleet, which he viewed as an instrument not merely of battle but of grand strategy, the pivot of the Allies' action in all spheres, economic, moral and military. Hence while desirous of bringing the German fleet to battle under his own conditions he was determined not to be lured into mine and sub marine infested waters.
Early in the afternoon of May 31, Beatty, with his battle cruisers and a squadron of battleships, after a sweep to the south was turning north to rejoin Jellicoe, when he sighted the German battle-cruisers, five in number. In the initial engagement two of Beatty's six battlecruisers were hit in vital parts and sunk; when thus weakened he came upon the main German fleet under Ad miral Scheer. He turned north to lure them into reach of Jellicoe, so m. distant, who raced to support him. To describe the intricate and much debated manoeuvres which followed is neither possible nor would it be just within the limits of this article, a strategical and not a tactical survey. Mist and failing light put an end to an indecisive action, which, however, left the British fleet between the German and its bases. During the night Scheer broke through the destroyer guard, and, although sighted, was not reported. Then he slipped safely through a net which Jellicoe dared not draw too close in view of his guiding principle and the danger of torpedo attack.
But if the battle of Jutland (q.v.) could be counted a tactical advantage to the Germans, it had no effect on their strategic posi tion. Britain's command of the sea was intact, and the grip on the blockade on Germany unrelaxed. Once more she fell back on submarine warfare, and the first development was an extension of range. In July one of her new large submarine-cruisers ap peared off the American coast and sank several neutral ships. In British and Mediterranean waters the pressure began seriously to affect the sea-borne trade and food supplies of the Entente. Various remedies were tried—the most effective being a system of sailing in convoys—but the only truly adequate measure, that of penning the Germans in their bases by close-in minefields, was debarred by Britain's failure to obtain a decisive battle success. But if Britain was feeling the strain of economic pressure, so also was Germany, and her leaders feared that the race between de cisive success on land and economic collapse would end against her. The naval authorities declared that a renewal of the "unlim ited" submarine campaign, which with her increased numbers could now be far more intense, would bring the Entente to their knees. Accepting this opinion, Ludendorff consented to a step which he had hitherto opposed, and on Feb. 1, 1917, it was inau gurated—with the full realization that it involved the weight of America being thrown into the scales against them.