These handicaps were accentuated by the divergent counsels of the Allies. While the British General Staff favoured a southward advance against Bulgaria which might have crushed the latter between the Rumanians and the Salonika army, the Russians urged a westward advance which would, in theory, be in closer co operation with their own Bukovina advance. The political and moral advantages of a move into Transylvania led the Rumanians to adopt the second course. This has been much criticized, but without sufficient appreciation of the fact that the advance into Transylvania placed the Austro-German command in an awkward predicament, which might easily have been disastrous if the inva sion had not been so sluggish. At the outset she had 23 divisions against 7 opposing her, but within a week the enemy would be, and were, able to raise this figure to 15.
The Rumanian advance began, on Aug. 27, with three main columns each of about 4 divisions, moving north-west through the Carpathian passes, the general conception being to pivot on the left and wheel the right up into line facing west when the Hun garian plain was reached. To guard the Danube three divisions were left and three more in the Dobruja, whither the Russians had promised to send two—Rumania's original stipulation had been that a force of 150,000 Russians should be sent.
The slow and cautious advance of the Rumanian columns, ham pered by the poverty and destruction of communications, but not by resistance, withheld danger from the five weak Austrian divi sions which covered the frontier and enabled their reinforcement by five German and two Austrian divisions. In fulfilment of the other half of the plan, made by Falkenhayn before his fall, four Bulgarian divisions with Austro-German technical troops were to be placed under Mackensen for the invasion of the Dobruja.
While the Rumanian columns were creeping westward into Transylvania, Mackensen stormed the Turtucaia bridgehead on Sept. 5, destroying the three Rumanian divisions which covered the Danube front, and then, with his flank secure, pressed east wards into the Dobruja. This automatically drew away reserves from, and thereby halted the Rumanian offensive in Transylvania, while Falkenhayn had arrived to take charge. Finding that the Rumanian columns, now at a standstill were dispersed over a 2oo-mile front, Falkenhayn concentrated against the southern column which had crossed the Rother Turm Pass, while using smaller forces to hold off the others. Having thrown this column back through the mountains by a convergent man oeuvre in which the Alpine Corps made a 50-mile march in three days, Falkenhayn then profited by the despatch of the Rumanian reserves against Mackensen to concentrate his forces against the Rumanian centre column at Brasov (Kronstadt). By Oct. 9 he
had driven this back in turn but he missed his greater goal of encircling it,-which would have opened for him a clear passage into Rumania. The mischance jeopardised the whole German plan and almost saved Rumania, for with all the passes still in their hands, her troops sturdily repulsed all efforts to press through on their heels. A prompt attempt by Falkenhayn to swing further south and force a way by the Vulcan and Szurduk passes was foiled and the beginning of the winter snows was on the point of blocking operations when a concentrated last-hour effort at the same point, Nov. 11-17, broke through. It was the signal for the next move in the German plan. Mackensen had switched his main forces westwards, and on Nov. 23 crossed the Danube close to Bucharest, on which both armies now converged. It fell on Dec. 6, and, despite belated Russian aid, the Rumanian forces were driven north into the upper section of the Rumanian "L." The bril liantly co-ordinated German strategy had crippled their new foe, gained possession of the bulk of Rumania, with its oil and wheat, and gave the Russians another 30o m. of front to hold. Sarrail, at Salonika, had not succeeded in detaining the Bulgarian re serves.