It is quite indispensable to the existence of such a system, that no one state should be permitted to obtain such a superiority of power as to enable it to overawe all opposition, and make the safety of those around it dependant on its will ; and as it is the dis position of all unchecked power to extend itself, the balancing system inculcates it to be the interest, as it is the right, of every state to join in opposing the first encroachments of any ambitious potentate or community. It teaches, that the danger extends much farther than to the party immediately at tacked or menaced ; that one encroachment will but pave the way to another; and that it is there fore wise to meet the danger whilst yet distant, and capable of being combated with less peril or loss. The right of interference to put downs danger of this kind is, in fact, only a modification of the right to resist an immediate attack. All human ex. perience shows, that the state which is suffered to alp grandize itself at the expence of one neighbour, will only, with its increased means, acquire stronger dispo.. sitions still farther to encroach ; and, therefore, self• defence authorises us warms that potentate as ekes.
is dy an invader, whose conduct entitles us to conclude, that he only waits a convenient opportunity to be , come so in effect. It is peculiarly and emphatically the language of the balancing system,--Obsta princi piis,—in other words, look well to the safety and in dependence' of your neighbours, even the most re mote, if you wish to preserve your own.
Upon this point it is by no means necessary to enter into any lengthened deductions. The princi ple of interference to prevent the.progress of a dan gerous power rests; both as to right and policy, upon the most obvious dictates of experience and pru dence. No state ever yet acquired a preponderating power without abusing it ; and, therefore, it is the right and interest of all states to prevent any one from rising to such an ascendancy as endanger • the common safety.
The right in question, however, is that of guarding against an injury justly to be apprehended from the conduct of a state, which uses improper means of aggrandizement. So far, therefore, as measures of hostility are concerned, there must beactual encroach ment somewhere in order to warrant them. The ba lancing system does not say there shall be no altera tions in the relative strength of states ; for a state may fairly and honourably increase her power by wise legislation, or by the cultivation of her own internal resources. To attempt to impede a state which travels in this road to greatness, would be to make war upon those very arts by whose successful cul tivation peace and happiness are spread through the world. The aggrandizements against which the balancing system declares war, are those which do immediate violence to some, and which infer farther violence to others. All that nations , can do, when a neighbour becomes formidable in a fair way, is to watch her, and to draw closer those ties of alliance which may enable them to counteract any bad use of her power. When Lord Bacon, in his
Essay on Empire, counsels princes " to keep due centinel, that none of their neighbours do so over grow by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like, as to become more able to annoy them than they were ;" he could not mean that the growth of a state by commerce was to be prevented in the same way as in the case of its ex tension by a Seizure of territory ; but that all great power, however acquired, is in its nature dangerous, and ought to be counterpoised by timely confederation.
There is another way in which a state may become formidable, and that of a sudden, where the balan tern, " that such an increase of power cannot, alone and of itself; give any one a right to take up arms in order to oppose it." (B. iii. c. 3. § 43.) Grotius and Pufl'endorf maintain the same opinion in terms equally decided. But suppose a soxereign, who has already' displayed an encroaching disposition, is about to acquire in this way an accession of power, which would render him more and more formidable to his neighbours ; in this case, as Vattel shows, the maxims of the balancing system authorize an im mediate interference to . procure securities, or, according as the danger is imminent, altogether to prevent his aggrandizement. It is ' perhaps wholly unprecedented, as this writer observes, that a state should receive any remarkable accession of power, without giving other states just grounds to interfere ; but if it should be .otherwise, the only course to be pursued is that which the balancing sys tem always recommends—the keeping a watchful eye on all the proceedings of the formidable state, and the formation of a counterpoise to her power by means of alliances.
These are, indeed, the grand expedients of the balancing system—vigilant inspection to discover, and prompt union to counteract, in their birth, all such projects of encroachment, as powerful states, without any external limitation of their power, will ever, when opportunity offers, be ready to form. By employing resident agents to procure speedy infor mation, and the weight of joint warnings and recla mation in every case of apprehended, or of real in jury, the balancing system offers the only means which human wisdom can devise to control the con duct of independent states ; and the only means which can be employed to guard against injustice, or ob tain redress, without an actual appeal to the sword. It was the .habitual employment of these expedients, with a view to guard against, distant dangers, that distinguished the balancing system, as exemplified in modern Europe, from those momentary efibrts and loose confederacies in which all nations, and even the rudest tribes, have occasionally united, in order to repel or pull down a powerful and common enemy.* Without this habitual attention to foreign affairs, and constant application of the principles of counterpoise, there cannot, indeed, be said to exist any thing like a system of reciprocal guarantee of the independence of nations, such as is involved in the idea of a balance of power.