AMONG States, a most important object of foreign policy, intimately connected with the general peace and independence of nations ; but which some have strangely treated as altogether chimerical, and others as strangely represented as having led only to perni cious results. It is far more generally admitted, how ever, to have a real foundation in the. principles of in tercourse and union among states, and to have exer cised a great and beneficial influence on the affairs of modern Europe. We say of modern Europe, be cause, though the policy in question was not wholly unknown to other ages and countries, it was no where systematically pursued, but among the nations of this quarter of the world. Previous to the sixteenth century, there was little political connection among those nations, their circumstances not being such as to admit of any regulated attention to foreign affairs ; but about the commencement of that cen tury, Europe began to be formed into one grand community or federal league, of which the actuat ing principle was the preservation of the balance of power. The attention to this principle thence forth influenced all the great wars and negotiations, and made every foreign movement, however remote, an object of interest and interference throughout every part of the system.
We shall endeavour to sketch a general outline of this importanf subject ; and, in doing so, we shall notice, though in a brief way, all the principal topics which it seems to 'us to present for discussion. The references which we shall frequently make to other writers, will serve both to illustrate and support our own views, and to point out the sources of more profound and complete information than we have either ability or room to give in this sketch.
I. The ultimate intention of the system founded on a balance of power, is to secure every state in the full possession and enjoyment of all its rights, by making the safety and independence of every state objects of interest and guardianship to all its neighbours. It endeavours to accomplish this great end by teaching, that it is the interest of all states to check the first encroachments of ambition ; to watch every move ment of foreign powers ; and to unite their respec tive forces in support of the weak against the strong. It is called the balancing system, because its aim is to prevent any state from aggrandizing itself to the danger of its neighbours, and to counterpoise any state that may in any way have become powerful, by a union of the forces of other states.
The metaphorical terms applied to this system seem to have given rise to some very absurd miscon ceptions of its true theory and purposes. It has sometimes been supposed, that its object was to equalize the powers of states composing a common system ; and as it is plainly impossible either to effect, or to maintain such an equality, it has thence been concluded, that the whole system is founded upon a chimera. But, with a view to the objects of this system, the question is, not what amount of power above another any state possesses, provided the power so possessed is fairly acquired,—but whether any state possesses its power in such circumstances as to enable it to trespass at its pleasure on a weaker neigh bour. If there is no other state, or confederacy of states, capable of counteracting any injurious de signs which its greater power might induce it to undertake, then it is said that there is no balance ; but if there is such a counterpoise, this is all that the balancing system and not an eqUali zation of forces, to produce what, in its language, is called an equilibrium. In order to obviate such misconceptions, and to make this point as clear as possible, we beg to refer to the following de finitions of the balance of power, as given by Vet tel and by Gents " By this balance," says the former, " is to be understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate or state shall* able absolutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the others." (Law of Nations, B. iii. c. 3. § 47. )—" What is usually termed a balance of power," says M. Gentz, " is that constitution subsisting among neigh bouring states, more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which, no one among them can injure the independence or essential rights of another, without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and, consequently, exposing itself to danger." (Fragments on the Political Balance, c. 1.) Thus, then, it is distinctly to be understood, that the system is not grounded upon an equali ty among states in respect of power, but upon a union of powers to repress the enterprises of the strong and ambitious, and to counteract the effects of necessary individual inequalities by aggregatestrength.