This maxim, indeed, lies so much within the sphere of common sense, that it can scarcely fail to be at tended to, wherever there is a collection of states capable of observing and _attacking each other. But circumstances may be more or less favourable to the growth of a consistent policy in this respect.. In mo dery Europe, a number of considerable states were formed under such circumstances as tended peculi arly to promote a regular intercourse among them, and, consequently, to develope and systematize this great principle of national security. But it did not be gin to manifest itself until, in the gradual and similar progress of European society, the power of the so vereigns of these states was so far consolidated as to enable them to give part of their attention to foreign affairs, and to send and maintain armies beyond their own 'frontiers. It was in Italy, where civilization was more advanced, and where there was a number of small states and commonwealths, whose safety requir ed that their rulers should reciprocally keep watch on each other, that the modern system of interference took its beginnings. From an early period of the fifteenth century, we see the balance of power as constant an object of concern among these states, as, in the next, it came to be throughout Europe. " Their jealousy of each other," says Guiccardini, "made them watch ful of every motion or measure that they conceived might any way increase the power of their neigh bours ;" and he draws a splendid picture of the be neficial effects, the long peace, and general inde pendence attendant upon this habitual attention to the principle in question. (History of Italy, B. i.) It was about the end of this century that these ideas began to extend to other quarters, and to ac tuate the movements of greater potentates. There were now several princes possessed of large consoli dated kingdoms, with powers and prerogatives which enabled them to take part in distant wars and ne gotiations. The first great movement of an ambi tious neighbour, would naturally therefore excite their jealousy, and bring them into concert. Thus, when Charles the Eighth of France, in 1494, invaded Italy, and laid claim to Naples, the sovereigns of Germany and Spain saw the expediency of listening to the Ita lian Princes, who suggested a confederacy to prevent France from gaining an accession of power, which could not but render her a dangerous neighbour. Dr Robertson regards the expedition of Charles as the first great exertion of those new powers, with which the progress of society had invested the prin ces of Europe ; and the confederacy formed against him, as the first considerable extension of those ideas of a balance of power, whose influence had hitherto been limited to the narrow sphere of Italian politics. " From this era," he says, " we can trace the progress of that intercourse between nations, which has linked the powers of Europe so closely together, and can discern the operations of that provident policy, which, during peace, guards against remote and con tingent dangers, and in war has prevented rapid and destructive conquests." ( View of the Progress of So ciety in Europe, sect. 2.) If we look only a little way beyond this era, we shall everywhere see a con stant jealousy of the increase of power, and a vigi lant attention to all foreign operations, combined with the application of those means of ;day which peculiarly belong to the balancing system. " During that triumvirate of kings," says Lord Bacod, in his usual expressive language, " Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First of France, and Charles the Fifth, Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would atraightways balance it, either by confedera tion, or, if need were, by a war ; and would not, in any wise, take up peace at interest." (Essays—on Em pire.) It has been objected to Dr Robertson, much to our surprise, we will confess, considering the very intelligent quarter from which the objection comes, that he has represented " the principle of the balance of power as a discovery made by the Italian politicians in consequence of this invasion of Charles; whereas, it was not to any such single event that the balancing system owed either its origin or refine ment ; but to the progress of society, which placed the whole states of Europe in the same relative situa tion in which the states of Italy were at that period, and taught them not to wait for an actual invasion, but to see a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that should manifest the least desire of change." (Brougham's Colonial Po licy, B. III. S 1.) What is here said as to the origin of the balancing system is no doubt true. We have already stated, that the principle on which it rests, is a principle of our common nature, which . cannot fail to manifest itself in certain situations; but that nations must have arrived at an advanced stage of civilization and intercourse, before it can be act ed upon with -consistency and concert.. It would, therefore, be absurd to represent that system as tak ing its rise in any single event, or its principle as a discovery of some long-sighted statesman. But Dr Robertson knew human nature too well to seek the origin of this principle in an accidental occurrence ; and he knew history too well to fix its origin " as a consequence " of Charles's invasion. On the contra ry, throughout the whole of his masterly chapter on the progress of the nations of Europe, with respect to the command of the national force requisite in fo reign operations, he speaks of this system as holding progress with the growing improvement and inter course of these nations ; and so far from representing the principle of the balance of power as a discovery consequent upon the event alluded to, he expressly speafs of the league against the French monarch, as only exemplifying an extension of those ideas which had long been familiar to the Italian statesmen, "in re gulating the operations of the petty states in their own country." ( View of the Progress of Society, sect. 2.) Before concluding these very remarks on the rise of the balancing system in modern times, we shall briefly advert to a conjecture of M. Villers up. on this subject, which occurs in his able work on the Reformation. Long before the states of Europe became united in a general system, Italy and Ger many, he observes, had formed partial systems, with a view to restrain the members within them, each by the other, and thus maintain a balance of power. It is possible, he adds, that the idea of the general ba lance of Europe may have been copied from these partial confederacies. (Essai Siff d f bffittenal de la Reformation, 2de Partie.) This conjecture, if we rightly understand the learned author, appears to us exceedingly unphilosophical. The states of Europe embraced the idea of a balance of power in proportion as their circumstances enabled- them to act upon it ; and not in consequence of any estimate of its effects, as displayed on those earlier and narrower stages of its agency.
III. It appears, then, to have been about the begin ning of the sixteenth century that the principle of main taining a balance of power came to be generally re cognised and acted upon by the states of Europe; " at first," as M. Gentz says, " more in a practical
way, and, as it were, from political instinct, but after wards with clear, reflecting, and methodical constan cy." (Fragments.) What were the advantages which Europe reaped from this course of policy, we shall endeavour to show, after we have adverted to certain arguments generally employed by those who wish to give an unfavourable view of the balancing system.
By some, this system is represented as produc tive only of sanguinary wars, as but a convenient pretext to cover projects of ambition, or to screen the restless movements of national jealousy. Others talk of it as being merely a brilliant conception ; and appeal to the many violences and usurpations which modern history records, as proofs, if not of its nonentity, at least of its inefficacy. But there is surely but little respect due to that sort of estimate of the system, which is founded solely on the abuses to which it is liable, or upon imperfections from which no human institution can be made fi v.e. They who decry, or who ridicule the balancing system, should be prepared to show,—not that it has sometimes afforded plausible pretexts for unnecessary wars, or has sometimes failed to protect the weak against the outrages of the strong,—but that it is wholly useless to interest ourselves in the safety of neigh bouring nations ; to take any trouble to avert dan gers which are yet distant; or to seek to strength en. ourselves against a powerful enemy, with any strength not our own. This view of things, were it to prevail, would, as M. Gentz observes, open the most desirable prospects to every sovereign whose power and ambition might prompt him to aspire to universal domination.
It must, we think, appear abundantly obvious to every one who reflects calmly upon the subject, that the balancing system is, upon the whole, greatly fa vourable to peace. The wars 'which peculiarly be long to it, are in the nature of a sacrifice of a smaller present, to secure a greater future good ; and the tendency of the system is to render these wars less and less frequent. The evil passions which give rise to ambitious attacks, like all other evil passions, will be more aet to be indulged, the less exposed they are to opposition or restraint. And it cannot be questioned, that in proportion as the maxims of this system are steadily pursued, there will . ., V .
be less inducement, because less prospect of success to ambitious undertakings.
Its object is to alarm, and to arm all against the prince whose power prompts him to transgress upon others; and the prince who knows that all his mo tions are keenly watched, and that his first successes would only expose him to a more extended contest, must see how hopeless would be any attempt to pos sess himself of the territories even of the weakest of his neighbours. Such is the general tendency of the system ; and however it may have. occasionally failed to prevent outrages, it cannot be doubted, that it has proved a formidable barrier against conquest, and a rampart of defence to the weaker states.
The complaint of a certain class of French poli ticians, alluded to by Mr Burke, in his Letters on a Regicide Peace, " that Rome had frequently acquir ed more territory in a single year, than all the power of France, actuated by all her ambition, had enabled her to acquire in two centuries," forms, in fact, though unintended, one of the finest panegyrics that could have been pronounced upon the salutary influence of the modern system. The advocates of that system can, in deed, appeal to history for the most satisfactory of all proofs of its efficacy, in the remarkable fact, that, for a period of nearly three centuries, no European state, however small, lost its independence from ex ternal violence. When we recollect the number of small states which, during so long a period, enjoyed an independent existence on the immediate frontiers of powerful nations ; and reflect for a moment on those evil passions which have, in all ages, prompted the strong to prey on the weak ; we must admit that, but for that salutary jealousy of power, and united resistance to its encroachments, which it was the object and office of this system to nourish and enforce, these otherwise helpless states would have been speedily absorbed, or their independence speedily hilated, by the mighty masses with which they were in contact. It was not the preservation of such countries as Portugal or Holland, of Sweden or Denmark, which, though small compared with many others in the system, were yet possessed of consider able means of self-defence ;—it was not the preserva tion of such states as these merely, but of a multi tude of feeble, though happy communities, in Ger many, in Switzerland, and Italy, which affords the proudest proof of the salutary influence of the ba lancing system on the fortunes of modern Europe. " Consider, for instance," to use the impressive words of a distinguished writer and orator, " the,situation of the republic of Geneva ; think of her defenceless position in the very jaws of France ; but think also of her undisturbed security, of her profound quiet, of the brilliant success with which she applied to in dustry and literature, while Lewis the Fourteenth was pouring his myriads into Italy before her gates; call to mind that happy period, when we scarcely dreamt more of the subjugation of the feeblest republic of Europe, than of the conquest of her mightiest em pire ; and say, whether any spectacle can be imagined more beautiful to the moral eye, or which affords a more striking proof of progress in the noblest prin ciples of true civilization." (Mackintosh's Speech on the Trial of John Peltier, in MS.) Such were the great and noble results of the sys , tem founded on the balance of power. It was a bri dle upon the strong, and a bulwark to the weak. When it failed to prevent the inroads of violence and injustice, it yet acted as a restorative principle, and replaced injured nations in their former state of inde pendence. It was at the memorable and fatal era of the partition of Poland in 1772 that it first lost this character,—that the first example was set of a deliberate, successful, unchecked conspiracy, against the independent existence of an unoffending coun try. It is here proper to mention, that some authors have spoken of this infamous transaction in terms which seem to imply, that it was quite in consonance with the principles of the balancing system. • It is indeed true, that the maxims of that system were still so far operative as to effect a relative equality in the division of the spoil. But, as the whole intention of this system is to maintain the integrity and indepen dence of nations against unlawful attacks, the parti tion was just as diametrically opposite to its princi ple, as if the whole spoil had been appropriated by one robber, instead of being shared by three. The equality of the division did not take away from the danger of the example ; the example of states com bining, not to uphold bet to destroy,—not to enforce respect to the great principles of national safety, but to set them at defiance ; an example too soon fol lowed by similar violences, and which, in fact, paved the way to that total overthrow of the ancient sys tem of Europe which ere long took place.