What particular alliances each state ought to form, with a view to maintain this bahince, is a matter of circumstances, and must vary with them. The ob ject of the system is always the same, to preserve such a distribution of power amidst the varying re lations of states, as shall most effectually check the spirit of encroachment, and confine every potentate to his own dominions.
In the preceding observations, we have had it in view to give a general idea of the nature, intention, and means of maintaining a balance of power among a number of connected nations of different degrees of power and magnitude. ,,Before proceeding to any remarks on the history and results of this branch of policy, we shall recapitulate, in the words of M. Gentz, those fundamental maxima which constitute the necessary conditions of the beneficial existence of such a system as we have described. These are, " That no one state in the common system must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together;— "That, if the system is not merely to exist, but to be maintained, without constant perils and violent concussions, every member which infringes it must be in a condition to be coerced, not only by the col lective strength of the other members, but by any majority of them, if not by one individual ;—and, " That if ever a state attempts, by unlawful en terprise, to attain, or does in fact attain, to a degree , of power, which enables it to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even of the whole, such a state should be used as a common enemy ; and 'if it has acquired that degree of force by an accidental concurrence of circumstances, with out any acts of violence, whenever it appears upon the public theatre, no means which political wisdom can devise for the purpose of diminishing its power, should be neglected or left untried." ( Fragments up on the Political Balance, c. 1.) II. The knowledge of the ancients in regard to these great principles of national safety, and the period when they came to obtain a decided influence among the moderns, are points of considerable historical interest. Mr Htnne has shown, in a very satisfac tory manner, that the principle of preserving a ba lance of power, is distinctly to be recognised in many of the great political transactions of the an cient nations. The anxiety of the Greeks, with regard to it, was particularly manifbsted in that famous league against the rising power of Athens which produced the Peloponnesian war. Athens herself showed, that she both knew and practised this po licy, by constantly throwing her power into the lighter scale, when Thebes and Sparta came to contend for the mastery of Greece. Mr Hume also traces the in , fluence of this salutary principle in the contests which arose among the successors of Alexander ; their attention to it having " preserved distinct, for several ages, the partitions made after the death of that conqueror.' (Essays, Vol. I.) The ora
tions of Demosthenes frequently display very clear and extensive views in this branch of policy. In that for the Megalopolitan, in 'particular, " we may see," according to Mr Hume, " the utmost refinements on the balance of power that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist ;" and by a later writer, this speech is also pointed out as " containing discussions of some of the most de licate parts of the theory." (Brougham's Colonial Policy, B. iii. § 1.) All who peruse this remarkable oration with due attention, must indeed perceive that it fully bears out this character: Its reasonings may be analyzed into these leading doctrines of the balan. cingsystem,—that it is the interest of every state to prevent the formation of a predominating power; that to this end the first encroachments ought to be promptly checked; and that it is necessary to join even a rival against a former friend, when that friend would otherwise infringe upon the balance.• It seems, in short, to be no longer a question, that it was only with the phrase, and not the idea, of a balance of power, that the ancients were unac quainted. But we cannot agree with Mr Hume when he goes so far as to say, that this principle, though it has been more generally known and ac knowledged in modern times, has not had an autho rity much more extensive in practice, than in the an cient world. (Essays, Vol. 1.) This opinion stands clearly refuted by all the great facts, and by the whole tenor of modern history, from the commencement of the sixteenth century. It was the more constant operation of that principle which gradually formed the nations of Europe into one great republic or fe deral league, whose common bond of union was the guarantee which it afforded of their respective inde pendence. But neither, on the other hand, can we agree with Mr Brougham, when he- affirms that the ancient states displayed nothing beyond a mere spe culative knowledge in this department. ( Colonial Po licy, B. iii. § 1.) 4 It may be very true, that those more enlarged ideas of foreign policy, which De mosthenes disclosed in some of his orations, were not generally understood or acted upon by his contem poraries; but it is nevertheless perfectly clear, from Mr Hume's statements, the accuracy of which has never been called in question, that among the Grecian states, the maxim of preserving a balance of power, though it had not produced any course of policy so regular and authoritative as the modern international system, was yet, on many occasions, the sole mov ing spring of their wars and alliances.