origin of a project so pernicious in its con sequences is a matter of some interest in the his tory of the balancing system. We learn, for the first time, from Rulhiere's Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne, published in 1807, that the distrac tions of this country had suggested the project of a partition so early as 1658 ; that a Swedish minister, named Stippenbach, proposed it to his own court, to,Austria, and the GrandDuke of Prussia, whose armies were then in possession of the country ; and that it would, in all probability, have been acted upon, but for the discovery of the scheme by France, and consequent interference of that power. t With regard to the project actually carried into execution in 1772, each party concerned was desirous to shift the blame of the first proposal to the others ; but it was generally believed to have originated with Frederick, though some were of opinion, that he was indebted for the idea to his brother, Prince Henry. Frederick, however, in one of his posthumous pieces, Memoires de 1763 jusqu'a 1775, states, that the scheme was devised by the Empress Ca tharine ; and this is corroborated by M. Rulhiere, who asserts that she communicated it to Prince Henry, during his visit to St Petersburgh in 1770 ; a piece of information, he adds, which was detailed to him, in the most circumstantial manner, by three different secretaries, who ac companied the Prince to the Russian Court. (Tom. IV. p. 151, 210.) It seems to be generally ac knowledged, that the proposal, when first made to the cabinet of Vienna, was opposed by that power ; and that her accession would not have been obtained, but for the astonishing apathy dis played by. France, and, indeed, by all the other states of Europe. The silence of England during the perpetration of this shameless plot against the independence of nations, if it can be accounted for, can never, at any rate, be excused ; inasmuch as the fact appears pretty well established, that, had she, as the guardian of the political balance, If raised her voice against the partition, Europe might have been saved from the fatal effects of that 0' new system of robbery and oppression, which the spoilers of Poland were suffered, without any sort of interruption, to exemplify. " To my certain know ledge, says Mr Burke, " if Great Britain had at that time been willing to concur in preventing the execution of a project so dangerous in the example, even exhausted as France then was by the preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterprising prince, abe would have at every risk taken an active part in this business." ( Thoughts on French affairs in 1791.) It would lead us much beyond our limits to detail that long series of violences, and transfers of dominion, too faithfully copied from the ex ample of the first and succeeding partitions of Po land, by which all remains of the ancient sys tem were for a season swept from the earth. • We more gladly proceed to observe, that the time has again arrived when the nations of Europe may and ought to unite, not, indeed, to rebuild the ancient edifice in its former proportions, that being rendered impossible from the many melancholy changes which have taken place; but carefully to recal, and steadi ly to adhere to those great principles which consti tuted its foundation, and to which it owed all its beauty and strength. It is not enough to have over thrown a power which domineered over all, and to have reinstated some other powers in their pristine strength and influence. The foundations of the : ancient structure were first sapped by a shame less disregard of the sacred principles of 'pub: lie justice; and if the balance of power, in the full and sound acceptation of the term, is again to be come an object of the foreign policy of nations, those guardian principles must hereafter constitute the rules of their conduct, in all the public transactions of Europe. Let us here again quote the words of M. Gentz, written in 1806, in a too early hope of the ap proaching deliverance of the Continent. He is speak ing of the transition which in that event ought to fol low " to a state of things founded upon a balance of power." In order to this, says he," every just and con scientious government must set it down as an un changeable maxim, never henceforth to lend an ear to plans which are not founded in the strictest equity. In the next place, though, in the proper sense of the term, a general code of laws cannot be framed for the regulation of a confederacy of states, at least no means should be left untried, to procure for this maxim a com mon sanction, and the solemn ratification of treaties. In every considerable alliance, in every treaty of peace, particularly in every congress composed of several considerable powers, the parties must mutually engage themselves not to extend• their territory by unjust means ; and not to enter into any scheme or associa tion directed against the rights or possessions of an independent state, by whatever name it may be called, whether of dividing, of rounding, of concen
of uniting, or of indemnifying themselves for other losses. A sort of anathema must also be pronounced by anticipation against all such as shall project such violations of right, or call upon others to assist them ; so that a lively conviction may be again established in the public mind, that when princes and states enter into combinations with one another, their objects are protection and defence against common danger, never the attack and inva sion of the innocent.' (Fragments, cap. S.) Whether
these precepts of this great enemy of the late am bitious ruler of France, and advocate of those by whom he was overthrown, were taken as the guides of that " Congress of Powers," which lately met for the purposes of general pacification, we shall leave to others to determine ; but thus much our pre sent subject requires us to state, that; without a return in good earnest to those sound and salutary maxims, no durable peace is to be hoped for Europe, and no restoration of that system of balance by which Europe was so long distinguished and protected.
IV. We have still to allude, and we can here but barely allude, to the great question, whether Britain, protected as she is on all sides by nature, ought to consider it as a necessary part of her policy to attend to the European balance of power ? This has been considered as constituting a separate question, by some who make no doubt that the other states of Europe could not long preserve their independence se . sure through any other course. Taking the question generally, we do not think there is any great difficulty in regard to it. With the multitude, to be sure, it always will be popular to argue, that Britain stands in need of no other defence than what the seas and her invincible navy afford her, and that all continental connexions are useless or pernicious. But the argument from the advantages of our insular situation would not in fact bear out this conclusion, even were the seas and the navy a stronger defence than it is possible they always can be. Our commerce and our colonies, the supports of that navy, render it indispensably necessary that we should more particularly observe some nations, and ally ourselves with others. These great concerns make it, indeed, nothing less than absurd•to talk of our being insulated as an empire or state because Britain is an island. And, with re gard to invasion, it is clear, that we could not al ways be as secure, and as free from uneasy apprehen sions, in a state of total insulation from foreign con nexions, as with friends and confederates to employ or oppose a formidable enemy on his awn confines.
But supposing the balante of power to constitute a great national object, the line of conduct which 1 that object imposes upon us may, no doubt, be affected by our insular situation. We may on some occasions allow other nations who are more exposed to danger, and who ought, on that account, to be more on the alert to prevent encroachments, to take the first measures, and bear the first ekpence of resistance. We may watch and warn, and use the influence of our remonstrances and our counsels, without having recourse, except in urgent cases, to the extremity of arms. It is only, in a word, as to the application of the general principle, and not as to its being necessary and worthy to be entertained, that there seems any fair room for difference of opi nion among British statesmen. In point of fact, all our later statesmen, however differing in other re spects, have distinctly assented to the general doc trine, that the maintaining a balance of power was an interest of the highest importance to England. The last time, we believe, that this general question can be said to have been fairly brought into debate, and fully discussed in Parliament, was on occasion of the famous armament against Russia for refusing to re store Ocazakow to the Porte ; and on that occasion, though Mr Fox and his followers reprobated the arma ment in the strongest terms, they did so, not because they denied the great principle to which the minister appealed, as the sole justification of the measure, that the balance of power was a British concern, and gave Britain an undoubted interest to interfere in the affairs of the Continent,—not because they thought that Britain ought never to guard against any distant danger,—but because there was no such degree of danger from the retention of that city and its district,' as called upon this country to interfere at the risk of a war. • If there be any certain medium between the po licy which Britain and other countries ought to observe with a view to the balance 'of power, we do not know that it can be pointed out in more specific terms than in the following passage of one of Lord Bolingbroke's political pieces, with which we shall conclude this article. " Other nations must watch over every motion of their neighbours ; penetrate, if they can, every design ; foresee every minute event; and take part, by some engagement or other, in almost every conjuncture that arises. But as we cannot be easily nor sudden ly attacked, it may be our interest to watch the secret workings of the several councils abroad ; to advise and warn ; to abet and oppose ; but it never can be our true interest easily and officiously to enter in to action, much less mto engagements that imply action and expence." (Idea of a Patriot King.)