MARNE, THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE (Sept. 1914), the first great turning point in the World War. A strategi cally decisive victory for the Allies, it brought the rapid and appar ently resistless advance of the German hosts through Belgium and France to a halt and forced them to retire northwards. The French reckon in the battle only the Armies west of Verdun, thus excluding Dubail's and de Castelnau's Armies' in Alsace Lorraine ; the Germans include the whole front from Belfort round to Paris, and, as they attacked on this with all their seven Armies and the fighting east of Verdun formed an important part of their plan, their definition is followed here.
After the "Battles of the Frontier" in the later part of August and the retreat of the French and British forces, Gen. Joffre at tempted to lengthen his line to the westward and prevent en velopment of the Allied left flank by collecting near Amiens on the left of the British Expeditionary Force a new army, under Gen. Maunoury, formed of divisions drawn from other parts of the line. Before this Army could be completely organized, its leading divisions came into contact with the enemy and became involved in the general retirement.
At this period the B.E.F., under Field-Marshal Sir John French, consisted of : Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir D. Haig) 1st Division (Maj.-Gen. S. H. Lomax), 2nd Division (Maj.-Gen. C. C. Monro).
Corps (General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien), 3rd Division (Maj.-Gen. H. I. W. Hamilton), 5th Division (Maj.-Gen. Sir C. Fergusson).
Corps (Maj.-Gen. W. P. Pulteney), 4th Division (Maj.-Gen. T. D'O. Snow), with 19th In fantry Brigade attached.
The Cavalry Division (Maj.-Gen. E. H. H. Allenby), of 4 cavalry brigades, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade.
The Royal Flying Corps (Brig.-Gen. Sir D. Henderson) of 5 squadrons.
Lines of Communication troops.
The German Movements and Orders Before the Battle. —As the German pursuit proceeded, Gen. von Kluck, command ing the German I. Army on the extreme west of the line, which had fought at Mons and Le Cateau and occupied Amiens, came to the conclusion that the B.E.F. and Maunoury's troops were
routed and practically dispersed, and that Gen. Lanrezac's Army on the right of the British was in consequence the left of the French line. The action of Lanrezac in attacking at the battle of Guise (Aug. 29-31), without assistance on his left, confirmed him in these views. In conjunction, therefore, with Gen. von Billow (II. Army), instead of continuing the advance in order to cross the Seine below Paris, as ordered, Kluck on Aug. 31 wheeled south-eastwards past the northern front of the French capital, with the object of striking the supposed French flank. After some of his advanced troops and his cavalry corps had been roughly handled by the British on Sept. 1, he turned south, but subsequently resumed his south-eastward course. The German Supreme Command at first accepted Kluck's views, but on Sept. 4 Gen. von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff and virtual Commander-in-Chief, became alarmed. Information reached him that the French were passing divisions from east to west, and that there were considerable assemblies of troops near Paris. On the evening of the 4th he despatched to the seven German Armies, warning messages, which he consolidated into a formal operation order on the 5th. This order brought to an end the great wheel that was to sweep the French into Switzerland, and substituted for it a plan by which the Paris forces were to be held off by the I. and II. Armies, whilst the other five armies attacked and en 'For the sake of clearness, the French Armies are called by the names of their commanders; the Germans by their numbers.
veloped what remained of the French forces. The supreme com mand operation order, the only one issued in regard to the battle, is of such importance that the greater part of it is quoted : "The enemy is bringing up new formations and concentrating superior forces in the neighbourhood of Paris to protect the cap ital and threaten the right flank of the German Armies.