"The I. and II. Armies must therefore remain (sic) facing the east front of Paris. Their task is to act against any operations of the enemy from the neighbourhood of Paris and to give each other mutual support to this end.
"The IV. and V. Armies are still operating against superior forces. They must maintain constant pressure to force them south-eastwards . . . Whether by co-operating with the VI. and VII. Armies they will then succeed in forcing any considerable part of the enemy's forces towards Swiss territory cannot yet be foreseen.
"The VI. and VII. Armies will continue to hold the enemy in position in their front, but will take the offensive as soon as possible against the line of the Moselle between Toul and Epinal, securing their flanks against these fortresses.
"The III. Army . . . will be employed as the situation de mands either . . . to support the I. and II. Armies or to co operate . . . in the fighting of our Armies on the left wing." Regardless of the fact that the I. Army was beyond the Marne going south, it was ordered to remain, facing west, between the Oise and the Marne, and the II. Army, not yet across the Marne, was ordered to remain between that river and the Seine. The II. Army took immediate steps to obey this order; Billow order ing his right corps as pivot to halt and the remainder to wheel forward so as to change front from south to west. The first stage of the wheel, to be carried out on the 6th, was to be to the line Montmirail–Marigny, a position not quite reached by the II. Army when the battle came to an end on the 9th. The I. Army continued its advance on Sept. 5 towards the Seine, Kluck re porting that he considered it best to settle with the French armies in the field first and then invest Paris. He, however, began preparatory steps for facing west, and when, in the afternoon, the representative of the supreme command, Lieut.-Col. Hentsch arrived, he approved of the preparations, but added that "the movement to face west might be made at leisure ; no special haste was necessary." Thus on the afternoon of September 5 four corps of the I. Army were across the Grand Morin, with two cavalry corps ahead of them; but there was only a weak flank guard, the IV. Reserve Corps (3 infantry brigades) and the remains of the 4th Cavalry Division (smashed up by the British on Sept. I) in echelon behind its right flank. The II. Army was a day's march behind the I., still facing south; the other German Armies were acting in conformity with their orders.
The French and British Movements and Orders.—The change of direction, to the south-east, of the German I. Army had been observed and reported by British aviators on the morn ing of Sept. 3, and they added at 5 P.M. that it was crossing the Marne. At 7 P.M. Maunoury reported that there were no German troops west of a line Paris–Senlis; at 8:45 P.M. the British found that there was only one German corps (IV. Reserve) left in the Ourcq valley. All this information was fully confirmed on the 4th. Gen. Joffre, however, did not at once change his plans. Three days previously on Sept. 1, by instruction No. 4, sent out by officers in motor cars at 2 P.M., he had provisionally fixed as the limit of the retirement the moment when his armies were situated as follows :— "Sarrail's army north of Bar de Duc ; De Langle's army, behind the Ornain east of Vitry; Foch's army behind the Aube, south of Arcis; Lanrezac's army, behind the Seine, south of Nogent."
On the 2nd, at II:40 P.M., he had by a note changed this limit and put the general line on which his forces as a whole should establish themselves considerably farther back on the right. It was defined by Joinville, Brienne, Arcis, Nogent and Pont sur Yonne.
The British were to be behind the Seine, close to Paris, from Melun to Juvisy, their left in touch with Maunoury's Army, now part of the garrison of the entrenched camp of Paris. The Mili tary Governor of Paris, Gen Gallieni, who had been warned on Sept. 3 (apparently about 8 A.m.) that his troops in the eventual offensive would be required to act in the direction of Meaux, seems to have been the first to realize that there was no time to lose in taking advantage of the tremendous opportunity that the Germans were offering by their flank march past Paris. At 9 A.M. on the 4th he proposed to Gen. Joffre by telephone to use his forces at once to attack from north of Paris eastwards against the German flank. The French commander-in-chief replied at noon by telegraph approving of the idea, but preferring that the attack should be made south not north of the Marne, which meant postponement and loss of time. Joffre then set about en suring the co-operation of the B.E.F., and about 4 P.M. received through the mission at Sir John French's headquarters at Melun, to which Gallieni had paid a visit, a definite assurance of the fullest support. Meantime he had been in communication with d'Esperey—now in command, vice Lanrezac of the V. Army— as to the condition of his troops and when they could attack. Between 5 and 8 P.M. two telegraph messages arrived from d'Esperey—the exact hour cannot be fixed, the times of receipt are not marked, but they are between letters received at 5 P.M. and 8 P.M. In these he stated that he could not attack before the 6th, and that Gen. H. Wilson, the sub-chief of the general staff of the British army, who was with him, agreed that the B.E.F. could be on the line Coulommiers–Changis on that date. Gen. Joffre had meantime fixed on the 7th. In the evening, however, Gallieni on return from British G.H.Q. again telephoned personally to him informing him of the measures taken for the eastward march of the Army of Paris and urging him that there was not a moment to be lost, with the result that Joffre definitely in formed Gallieni that the general attack would take place on the 6th, and that he might attack north of the Marne as he wished, and gave him a summary of his orders, in which the destination of the B.E.F. as mentioned above was specified. Orders were then prepared, and telegraphed in cypher timed ri :15 P.M. on Sept. 4, to Maunoury and d'Esperey, :50 P.M. to Foch and Gallieni, and 12:10 A.M. on the 5th to British headquarters. Duplicates were sent by motor car General Joffre's orders directed the forces on the left of his line to take up positions during Sept 5 ready to attack on the front and flank of the German I. and II. Armies on the morning of the 6th. Maunoury was to be north-east of Meaux, ready to cross the river Ourcq eastwards in the direction of Château Thierry; the B.E.F. to advance to the line Coulommiers–Changis, ready to move north-eastwards; d'Esperey to fall back to the line Sezanne-Courtacon, and then attack northwards ; Foch was to cover the right of d'Esperey by holding the exits of the Marais de St. Gond.