On the left, the 4th Division (Snow) had started at 4 :45 A.M. with the intention of crossing at La Ferte sous Jouarre. It found both bridges over the Marne, there nearly a hundred yards wide and very deep, broken (they had been blown up by the French in the retreat) ; the enemy were holding the farther bank at all likely points of passage. About i P.M., two battalions, followed later by a third, managed to cross by a weir a mile above La Ferte, and another battalion crossed at a railway viaduct 3m. above. But by this time, 2 : 3 o P.M., the Germans had abandoned the defence of the passages, and were making off. Conneau's cavalry on the British right did not begin crossing the Marne at Azy just below Château Thierry until i P.M. (Palat), and did not get up level with the British I. Corps until the latter had halted for the night. Meanwhile, farther east, Foch was again heavily attacked, particularly on his right, but d'Esperey was making good progress, driving back Billow's right, so that he was able to lend Foch a division. The latter therefore withdrew Grossetti's division from his left in order to restore the combat on his right by counter-attack.
On the British left, Maunoury's left was being forced back on the exterior defences of Paris, for he had against him the addi tional weight of the greater part of Kluck's III. and IX. Corps, which had now reached the battlefield, and also the fourth brigade of the IV. Reserve Corps which had appeared from Ant werp on his outer flank. But the farther the German I. Army ad vanced from the Ourcq the more it suffered from the fire of the heavy guns of the Paris defences, which had been brought into the field, and had already taken heavy toll of it in the previous three days' fighting. Where, therefore, the enemy seemed to be advancing—opposite Foch's right and against Maunoury—further progress was unlikely and a decision impossible. Kuhl goes even farther, and says:— "Even a victory over Maunoury could not prevent us [I. Army] from having our left flank enveloped by superior force, and from being driven away from the main army. The I. Army stood isolated." At this crisis, at i P.M., the Germans began their retirement from the battlefield.
What happened at I. Army (Kluck) headquarters is not quite so clear. There are two distinct versions, those of Lieut.-Col.
Hentsch, the emissary of the supreme command, and Gen. von Kuhl, Kluck's chief of the staff. Hentsch had been despatched by Gen. von Moltke at midday on the 8th to visit the V., IV., III., II. and I. Armies in succession, a round trip of doom. According to the court of enquiry, the proceedings of which Ludendorff pro mulgated to the general staff, Hentsch was given full powers to co-ordinate a retreat, "should rearward movements have been initiated"—and he was despatched by Moltke in full expectation that such movements had been begun. Hentsch found none had taken place in the V., IV. and III. Armies, and then spent the night of the 8th-9th at II. Army headquarters, where he observed a spirit of depression and pessimism. He left early on the morning of the 9th, before definite orders for the retreat had been given, but apparently convinced that they would soon be given. Owing to blocks and panic on the road, it was past midday when he ar rived at I. Army headquarters, taking seven hours to go 6om.; he did not see Gen. von Kluck, dealing only with Kuhl. Hentsch states that he found orders for retirement had already been issued. Kuhl denies this, but admits that such orders had gone out by telephone owing to the overzeal of a subordinate officer, since dead, who had misunderstood him. What, according to Kuhl, had been ordered at II :3o A.M., and was in course of execution in view of the British advance, was a wheel backwards of the left only of the I. Army. Thus Kuhl's contention is that Hentsch, in view of the situation of the II. Army, ordered the I. to retreat and quoted his full powers given for the purpose of co-ordinating a retire ment. Hentsch's statement is to the effect that the retirement had been decided on, and that he merely gave Kuhl the direction in which the I. Army was to retire, north-eastwards, so as to join up with the II. Army. The court of enquiry accepted Kuhl's view, adding, however, that Hentsch was justified "as the case provided for in his instructions, the initiation of rearward movements, had arisen." A curious feature of the events at German I. Army head quarters is that Kuhl, by his own account, accepted Hentsch's verbal instructions without requiring that so important a decision should be in writing, and without taking him to see Kluck, the army commander. In one of the books that he has written on the battle he has admitted that : "The break-through of the British and the French V. Army which was threatening brought about the decision in the battle of the Marne." At 2 P.M. the retirement of the I. Army in the general direction of Soissons was begun. Its preliminary movements having brought it from facing west to facing south-west, and all the roads having been cleared by sending back the transport and trains, it was a comparatively easy matter. But, owing to the direction of the British advance, the I. Army could not incline inwards towards the II. Army and retreated due north, still leaving a gap in the German line. The German withdrawal, covered by rear guards, was not immediately obvious. It was not until 3 P.M. that the British I. Corps resumed its advance, and then owing to its fatigue only a short one was made to a line 5m. from the Marne. The left (5th) division of the II. Corps remained in contact with the enemy until dusk. It was not until 9 P.M. that the 4th Division on the extreme left was able to begin a bridge over the Marne at La Ferte, ten of its 16 battalions (including the 19th Brigade) being then still south of the river. Conneau's Cavalry Corps had crossed the Marne at Château Thierry, and now came up along side the I. Corps but none of d'Esperey's infantry had reached the Marne. In Foch's Army Grossetti's division brought from the left to counter-attack arrived too late to follow the enemy except with a few shells. It was not until 5 P.M. that Maunoury, after a hard day's fighting in which he had been reinforced by every man that Gallieni could send from the Paris garrison, was able to report that the Germans were in retreat, covered by their artillery.