The German IV. Army, assisted by half of the III. Army, encountered de Langle, who stood on the defensive and then counter-attacked. After severe fighting on his flanks (actions of Revigny and Vitry), the Germans failed to make ground. By the morning of the 9th, the Germans were reduced by the French artillery fire to seeking what shelter they could in trenches and dead ground. Thus on the eastern half of the battlefield, where the Germans were the attackers, they had the worse of the fight ing and there was no decision.
The II. Army (Billow) and the other half of the German III. Army co-operating with it were at the opening of the battle facing nearly south, half-way between the Seine and Marne. Opposite them were Foch's army and the right of d'Esperey's. The former general—owing to his having received Joffre's orders of Sept. 4 in time to act on them—was actually in contact with the enemy. Severe fighting at once ensued near the Marais de St. Gond. But it was not Billow's object to break through. He was merely pivoting on his centre so as to change from facing south to facing west towards Paris, between the Seine and the Marne, endeavouring to reach the line Montmirail-Marigny. Thus heavy pressure was brought on Foch, and he was forced back and had to call on d'Esperey for help. But, with the assist ance of the X. Corps lent by d'Esperey and of the XVII. Corps sent by Joffre to fill the gap between his army and de Langle's, Foch was able to remain in the line and fulfil his task of guarding the flank of Joffre's main attack of the left wing—d'Esperey, French and Maunoury.
The Allied Left Wing.—It has been seen how on the morn ing of the 6th Kluck (I. Army) had withdrawn the II. and IV.
Corps to succour his flank guard threatened by Maunoury on the Ourcq. This left in front of d'Esperey and French the right half of the German II. Army (the pivot of Billow's wheel), the IX.
Corps, and two cavalry corps. During the day d'Esperey made no progress but the B.E.F. gained ground against a weakening opposition, about 5m. on the right, which had to wait for the French, and I 2M. on the left. Maunoury also made an advance, and so dangerous did it appear that on the morning of the 7th Kluck summoned the IX. and III. Corps from their place in the line next to the II. Army, and sent them also back across the Marne to join the rest of his army on the Ourcq. These two corps were thus marching on the 7th and 8th, and were wasted so far as the battle went ; for they only appeared opposite Maunoury on the 9th. In the great gap, some 3om. wide, left in the German front by the removal of the I. Army were now only two cavalry corps (which contained five lager battalions and extra machine-gun companies) and some infantry detachments, and no one was appointed to take command of them as a whole.
The way through the German front appeared almost open : the Germans themselves had created a gap in their front such as, in the succeeding years of trench warfare, each side strove in vain to batter through its opponent's line. Unfortunately Gen. Joffre's plan, like the famous Plan XVII. with which the campaign had been opened, took no account of ground. In Aug. 1914 the French were committed to an offensive into the defiles of the Vosges and the forests of the Ardennes, where they were am bushed by the enemy. Now the advance of d'Esperey and the B.E.F. was confronted by a series of transverse rivers, the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin and the Marne, all passable only at the bridges, some of which had been destroyed by the French in the retreat. Nevertheless, in very hot, dry and dusty weather, the Allies forced the passage of the Grand Morin on the 7th and of the Petit Morin on the 8th. The German resistance in the gap was practically broken, and there was every chance of cutting off Kluck and falling on his rear, although he hastily despatched first a composite brigade and then the 5th Division to stop the British. On the evening of the 8th Sir John French's five divi sions were close up to the Marne. D'Esperey, having farther to go, was not within reach of the river; but his right had driven back the right of the German II. Army and widened the gap. Mau noury's army (of seven divisions, only two of which were active troops, the rest being reserve), had ceased to make any progress against the six divisions of the German I. Army, to reinforce which four more were now on the way.
Sept. 9th: The Passage of the Marne.—Early on Sept. 9 the British cavalry, driving off the Germans, seized two bridges over the Marne below Château Thierry; the 6th Infantry Brigade secured another, and by 7 :30 A.M. the I. Corps (Haig), the right of the B.E.F. was beginning to cross the river. In the centre, the II. Corps (Smith-Dorrien) found two bridges intact and unde fended, and by 9 A.M. the vanguards of both its divisions were across. Reports were now received from the Flying Corps that there were large masses of Germans north of Château Thierry (actually the German 5th Cavalry Division and infantry attached to it), and the I. Corps, as there were no French troops across the river on its right, halted and began to entrench to secure itself against a counter-stroke. As the French historian, Gen. Palat, has written, "our Allies were very notably ahead of Con neau's Cavalry Corps, which itself was bound to outpace the V. Army (d'Esperey)." The head of the 5th Division, the left of the II. Corps, met with considerable resistance after crossing from a German composite brigade, and the 3rd Division, learning this and finding the I. Corps on its right at a standstill, also halted.