The evening reports from the air confirmed that everywhere along the battle line retrograde movements of the enemy were taking place ; but, his main bodies having got a good start during the day, and his rear guards being able to slip off in the darkness, there was no pursuit until next day, and then Joffre's instructions to Maunoury were to gain ground to the left and endeavour to envelop the enemy's right ; the order to head the columns off by flanking them from the west was not issued until the 13th. The German I. and II. Armies were thus able to pursue their way prac tically undisturbed back to the Aisne, there to make another stand. The gap between them was then filled by fresh troops released by the capitulation of Maubeuge. At 5 P.M. on the loth orders were sent by the supreme command to the IV. Army to retire, and at noon on the 1 i th to the V. Army. The VI. and VII. Armies had ceased their attacks on the 9th and retired to a selected line.
The Victory.—At 8:15 P.M. on the 9th Sir John French's or ders changed the word "advance" of the previous days to "pur suit"; Gen. d'Esperey, in an order issued from the historic field of Montmirail on the same evening, accurately summarized the battle :— "Held on his flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is now retreat ing towards the east and north by forced marches." The Germans had entered Belgium and France with 78 divi sions, excluding cavalry divisions. Of these they only managed to bring 44 divisions on to the great front between Verdun and Paris, 22 divisions being engaged on the Alsace-Lorraine front, four sent back to East Prussia and eight (XV., III. Reserve, IX. Reserve Corps) kept from the battle at the investments of Antwerp, Maubeuge, etc. The French, with 23 divisions in Alsace-Lorraine against 22 German, had 51 divisions and five British divisions on the Verdun-Paris front. Thus there were 56 Allied divisions against 44 German. The French Reserve divisions were not up to the standard of the German Reserve formations, but all the Allied divisions in falling back had received reinforcement, whilst the Germans hampered by the destruction of the railways and handi capped by the very rapidity of their advance, had not been able to get up drafts to fill the gaps in their ranks, so that as regards actual combatants, numbers were still more in favour of the Allies.
Neither the French nor the Germans have yet published their losses, but the Allies captured 38,00o prisoners and i6o guns be sides other trophies including colours.
The moral effect of the victory both on the Allies and on the Germans was immense, for the legend of German invincibility was broken. That the material and tactical results were not more im portant is due partly to the immense fatigue of the Allies after the earlier battles, the long retreat of 13 days and a four-day battle in summer heat. But it would seem to be partly due to the direc tion of the main Allied attack having been frontal and across the courses of several rivers. Greater success would no doubt have been achieved had Maunoury's flank attack, between the rivers, been made stronger. Possibly his army would have done better even if it had been no stronger but composed of better troops ; for it consisted of only two active divisions (7th and 14th), badly mauled in the frontier fighting, an Algerian division and four Re serve divisions shaken by fighting near Amiens. Had some of the 14 British Territorial Force Divisions and 14 mounted brigades with the 6th Division, still in England, been landed at the Channel coast ports to fall on the German communications and rear, a decisive tactical result might have been obtained and the war finished. In any case, with such addition to their forces, the Allies would have been better placed to have obtained a decision in the "Race to the Sea," in which actually they were always "an army corps too few and 24 hours too late." BIBLIOGRAPHY.-British Official History of the Great War: "Mili tary Operations France and Belgium, 1914," vol. i., 1922 (where there is a bibliography) ; "Les Armies Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, tome i. vol. ii., 1925 (which takes the narrative to Sept. 5 only) ; Reichsarchiv's Der Weltkrieg 1914-18, Band 3 and Band 4 (the latter containing a bibliography). (J. E. E.)