The Russian War of 1812

The emperor was now in the direst perplexity. Kutusov was hovering on the outskirts of the city, his main body at Kaluga, some marches to the south-west, where he was in full communica tion with the richest portion of the empire ; and now news arrived that St. Cyr, who had relieved Macdonald on his extreme left, had only 17,00o men left under arms against upwards of 40,000 Russians under Witgenstein ; and to the south Tschitschagov's army, being no longer detained on the Turkish frontier, where peace had been made, was marching to join Tormassov about Brest-Litovsk with forces which would bring the total of the two well over 1 oo,000 men. Meanwhile Schwarzenberg's force oppos ing these had dwindled to a bare 30,000.

The French army was thus disposed almost in an equilateral triangle with sides of about 570m., with 95,00o men at the apex at Moscow opposed to 120,00o, 30,00o about Brest opposite oo, 000, and 17,000 about Drissa confronted by 40,00o, whilst in the centre of the base at Smolensk lay Victor's corps, about 30,000.

From Moscow to the Niemen was 55o miles. In view of this situ ation Napoleon on Oct. 4 sent General Lauriston to the Russian headquarters to treat. While waiting his return Murat was en joined to skirmish with Kutusov, and the emperor himself worked out a scheme to assume the offensive with his whole army towards St. Petersburg, calling in Victor and St. Cyr on the way. This project was persisted with, until on the 18th Murat was himself attacked and severely handled (action of Tarutino or Vinkovo). On the morning of the 19th the whole army moved out to accept this challenge, and the French were thoroughly worsted on the 24th in the battle of Maloyaroslavetz.

The Retreat from Moscow.

Then began the celebrated re treat. It has generally been forgotten that the utter want of march discipline in the French, and not the climatic conditions, was responsible for the appalling disasters which ensued. Actually the frost came later than usual that year, Oct. 27, and the weather was dry and bracing ; not till Nov. 8 did the cold at night become sharp. Even when the Beresina was reached on Nov. 26, the cold was far from severe, for the slow and sluggish stream was not frozen over, as is proved by the fact that Eble's pioneers worked in the water all through that terrible day. But the French army was already completely out of hand, and the degree to which the panic of a crowd can master even the strongest instinct of the indi vidual is shown by the conduct of the fugitives who crowded over the bridges, treading hundreds under foot, whilst all the time the river was easily fordable and mounted men rode backwards and forwards across it.

To return to the actual sequence of events. Kutusov had been very slow in exploiting his success of the 24th and indeed had be gun the pursuit in a false direction; but about Nov. 2, head quarters of the French being at Vyazma, the Cossacks became so threatening that the emperor ordered the army to march (as in Egypt) in hollow square. This order, however, appears only to have been obeyed by the Guards, with whom henceforward the emperor marched.

Kutusov had now overtaken the French, but fortunately for them he made no effort to close with them, but hung on their flank, molesting them with Cossacks and picking up stragglers. Thus the wreck of the Grande Armee, now not more than fifty thousand strong, reached Smolensk on the 9th and there rested till the 14th. The march was then resumed, the Guard leading and Ney commanding the rearguard. Near Krasnoi on the 16th the Russian advanced guard tried to head the column off. Napoleon halted a whole day to let the army close up; and then attacked with his old vigour and succeeded in clearing the road, but only at the cost of leaving Ney and the rearguard to its fate. By a night march of unexampled daring and difficulty Ney succeeded in break ing through the Russian cordon, but when he regained touch with the main body at Orcha only Boo of his 6,000 men were still with him (21st).

The Beresina.

From here Napoleon despatched orders to Victor to join him at Borisov on the Beresina. The cold now gave way and thaw set in, leaving the country a morass, and inf or mation came that Tschitschagov from the south had reached Borisov. He now selected Viesselovo as the point of passage and at r A.M. on the 23rd sent orders to Oudinot to march thither and construct bridges. In the execution of these orders Oudinot encoun tered the Russian advanced guard near Borisov and drove the lat ter back in confusion, though not before they had destroyed the existing bridge there. This sudden reassumption of the offensive threw Tschitschagov into confusion. Thus time was gained for Vic tor also to come up and for Oudinot to construct the bridges at Studienka near the above-mentioned place, but a spot in many respects better suited for the purpose. Thither therefore Napoleon sent his pontonniers under General Eble, but on their arrival they found that no preparations had been made and much time was lost. Meanwhile Victor, in doubt as to the real point of passage, had left the road to Studienka open to Wittgenstein, who had fol lowed hard on his heels.