The Russian War of 1812

The allies, aware of the gradual strengthening of their enemy's forces but themselves as yet unable to put more than 200,000 in the field, had left a small corps of observation opposite Madgeburg and along the Elbe to give timely notice of an advance towards Berlin; and with the bulk of their forces had taken up a position about Dresden, whence they had determined to march down the course of the Elbe and roll up the French from right to left. Both armies were very indifferently supplied with information, as both were without any reliable regular cavalry capable of piercing the screen of outposts with which each endeavoured to conceal his disposition, and Napoleon, operating in a most unfriendly country, suffered more in this respect than his adversaries.

'Napoleon always gave their number as 300,000, but this was never attained.

On April 25 Napoleon reached Erfurt and assumed the chief command. On this day his troops stood in the following positions: Eugene, with Lauriston's, Macdonald's and Regnier's corps, on the lower Saale ; Ney in front of Weimar, holding the defile of Kosen; the Guard at Erfurt, Marmont at Gotha, Bertrand at Saal feld, and Oudinot at Coburg, and during the next few days the whole were set in motion towards Merseburg and Leipzig, in the now stereotyped Napoleonic order, a strong advanced guard of all arms leading, the remainder—about two-thirds of the whole— following as masse de manoeuvre, this time, owing to the cover afforded by the Elbe on the left, to the right rear of the advanced guard.

Meanwhile the Russians and Prussians had concentrated all available men and were moving on an almost parallel line, but somewhat to the south of the direction taken by the French. On May t Napoleon and the advance guard entered Liitzen. Witt genstein, who now commanded the allies in place of Kutusov, hearing of his approach, had decided to attack the French ad vanced guard, which he took to be their whole force, on its right flank, and during the morning had drawn together the bulk of his forces on his right in the vicinity of Gross-Gi5rschen and Kaya.

Battle of Liitzen.

About 9 A.M. on May 2 he began an attack on the French advance guard in Liitzen, whilst the remainder of his army was directed against Napoleon's right and rear. Just as the latter were moving off the heads of the French main body suddenly appeared, and at i i A.M. Napoleon, then standing near the Gustavus Adolphus monument on the field of Liitzen, heard the roar of a heavy cannonade to his right rear. He realized the situation in a moment, galloped to the new scene of action, and at once grouped his forces for decisive action—the gift in which he was supreme. Leaving the leading troops to repulse as best they might the furious attack of both Russians and Prussians, and caring little whether they lost ground, he rapidly organized for his own control a battle-reserve. At length when both sides were exhausted by their efforts he sent forward nearly a hundred guns which tore asunder by their case-shot fire the enemy's line and marched his reserve right through the gap. Had he possessed an

adequate cavalry force the victory would have been decisive. As it was, the allies made good their retreat and the French were too exhausted for infantry pursuit.

Perhaps no battle better exemplifies the inherent strength of the emperor's strategy, and in none was his grasp of the battlefield more brilliantly displayed, for, as he fully recognized, "These Prussians have at last learnt something—they are no longer the wooden toys of Frederick the Great," and, on the other hand, the relative inferiority of his own men as compared with his veterans of Austerlitz called for far more individual effort than on any previous day. He was everywhere, encouraging and compelling his men—it is a legend in the French army that the persuasion even of the imperial boot was used upon some of his reluctant conscripts, and in the result his system was fully justified, as it triumphed even against a great tactical surprise.

Bautzen.

As soon as possible the army pressed on in pursuit, Ney being sent across the Elbe to turn the position of the allies at Dresden. This threat forced the latter to evacuate the town and retire over the Elbe, before blowing up the stone bridge across the river. Napoleon entered the town hard on their heels, but the broken bridge caused a delay of four days, there being no pontoon trains with the army. Ultimately on May i8 the march was renewed, but the allies had continued their retreat in leisurely fashion, picking up reinforcements by the way. Arrived at the line of the Spree, they took up and fortified a very formidable position about Bautzen (q.v.). Here, on the 20th, they were attacked and fixed by Napoleon; but the intended decisive coup by which Ney was to arrive on their right rear on the 21st missed its mark owing to Ney's want of initiative and rigid adherence to the letter of his orders. As a result the allies were able to break off the action at their own time and retire in such good order that the emperor failed to capture a single trophy as proof of his victory. The enemy's escape annoyed him greatly, the absence of captured guns and prisoners reminded him too much of his Russian experiences, and he redoubled his demands on his corps commanders for greater vigour in the pursuit. This led the latter to push on without due regard to tactical precautions, and Blucher took advantage of their carelessness when at Haynau (May 26), with some twenty squadrons of Landwehr cavalry, he surprised, rode over and almost destroyed Maison's division. The material loss inflicted on the French was not very great, but its effect in raising the moral of the raw Prussian cavalry and increasing their confidence in their old commander was enormous.