The Russian War of 1812

THE RUSSIAN WAR OF 1812 Whilst the campaign of 1809 had shaken the faith of the mar shals and the higher ranks in the infallibility of the emperor's judgment, and the slaughter of the troops at Aspern and Wagram had still further accentuated the opposition of the French people to conscription, the result on the fighting discipline of the army had, on the whole, been for good. The panics of Wagram had taught men and officers alike a salutary lesson. Aware of the growing feel ing against war in France, Napoleon had determined to make his allies not only bear the expenses of the coming campaign, but find the men as well, and he was so far master of Europe that of the 363,00o who on June 24 crossed the Niemen no less than two thirds were Germans, Austrians, Poles or Italians. But though the battlefield discipline of the men was better, the discipline in camp and on the march was worse, for the troops were no longer eager to reach the battlefield, and marched because they were compelled, not of their own goodwill. The result was apparent in a sudden diminution in mobility, and a general want of punctuality which seriously influenced the course of the campaign. On the other hand, the Russians, once their fatherland was invaded, became dominated by an ever-growing spirit of fanaticism, and they were by nature too obedient to their natural leaders, and too well inured to the hardships of campaigning, to lose their courage in a retreat.

By the middle of June 1812 the emperor had assembled his army along the line of the Niemen. On the extreme right stood the Austrian contingent under Schwarzenberg (34,00o men). Next, centring about Warsaw, a group of three corps (70,000 men) under the chief command of Napoleon's brother Jerome. Then the main army under Napoleon in person (220,000 men; with 8o,000 more under the viceroy of Italy on his right rear) ; and on the extreme left at Tilsit a flanking corps, comprising the Prussian auxiliary corps and other Germans (in all 40,000 strong). The whole army was particularly strong in cavalry; out of the 450,00o, 8o,000 belonged to that arm, and Napoleon, mindful of the lessons of 1807, had issued the most minute and detailed orders for the supply service in all its branches, and the forwarding of rein forcements, no less than ioo,000 men being destined for that purpose in due course of time.

Information about the Russians was very indifferent ; it was only known that Prince Bagration (with 43,000 men) lay grouped about Wolkowysk; Barclay de Tolly (who had about 13o,000) about Vilna; and on the Austrian frontier lay a small corps under Tormassov (40,00o) in process of formation, while far away on the Turkish frontiers hostilities with the sultan retained Tschit schagov with 5o,000 more. Of the enemy's plans Napoleon knew nothing, but, in accordance with his usual practice, the dispositions he had chosen met all immediate possible moves.

Opening of the Campaign.

On June 24 the passage of the Niemen began in torrid heat which lasted for a few days. The main army, with the emperor in person, covered by Murat and the cavalry, moved on Vilna, whilst Jerome on his right rear at once threatened Bagration and covered the emperor's outer flank. From the very first, however, the inherent weakness of the vast army, and the vicious choice of time for the beginning of the advance, began to make themselves felt. With crops still green, and nothing else available as forage for the horses, an epidemic of colic broke out amongst them, and in ten days the mounted arms had lost upwards of one-third of their strength ; men died of sunstroke in numbers, and serious straggling began. Still everything pointed to the concentration of the Russians at Vilna, and Jerome, who on July 5 had reached Grodno, was ordered to push on. But Jerome proved quite inadequate to his position, listening to the complaints of his subordinates as to want of supplies and even of pay ; he spent four whole days in absolute inertia, notwithstanding the emperor's reprimands. Meanwhile the Russians covered by stubborn rearguards made good their retreat—Barclay towards the entrenched camp of Drissa on the Dvina, Bagration towards Mohilev.