The Russian War of 1812

Still the allies continued their retreat and the French were unable to bring them to action. In view of the doubtful attitude of Austria, Napoleon became alarmed at the gradual lengthening of his lines of communication and opened negotiations. The enemy, having everything to gain and nothing to lose thereby, agreed finally to a six weeks' suspension of arms. This was per haps the gravest military error of Napoleon's whole career, and his excuse for it, "want of adequate cavalry," was the strongest testimony as to the value of that arm.

As soon as a suspension of arms (to Aug. 15) had been agreed to, Napoleon hastened to withdraw his troops from the dangerous position they occupied with reference to the passes leading over the mountains from Bohemia, for he entertained no doubt now that Austria was also to be considered as an enemy. Finally he decided to group his corps round Gorlitz and Bautzen whence they could either meet the enemy advancing from Breslau or fall on his flank over the mountains if he attempted to force his way into Saxony by the valley of the Elbe. This latter manoeuvre depended, however, on his maintenance of Dresden, and to this end he sent the I. Corps up the Elbe to Pirna and Konigstein to cover the fortifications of Dresden itself. His instructions on this point deserve the closest study, for he foresaw the inevitable attraction which a complete entrenched camp would exercise even upon himself, and, therefore, limited his engineers to the construction of a strong bridge head on the right bank and a continuous enceinte, broken only by gaps for counter attack, around the town itself.

Then he turned his attention to the plan for the coming cam paign. Seeing clearly that his want of an efficient cavalry pre cluded all ideas of a resolute offensive in his old style, he deter mined to limit himself to a defence of the line of the Elbe, a po sition of waiting from which he could make a spring, of not more than a few days' duration, at any target the enemy might present.

Reinforcements had been coming up without ceasing and at the beginning of August he calculated that he would have 300,000 men available about Bautzen and i oo,000 along the Elbe from Hamburg via Magdeburg to Torgau. With the latter he deter mined to strike the first blow, by a concentric advance on Berlin (which he calculated he would reach on the 4th or 5th day), the movement being continued thence to extricate the French garri sons in Kiistrin, Stettin and Danzig. The moral effect, he promised himself, would be prodigious, and there was neither room nor food for these i oo,000 elsewhere. Towards the close of the ar mistice he learned the general situation of the allies. The crown

prince of Sweden (Bernadotte), with his Swedes and various Prussian levies, 13 5,000 in all, lay in and around Berlin and Stettin ; and knowing his former marshal well, Napoleon con sidered Oudinot a match for him. Blucher with about 95,000 Russians and Prussians was about Breslau, and Schwarzenberg, with nearly i8o,000 Austrians and Russians, lay in Bohemia. In his central position at Bautzen he felt himself equal to all his enemy's combinations.

Dresden.

The advance towards Berlin began punctually with the expiration of the armistice, but with the main army he him self waited to see more clearly his adversaries' plans. At length becoming impatient he advanced a portion of his army towards Bliicher, who fell back to draw him into a trap. Then the news reached him that Schwarzenberg was pressing down the valley of the Elbe, and, leaving Macdonald to observe Blucher, he hur ried back to Bautzen to dispose his troops to cross the Bohemian mountains in the general direction of Konigstein, a blow which would have had decisive results. But the news from Dresden, where the construction of the defences was still incomplete, was so alarming that at the last moment he changed his mind, and sending Vandamme alone over the mountains, he hurried with his whole army to the threatened point. This march remains one of the most extraordinary in history, for the bulk of his forces moved, mainly in mass and across country, 9om. in 72 hours, entering Dresden on the morning of the 27th, only a few hours before the attack of the allies commenced. For the events which followed see DRESDEN (battle).

Dresden was the last great victory of the First Empire. By noon on Aug. 27 the Austrians and Russians were completely beaten and in full retreat, the French pressing hard behind them, but meanwhile Napoleon himself again succumbed to one of his unaccountable attacks of apparent intellectual paralysis. He seemed unaware of the vital importance of the moment, crouched shivering over a bivouac fire, and finally rode back to Dresden, leaving no specific orders for the further pursuit. The allies, how ever, continued to retreat, but unfortunately Vandamme, with his single corps and unsupported, issued out of the mountains on their flank, threw himself across their line of retreat near Kulm, and was completely overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers (29th). In spite of this misfortune, Napoleon could claim a brilliant suc cess for himself, but almost at the same moment news reached him that Oudinot at Grossbeeren near Berlin, and Macdonald on the Katzbach opposed to Bliicher, had both been severely defeated.