During the next two days the emperor examined his situation and, after discussing on paper the respective hypotheses of a spring at Prague or at Berlin, summed up in favour of the second. But his consideration of this proj ect was interrupted by news which indicated that the conse quences of Macdonald's defeat had been far more serious to the moral of that command than he had imagined. He immedi ately rode over to establish order, and his manner and violence were so improper that Caulaincourt had the greatest difficulty in concealing the scandal. Bliicher, however, hearing of his arrival, at once retreated and the emperor followed, thus uncovering the passes over the Bohemian mountains, a fact of which Schwarzen berg was quick to take advantage. Learning of his approach, Napoleon again withdrew to Bautzen. Then hearing that the Austrians had counter-marched and were again moving towards Dresden, he hastened back there, concentrated as many men as could conveniently be handled, and advanced beyond Pirna and Konigstein to meet him. But the Austrians had no intention of attacking him, for time was now working on their side and, leav ing his men to starve in the exhausted district, the emperor again returned to Dresden, where for the rest of the month he remained in an extraordinary state of vacillation. On Oct. 4 he again drew up a review of the situation, in which he apparently contemplated giving up his communications with France and wintering in and around Dresden, though at the same time he was aware of the distress amongst his men for want of food.
In the meanwhile Bliicher, Schwar zenberg and Bernadotte were working round his flanks. Ney, who had joined Oudinot after Grossbeeren, had been defeated at Dennewitz (Sept. 6), the victory, won by Prussian troops solely, giving the greatest encouragement to the enemy. Sud denly Napoleon's plans are again reviewed and completely changed. Calling up St. Cyr, whom he had already warned to remain at Dresden with his command, he decided to fall back towards Erfurt, and go into winter quarters between that place and Magdeburg, pointing out that Dresden was of no use to him as a base and that if he had a battle, he had much better have St. Cyr and his men with him than at Dresden. He then on Oct. 7 drew up a final plan, and this he immediately proceeded to put into execution, for he was now aware of the danger threatening his line of retreat from both Blucher and Schwarzenberg and the North Army; yet only a few hours afterwards the portion of the order relating to St. Cyr and Lobau was cancelled and the two were finally left behind at Dresden. From the loth to the 13th Napoleon lay at DUben, again a prey to the most extraordinary irresolution, but on that day he thought he saw his opportunity. Blucher was reported near Wittenberg, and Schwarzenberg was moving slowly round to the south of Leipzig. The North Army under Bernadotte, unknown to Napoleon, lay on BlUcher's left around Halle. The emperor decided to throw the bulk of his force on Blucher, and, having routed him, turn south on Schwarzenberg and sever his communications with Bohemia. His concentration was effected with his usual sureness and celerity, but whilst the French moved on Wittenberg, BlUcher was march ing to his right, indifferent to his communications as all Prussia lay behind him. This move on the 14th brought him into touch with Bernadotte, and now a single march forward of all three armies would have absolutely isolated Napoleon from France ; but Bernadotte's nerve failed him, for on hearing of Napoleon's threat against Wittenberg he decided to retreat northward, and not all the persuasions of Blucher and Gneisenau could move him. Thus
if the French movement momentarily ended in a blow in the air, it was indirectly the cause of their ultimate salvation.
On the 15th Napoleon con centrated his forces to the east of Leipzig, with only a weak de tachment to the west, and in the evening the allies were prepared to attack him. Schwarzenberg had 18o,000 men available at once and 6o,000 on the following day; BlUcher had about 6o,000, but Bernadotte now could not arrive before the i8th.
Napoleon prepared to throw the bulk of his force upon Schwarz enberg and massed his troops south-east of the town, whilst Schwarzenberg marched concentrically against him down the valleys of the Elster and Pleisse, the mass of his troops on the right bank of the latter and a strong column under Giulay on the left working round to join Blucher on the north. The fighting which followed was most obstinate, but the Austrians failed to make any impression on the French positions, and indeed Giulay felt himself compelled to withdraw to his former position. On the other hand, Bliicher carried the village of Mockern and came within a mile of the gates of the town. During the 17th there was only indecisive skirmishing, Schwarzenberg waiting for his rein forcements coming up by the Dresden road, Blucher for Berna dotte to come in on his left, and by some extraordinary over sight Giulay was brought closer in to the Austrian centre, thus opening for the French their line of retreat towards Erfurt, and no information of this movement appears to have been conveyed to Blucher. The emperor when he became aware of the movement, sent the IV. corps to Lindenau to keep the road open. On the 18th the fighting was resumed and by about noon Bernadotte came up and closed the gap to the N.E. of the town between. BlUcher and the Austrians. At 2 P.M. the Saxons, who had re mained faithful to Napoleon longer than his other German allies, went over to the enemy. All hope of saving the battle had now to be given up, but the French covered their retreat obstinately and by daybreak next morning one-half of the army was already filing out along the road to Erfurt which had so fortunately been left for them.
It took Blucher time to extricate his troops from the confusion into which the battle had thrown them, and the garrison of Leip zig and the troops left on the right bank of the Elster still resisted obstinately—hence no direct pursuit could be initiated, and the French, still upwards of ioo,000 strong, marching rapidly, soon gained distance enough to oe reformed. Blucher followed by par allel and inferior roads on their northern flank, but Schwarzenberg knowing that the Bavarians also had forsaken the emperor and were marching under Wrede, 50,000 strong, to intercept his re treat, followed in a most leisurely fashion. Blucher did not suc ceed in overtaking the French, but the latter, near Hanau, found their way oarred by Wrede with 5o,000 men and over ioo guns in a strong position. To this fresh emergency Napoleon and his army responded in most brilliant fashion. As at Krasnoi in 1812, they went straight for their enemy and after one of the most brilliant series of artillery movements in history, directed by General Drouot, they marched right over their enemy, practically destroying his whole force. Henceforward their march was un molested, and they reached Mainz on Nov. 5.