Napoleon took action against the Spaniards at once. Their most formidable force lay in Andalusia, on his front, and in Galicia on his right flank; and he judged it further most important to secure the ports on the east coast and to seize the fortress of Zaragoza, as a link of union between his forces in Catalonia and in central Spain. He accordingly detached Gen. Dupont with 20,000 men towards Andalusia, Moncey with 9,000 more to ad vance along the east coast, and Lefebvre-Desnouettes with 4,000 more to deal with Zaragoza, while Gen. Merle with a smaller column was ordered to restore order on the northern coast. All except Merle failed. On the east coast not only Valencia but Gerona repulsed French attacks; Zaragoza defended itself with desperate tenacity; and Dupont, thanks in part to useful demon strations made by Spencer's force on the coast, so mismanaged his operations that on July 23 he was forced at Baylen, to capit ulate with 18,000 men. Had not the Spanish army of Galicia, under Gen. Blake imprudently accepted battle and been totally defeated at Medina de Rio Seco by Bessieres (July 14), practically the whole of Napoleon's operations would have been fruitless.
the British Government had in June decided to comply with the Spanish appeal for help. Not many troops were available, for 12,000 had been sent under Sir John Moore upon a hopeless enterprise to Sweden. However, between r o,000 and r r,000 men were embarked under Sir Arthur Wellesley. He was empowered to add Spencer's force to these ; and his first objective was to be the Tagus. His in formation was that Junot had but 20,000 men in all, of which at least 6,000 were at a distance from Lisbon, so he landed without hesitation on Aug. r at the mouth of the Mondego. Thence mov ing south he drove back an advanced French division under Gen. I)elaborde at Rolica (Aug. r 7) and took up a position at Vimeiro to cover the landing of reinforcements, which were waiting off the coast to join him. Further reinforcements were on their way, including Moore's 12.000 men; but, since Moore, who was senior to Wellesley, had offended the Government by returning from Sweden, two officers, Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple, had been specially appointed to keep Moore out of the chief command. Burrard appeared off the coast on the loth; and on the 2rst Junot with 13,000 men attacked Wellesley, who had I 7,000, at Vimeiro, and was hopelessly worsted. Left to himself Wellesley would have captured Junot and his whole army, but Burrard interposed; and before Burrard had held command 24 hours, Dalrymple appeared to supersede him. Though an excellent administrator, Dalrymple was inexperienced and nervous in the field. He would not follow up the beaten French ; and ultimately Junot and his army were sent back to France by sea under the Convention of Cintra (Aug. 31). The Ministry made Dalrymple the scapegoat for the mistakes, mainly its own, which had led to the convention; but at least Lisbon had been secured as a base for future operations.
The British Government decided to prosecute the advantage gained. The Spaniards had driven the French behind the line of the Ebro; and four Spanish armies, so-called, under four differ ent commanders, each of them jealous and unskilled, with no corn mander-in-chief, were ranged along the river from Tudela to Reinosa, talking big of expelling the enemy from Spain. A space
in this line was left for the English, and in September the British Government resolved that it should be filled with 40,000 British troops. Although Sir Harry Burrard had been expressly appointed to exclude Sir John Moore from the chief command, it was now determined to supersede Burrard by Moore, a decision which Burrard received not only with obedience, but in an ideal spirit of loyalty and patriotism. But meanwhile, upon the news of the disaster of Baylen, Napoleon had ordered 8o,000 men to march into Spain ; and early in September he organized the army of Spain into six corps and a reserve, with a total strength of 200,000 men. By the end of October he had not far short of 120,000 effective men on the Ebro ; on Nov. 6 he took personal com mand. The Spaniards likewise had been reinforced by the trans port of 9,000 out of Romana's 15,000 men from the Baltic to Santander by the British fleet but nothing could give strength to ill-organized and half-disciplined levies. On Oct. 29 one Spanish army was dispersed at Zornosa. On Nov. ro another was utterly routed at Gamonal, on the r rth and r3th another underwent the same fate at Espinosa and Reinosa; and on the 23rd yet another army was signally defeated at Tudela. Briefly, the Spanish army of the left had ceased to exist, and those of the centre and right had been broken and routed. The way to Madrid was open and on Dec. 4 the capital was occupied by the French.
Meanwhile Moore, much hampered by want of transport and money, had set his troops in motion at the end of October. He had actually with him about 22,000 men, but a further body of some 18,000 more under Sir David Baird was under orders to sail from England to Corunna ; and Moore decided that, with the Spanish armies lying between him and the enemy, he might safely effect his junction with Baird by land. While, therefore, he himself moved north east upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca, Baird was to strike south-eastward from Corunna, and meet him at Valladolid, or even farther to the east. Owing to the lack of roads, however, Moore was obliged to send the cavalry and artillery under Sir John Hope by the valley of the Guadiana, to move eastward through Talavera to Madrid, and thence north-westward through the Escorial pass of the Guadarrama—a very considerable detour. On his march northward Moore received only disquieting news of the Spanish dispositions, and upon reaching Salamanca on Nov. 14 he heard definitely that the Spaniards had been routed at Zornosa, and that the French were advancing on Valladolid. Plainly, it was madness to think of advancing farther to effect his junction with Baird, and he therefore halted and wrote to inform the Government that the plan of campaign which they had prescribed for him was visionary, that the Spaniards them selves had no definite plans, and that it was impossible for him to get any authority in Spain to take any notice of his presence.