In the matter of tactics, when occupying a defensive position he always hid away his troops on the reverse side of a hill, a practice which was confined to him and which was one reason for the cautiousness of the French generals, in the later stages of the war, in offensive movements against him. His habit of meeting French columns with English lines is too well known to need more than mere mention, though no other army in Europe ventured to imitate either of these peculiarities. In respect of artillery his resources, as compared with those of the French, were of somewhat mixed value. The heaviest of the French field guns—the 12-pounders, called by Napoleon his "pretty girls"— were of greater range and calibre than any of the English field pieces. But, on the other hand, the English had the advantage of the spherical case-shot invented by Maj. Shrapnel, which practically enabled the English gunners to rain grape-shot upon an enemy at the then enormous ranges of goo, i,000 and even 1,200 yards. Shrapnel shell first came by its own in the Peninsular War and contributed more powerfully to its successful issue than is generally recognized.
Wellington's system of conducting a siege is almost contemp tuously dismissed by Continental critics; and he practically ad mitted that he relied too much upon the methods which he had found successful in India. But if military engineering did not shine in his army, the topographical work and the civil engineering performed by the staff corps (the quartermaster-general's engineers as opposed to those of the master-general of the ordnance) was very remarkable indeed ; their feats of bridging were notable ; and they designed and constructed the first suspension-bridge in mili tary history.
To come last to the French, their misfortunes were due mainly to the injustice of their cause, to the fact that sea-transport was denied to them, to their dependence upon the invaded country not only for subsistence but for money, to the jealousy and cupidity of their generals, and to Napoleon's great blunder in en deavouring to control the operations from a distance instead of appointing a commander-in-chief upon the spot and insisting that he should be obeyed. No attempt was made to conciliate the Spaniards and much was done to exasperate them, with the result that the invaders were loathed beyond human bounds. The closing of the sea compelled the transport of all stores of war to be made by land, which was a great strain, and every French infantry soldier had to march into Spain on his feet, which signified great wear and tear of shoes and clothing, with countless casualties from fatigue and sickness. Subsistence upon the country again frequently meant that the stronger men took such food as was to be obtained, while the weaker went empty and died of starvation. Moreover, when one year's harvest in some district had been consumed, Wellington could count that his enemy was food-bound, so to speak, till next harvest and could take liberties accordingly. Again for want of a commander-in-chief the French operations were ill-concerted and executed with Every French general wished to be independent and many of them thought only of filling their pockets. Soldiers were often em ployed by them in herding merino-sheep instead of in their legitimate business; and the example set in high places was only too faithfully imitated by subordinate officers. High command ers, again, set the example of taking women into the field. Junot carried a mistress with him to Vimeiro; Massena took with him the wife of one of his officers throughout the campaign of 181o. This evil reached such a pitch that a French officer cap tured at Vittoria said bluntly to an English officer, "0! sir, you are an army; we are a travelling brothel (un bordel ambulant)." From all these causes discipline suffered ; the morale of the French troops deteriorated; and by 1812 every French commander was afraid to meet the British. As Napoleon drew more and
more of his soldiers from the Peninsula to make good his losses in Russia, the quality of Soult's force sank lower and lower. This naturally reacted upon the officers; and the French historian, Capt. Vidal de Lablache, contrasts eloquently the co-operation of the British divisional commanders with each other against the sulky helplessness of many of their French peers. By the end of 1813 the French army in southern France had become almost contemptible. The more honour to Soult, its commander, and to his officers and men that they strove at least to fight on to the end.