Peninsular War 1808-1814

Baird, meanwhile, had reached Corunna with his infantry on Oct. 13, but had found his arrival anything but welcome to the junta of Galicia. However, by Nov. 13 the whole of his cavalry had also joined him, and by the 22nd he had reached Astorga. There he received news of the rout of the Spaniards at Zornosa and Espinosa, not from any Spanish source—for the Spaniards ignored his existence—but from his own intelligence-officers ; and he made up his mind to retreat. On the 28th Moore at Salamanca heard of the defeat of the Spanish right at Tudela, and at once decided to retire upon Portugal. He therefore sent orders to Hope, who was already across the Guadarrama, to hasten to him with all speed, and to Baird to fall back to Corunna and join him at Lisbon by sea. Baird began his retirement at once; and Hope, by a forced march by way of Avila, Fontiveros, Perieranda and Alba de Tormes, regained touch with Moore on Dec. 4. Urgent messages now reached Moore from Frere, the British minister at Madrid, to make an effort to save the capital, which was pre paring for a desperate resistance ; and Moore, though distrustful, countermanded his orders to Baird, and bade him return to Astorga. On the 9th he learned of the fall of Madrid ; and he now resolved to make a dash upon the French communications at Burgos. On the 13th he moved his headquarters from Sala manca north-eastward to Alaejos, where, by great good fortune, an intercepted despatch from Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff, to Soult, gave him the key to the French dispositions and showed that Soult's corps, little over 20,000 strong, lay isolated on the Carrion some 9om. to north-east of him. Incidentally, he learned that the French in Spain now numbered 250,000, but, though fully alive to the risk, he resolved to advance and strike at Soult. Moving northward he joined hands with Baird at Mayorga on Dec. 17, his advanced parties more than once brushing against the French on the way, and marched upon Sahagun, where, on the 2rst, his cavalry fought a brilliant little action against the French horse. On the 23rd he had made all his preparations for falling upon Soult on the morrow, when intelligence reached him that the French under the emperor in person were moving against him in great force. Thereupon he gave orders for immediate retreat. He had been expecting that he would have to "run for it" and now the time was come.

Napoleon had been fully convinced that the British had with drawn into Portugal and could hardly give credence to Moore's audacity. He realized it, however, on Dec. 19, and taking 42,000 men in hand himself, and entrusting as many more to Junot and Soult, he flew to the pursuit, hoping to make an end of Moore by a great enveloping movement. Moore retired upon Corunna; but the emperor could never overtake him, and on Jan. 1, 1809, he made over the chase to Soult. The discipline of the British began to fail very early in some regiments, but Moore hustled them on, fighting many petty rearguard actions on the way, and after much hardship in crossing the mountains of Galicia, on Jan. I I, brought his army, sadly thinned indeed but safe, to Corunna. The transports having been delayed in their arrival by foul winds, he was obliged to take up a position to cover his embarkation. The

ships arrived on the 14th ; and on the 16th Soult, with 20,000 men and 4o guns, attacked Moore with 15,0m men and nine light cannon. Soult was repulsed, but Moore was mortally hurt ; Baird was disabled by a severe wound ; and it fell to Gen. Hope to re embark the troops and bring them safely to England. The result of the campaign seemed to be a failure; but Moore had dislocated the whole of Napoleon's plans and, moreover, had caused him to scatter his troops far too widely over the surface of the Peninsula, with fatal consequences.

Campaign in Portugal and Spain,

1809.—Austria pre paring again to take up arms against Napoleon; and the question was where England should act in her support. Moore had quite correctly declared the Portuguese frontier to be indefensible. Wellesley, who was now consulted, opined that, if the Portuguese army and militia were reorganized and 20,000 British were added to them, the French would need ioo,000 men to conquer Portugal, and that if the Spaniards continued to resist, the French could not spare so many. The cabinet resolved to make its main effort on the Scheldt ; and only with great difficulty Castlereagh per suaded them to send Wellesley out to the Peninsula and to give him 26,000 men. Wellesley reached the Tagus at the end of April. He found that Soult, after his march to Corunna, had invaded Por tugal and taken Oporto; that Ney, who had also joined in the chase of Moore, was subjugating Galicia and that Marshal Victor was lying at Merida within 4om. of the eastern Portuguese fron tier, threatening invasion by the line of the Tagus. The Spaniards had not done well during the winter. Gen. St. Cyr had beaten them badly in Catalonia, and the army of the centre had sustained defeats at Ucles (Jan. 12), Ciudad Real (Feb. 18) and Medellin (March 28). There was nothing to stop Soult except some dis heartened Portuguese levies, nor to check Victor except the de moralized army of Gen. Cuesta, which had just been beaten at Medellin. However, both Soult and Victor were stationary ; their headquarters were zoom. apart ; and, although they were supposed to be acting in concert, they were not in communication with each other. Gen. Beresford and other British officers had by this time brought 15,00o Portuguese troops into a fairly efficient condition ; and with these and 25,000 British, Wellesley, on May 7, advanced northward against Soult. The marshal, suspecting nothing, had scattered his troops in considerable depth to south and north of Oporto, and Wellesley tried to cut off the southern detachments, but failed. He crossed the Douro just above Oporto, however, under Soult's very nose, and catching the French army by surprise drove it away as a mere disorderly mob, which would have been destroyed but for the timidity of Gen. Murray, one of Wellesley's divisional commanders. Following Soult, Wellesley drove him north through a miserable country ; and only by desperate marches and after desperate perils did the marshal finally make his way to Lugo, having lost 6,000 men and the whole of his artillery. He owed his safety mainly to the fact that Wellesley had, on the i8th, been obliged to abandon the pursuit, having received news that Victor was in motion on the Tagus.