Peninsular War 1808-1814

Campaign of 1811.

Meanwhile Sir Thomas Graham and the Spaniards had fallen upon the besiegers of Cadiz, and the British had fought a brilliant action against them at Barrosa (March 5). Thereupon Soult hurried back from Badajoz to Andalusia; and Wellington, reinforcing Beresford, set him down to beleaguer Badajoz (April 22), with the option of fighting Soult or refusing battle as soon as the marshal should march back, as he certainly would, to relieve the fortress. He then returned to his own army, which had stopped its pursuit of Massena on the Portuguese frontier, and was now covering the blockade of Almeida. Massena advanced from Salamanca to relieve it, and Wellington offered him battle (May 3) at Fuentes de Ofioro, just across the Spanish fron tier. Massena assailed the village on the 3rd and was repulsed with 65o casualties, Wellington's not exceeding 25o. On the 5th Massena made a general attack; and then, as Wellington said, "if Boney had been there, we should have been beat." But, though Wellington's position was defective, the steadiness of his troops enabled him to hold his own. His casualties were 1,53o, Massena's 2,200; and on the 7th Massena retreated to Salamanca, leaving Almeida to its fate. The fortress was presently abandoned and blown up by the French, the garrison, to Wellington's great vexation, escaping. Massena was shortly afterwards recalled and replaced by Marmont ; but Wellington always considered Massena the ablest of all the French generals with whom he had to do in the Peninsula.

Meanwhile, for want of proper artillery, Beresford's siege of Badajoz had not prospered. Soult with 24,00o men and so guns returned from Andalusia to its relief in May, and on the i6th Beresford, with 8,000 British and 21,000 Spaniards, engaged him at Albuera. Beresford mismanaged the action and would have lost it but for one of his staff, Capt. Henry Hardinge. He was saved by the steadiness of his British troops, who suffered 4,000 casualties. The Spaniards lost 3,00o and Soult 8,000. The marshal retired, and all was safe for the present; but Wellington, with his little force, had actually fought two general actions on the two main lines of entry into Portugal—a very severe strain upon his strength.

He now (May 29) re-opened the siege of Badajoz with bad Portuguese cannon, for, living in almost daily dread of orders to evacuate the Peninsula, he had all this time kept his own siege train on its ships in Lisbon harbour. On June io the prospective junction of Marmont with Soult obliged him to raise the siege and withdraw his troops, 37,00o British and 17,00o Portuguese, to the Caia, a little to west of Badajoz. Soult and Marmont having joined forces at Merida (June 17) advanced against him with nearly 6o,000 men, but decided to leave him alone. The two marshals then quarrelled; and Soult returned (June 28) to Andalusia, leaving troops which raised Marmont's strength to 43,00o men. On July 13 Marmont withdrew to the valley of the Tagus. Wellington then landed his siege-train, and moved north to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving the bulk of his force under Graham and Hill to protect the eastern frontier. Marmont, collecting 58,000 men, marched to its relief, and Wellington, calling up troops which gave him a strength of 30,00o British and 16,000 Portuguese, raised the blockade and awaited him.

On Sept. 25 Marmont made a reconnaissance in force which brought on a lively little combat at El Bodon, but he was afraid to go farther, and on Oct. I retired to his cantonments on the Tagus. The campaign ended by a spring of Gen. Hill upon an isolated French detachment at Arroyo Molinos, to the north-east of Merida, when 2,000 French were killed or captured at a cost of Ioo British casualties (Oct. 28).

Campaign of

1812.—Throughout the perilous year 1811, when Wellington had borne the brunt of the attack of the armies both of Portugal and Andalusia, the Spaniards had accomplished very little. But their armies had now been in large measure replaced by

guerrilla-bands of irregulars, frequently under very able leaders, which made the task of holding Spain in subjection more difficult to the French than ever. To paralyse one of these chiefs, Balles teros, in the south, Soult (Dec. 181I) directed an attack upon one of his principal bases, Tarifa, which was repelled with trifling loss to the little garrison, half Spanish, half English, but cost the French soo casualties. And now Napoleon, intent on the invasion of Russia, decided that he would draw upon Marmont's army to subdue the eastern provinces and Andalusia thoroughly, and then turn all his strength upon Portugal. Wellington for his part had planned the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, so as to close the north-eastern gate of Portugal; and on Jan. 8 he invested the place, battered a breach and on the 19th stormed it out of hand, with no more than soo casualties, before Marmont could even assemble troops to save it. Marmont was left gasping with dismay. Ciudad Rodrigo, with a garrison of 5,000 raw Spaniards, had defied Marshal Ney for 25 days, and Wellington had snatched it from a French garrison in 12 days. Wellington then dispersed his troops innocently into cantonments, as did Marmont, being unable to keep them concentrated for want of supplies. On Feb. 16 Wellington advanced to the siege of Badajoz, stationing Hill at Merida to cover the operation from the east. Ground was broken on March 17, a breach was battered, and on April 5 the place was taken by escalade, the storming parties having failed in their assault. The capture of Badajoz cost Wellington 5,000 casualties, and for 48 hours the troops were out of all control; but the gain was great, for he had captured the French siege-train at Ciudad Rodrigo and their pontoon-train at Badajoz. He then detached Hill to destroy the French bridge of boats over the Tagus at Almaraz (May 17), thereby reducing Soult and Marmont to the bridge of Toledo for communication between their armies; and then leaving Hill at Merida with 22,000 men to parry any movement of Soult, he advanced (June 13) with 28,000 British and 15,00o Portuguese against Marmont at Salamanca. The marshal fell back to the Douro till, being reinforced, he took the offensive (July 16) and manoeuvred against Wellington's com munications. On more than one day the two armies raced each other in two parallel columns, only a few hundred yards apart, ready to wheel into line and engage at any moment. At last on July 22 Marmont made a false movement, leaving his left wing in isolation, and Wellington sprang upon him instantly and inflicted a crushing defeat. He had 5o,000 men, including Spaniards, and 6o guns; Marmont had 47,00o and 78 guns. The French losses were 14,000 men, 20 guns and two eagles; Wellington's casualties were 5,000. The French retreated north-east upon Burgos, and Wellington, having entered Madrid in triumph (Aug. 12) invested Burgos. The siege was most unskilfully conducted; and Welling ton was obliged to raise it (Sept. 22) upon the advance of the French against him in force from all parts of Spain. With dif ficulty he gained time for Hill to join him as he retreated, and on Nov. with 68,000 British, Portuguese and Spaniards, he offered battle to 90,00o French on the field of Salamanca. The French declined the challenge ; and Wellington pursued his retire ment, with some suffering to his troops but little molestation from the enemy, to Ciudad Rodrigo, where the campaign came to an end (Nov. 19). His losses in the retreat were 9,000, but foreign critics count it his greatest achievement. The advance on Madrid was no doubt a mistake; but the campaign had been brilliant. It had cost him 20,000 men; but it had cost the French 40,000 and some hundreds of guns, and lastly it had cleared the French out of all Spain south of the Tagus.