Victor's movement proved to be nothing but a reconnaissance in force, designed to obtain intelligence of Soult ; and King Joseph at Madrid, having learned, not from Soult but from Paris, of the mishaps which had befallen that marshal, recalled Victor up the Tagus to Talavera. Soult, having called upon Ney at Lugo to re-equip his army, the two commanders and their respective armies had quarrelled violently, with the result that joint opera tions planned between them against the Galician insurgents came quite to nought, and the French were driven out of Galicia for ever. Rather by accident than design Ney and Soult drifted south ward ; and by the beginning of July their corps, as also that of Mortier, some 50,000 men in all, were assembled at Astorga, Benavente and Valladolid within 5om. of the valley of the Tagus. Joseph had in and near Madrid 27,00o men, and Victor's corps numbered about 23,00o; so that he was in a position at short notice to concentrate at this time f oo,000 men in that valley. Such was the situation when Wellesley, having returned to Abran tes from northern Portugal, proposed that he, with 23,000 British, and Cuesta with as many Spaniards, should march on Madrid by way of the Tagus. The supreme Government of Spain eagerly accepted the suggestion, undertaking to provide everything; and, quite unconscious of the storm that was gathering before him, Wellesley marched (June 27) to join Cuesta at Plasencia. On July 17 the two armies advanced. The march was one long story of wrangling and distress. Cuesta was old, infirm, incompetent and obstinate. His army was without order or discipline ; and no measures had been taken for transport and supply. Victor fell back before the allies till reinforced by Joseph to a strength of 46,000 men; then the allies fell back in turn, the Spaniards turning their retreat into a flight. With much difficulty Wellesley stopped the panic and took up a position at Talavera (July 27). Victor at tacked the key of the position on the same night and was repulsed; and renewing the onslaught in force on the next day was again repelled with a loss of 7,000 men and 17 guns. Wellesley himself had lost 5,000 men, but being reinforced by the Light Brigade on the 29th, was eager to advance. Cuesta fortunately refused, and on Aug. 1 Soult came down the pass of Banos, which Cuesta, in spite of Wellesley's urgent entreaties, had declined to defend, into the valley of the Tagus. Wellesley, awaking to his danger, abandoned his wounded, crossed the river by the bridge of Arzo bispo, and led his starving army back to Portugal by way of Badajoz. Though the preoccupation of Napoleon with the Austrian war justified Wellesley in making an extraordinary effort, he had taken an unwarrantable risk. He had been warned that the Spanish troops were worthless and their supply system chaotic ; and he had disregarded the warning. Having now learned his lesson, he resolved to have nothing to do with the Spaniards in the future. However, for his victories he was created Viscount Wellington.
officers so as to make my 40,000 into 50,000." This task he com mitted to Beresford. "The French," he argued next, "live on the country and therefore cannot stay long in one place. I have the sea to furnish me with all that I want ; and if I organize my service for feeding my army perfectly, I can go when I please and stay where I wish as long as I wish." So he set himself to organize an efficient service for transport and supply. "But," he went on, "everything depends on my base on the sea, Lisbon, and I must make Lisbon impregnable." He did so by throwing up the fortified lines of Torres Vedras, 25m. north of the city. "Now," he argued, "if I have 50,000 men the French must bring 6o,000 to beat me. The removal of 6o,000 men must weaken them in some part of Spain, and there the Spaniards will make trouble. If they advance against me, I shall retire before them, accepting battle if they give me a favourable opportunity, for the missile action of my lines is superior to the shock-action of their columns; but, if not, re treating steadily till I reach my fortified lines. They cannot wait long before them, because they live on the country and will ex haust it. They must retreat in time, through territory which they have already eaten up, and I, carrying my food with me, can pur sue them and cause them heavy loss. I can go on playing this game as long as they like. I must win in the end. The only trouble is that, though the natural access for the French to Por tugal is from the north-east, by way of Salamanca and Almeida, they can enter it also from the east by the line of the Tagus, so that I must divide my force to secure both routes. If they advance by both routes in strength, it may be awkward ; but that is un likely. The way by the Guadiana, south of the Tagus, is luckily sealed up for the present by the Spanish fortress of Badajoz. But even if driven from Portugal, I can land my army at Cadiz and play the same game there. I must win in the end, and the more certainly because the French generals are always quarrelling among themselves, and pay no obedience to King Joseph, their nominal commander." And so it came about. Napoleon gave Massena the command of 65,000 men as the army of Portugal, and Soult the command of as many as the army of Andalusia. Wellington with 18,000 British and 14,00o Portuguese awaited Massena near Almeida, leaving Gen. Hill with about 20,000 men, mostly Portuguese, to guard the route by the Tagus. Massena first besieged and cap tured Ciudad Rodrigo, which barred his way (July o), and then pushed his advanced troops across the frontier. Gen. Craufurd with the Light Division engaged these most unnecessarily on the Coa (July 23), happily without serious mishap, though the odds against him were four to one. Then Massena advanced, and Wellington retreated steadily before him. At Bussaco, having summoned Hill to him, Wellesley offered battle with 5o,000 men in a very strong position. Massena accepted it (Sept. 27) and was repulsed with 4,600 casualties, whereas Wellington's did not exceed 1,25o. Then the retreat began again, and Wellington en tered the lines of Torres Vedras (Oct. o). Massena lingered be fore them for a month, till compelled by want of subsistence to retire 3om. to Santarem. Here he waited with persistence, for it was expected that the British Ministry would fall and be sup planted by the Whigs, who would certainly withdraw the British army from the Peninsula. It was an anxious time for Wellington, for in Jan. 1811, Soult appeared with another army before Badajoz, and the Spanish army on the spot offered battle, which Wellington had begged that it would on no account do, and was, of course, beaten. Wellington detached Beresford with ten British battalions and some Portuguese to watch Soult ; and at last, on March 5, Massena began to retreat. Wellington followed him up with 44,000 men, but was obliged immediately to send 8,000 of them to Beresford, since Badajoz had (March o) been treacherously surrendered to Soult. With the remainder be con tinued his pursuit; and by April 8 Massena had recrossed the Portuguese frontier on his way to Salamanca, with his army in rags, starved and demoralized. The campaign had cost him 25,000 men killed, captured, or dead from sickness.