In addition to all the political ramifications in the army itself, there is the additional check provided by the special troops, who, though administered by the military authorities, are under the civil authorities for employment. They are mainly communists, volunteers who have served in the army, and they are divided into political department troops and frontier guards, organized in mili tary units, and special detachments which, if in the military dis tricts, are placed under the military authorities. Such is the sys tem under which precautions are taken to secure political control over the army. According to the latest available figures, which are those for 1924-5, the cost of the salaries of the administrative authorities is more than a third as much as the amount spent on the pay of the whole army (22,438,000 roubles, as compared with 68,967,00o). Judging by the precedent of the pre-Napoleonic ar mies of the French Republic, military efficiency would be difficult to secure under such conditions, especially in field operations.
The troops are distributed territorially in the following military areas, the headquarters are given in brackets : I. Moscow (Mos cow), II. Leningrad (Leningrad), III. Volga (Samara), IV. Uk raine (Kharkov), V. Northern Caucasus (Rostov), VI. Western Front (Smolensk), VII. Turkestan (Tashkent), VIII. Siberia (Novo Nikolayesk) and IX. The Red Flag Army of the Caucasus (Tiflis). Officers commanding military areas are appointed by, and under the orders of, the Revolutionary Military Soviet. For mili tary operations they are under the commander-in-chief.
The possession of personnel specializing in camouflage, chem ical warfare, etc. has already been noted under "organization," and the large proportion of automatic rifles in the hands of the infantry has been mentioned. It is not possible to give exact fig
ures. The types known are the Choka (8.8 mm.) firing r5o rounds a minute, and the Feodoroff (6.7mm.) firing 8o to zoo rounds a minute, the range of both being given as 1420 metres. Revolvers of Nagarre and Browning patterns, both with 7 chambers, seem to be provided in large numbers. Great attention is clearly paid to propaganda, to which the Russian character appears to be par ticularly susceptible. Action in China, especially during the year 1927, teaches an object lesson in the intensive use of propagandist agents to shake the moral of opposing armies, and public an nouncements have at times been made to the effect that the use of military forces in support of the world-revolution on com munist lines for which the foreign policy of the Union of Social ist Soviet Republics stands would be delayed until subversive propaganda had so shaken an opposing nation as to affect its fighting forces, and willingness for combat.
As is to be expected, information is not published about the condition in which the historic Russian fortresses such as Kron stadt in the Baltic, Sevastopol in the Black Sea, Vladivostok in Siberia, and other naval or mercantile ports are maintained. A small sum, which amounted in 1924-25 to 500,000 roubles, is allotted in the Estimates for army fortifications.