Ussr

General Notes.

To sum up, the Russian army on paper is very thoroughly organized and appears formidable. On the other hand, no amount of paper organization can at once remove fail ings inherent in the national character or disabilities in the eco nomic position of the country. The old Imperial Russian army suffered from a shortage of educated officers and non-commis sioned officers and of skilled technical personnel ; in present-day Russia this defect must still be pronounced. The lack of power to manufacture her requirements in munitions, failure in distributing the available resources, corruption in the public services, and the backward state of the communications of the country were fatal to Russia's armies in the World War ; it can hardly be said that the manufacturing strength of the country has increased under Soviet rule, while the transport system went from bad to worse, though transport was reorganized by Dzerjhinsky and much im proved in 1923-4. There is no assurance that discipline and moral are as high as they were under the old regime. On the whole, therefore, it may be doubted whether the Red forces would be as formidable in the field as they are imposing on paper. The Bol shevist authorities have, however, brought to a high degree of efficiency a strategical weapon which at times has been of more value than armies, that of subversive propaganda. The founder of Soviet policy, Lenin, laid down that "the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy." Russia's chief economical and strategical need has always been a free outlet to the oceans of the world. Her northern shores are ice-bound for a great part of the year; so is her now constricted coast in the Baltic on the west; and other nations control the exits from the Black Sea in the South. Only in the far east, at an uneconomical distance from her main centres of population, is an unimpeded outlet to the high seas possible. On land, Russia's un wieldy size and the poor development of her communications have been serious handicaps to offensive action on her part, but have, on the other hand, always in the end baffled enemies who have sought to invade her. The value of the mounted arm in this country of wide plains and great distances has always been ex pressed by the high proportion of cavalry in the Russian army, a condition still maintained.

The changes brought about by the World War on the European frontier of Russia have simplified her defence problem on that side, since she is now bordered by a series of small and compara tively weak States, of which Poland is the strongest. The Finnish frontier comes uncomfortably close to the former capital (now Leningrad) and to the naval fortress of Kronstadt, but aggression on the part of Finland is not a probable contingency. In the south, the possession by Rumania of the former Russian prov ince of Bessarabia may at some date prove a subject of conten tion. But the western frontier of Russia certainly lies under no such threat as it did in 1914 from Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the Caucasus frontier Russia is faced by a much weakened Turkey.

In the east, the activities displayed by the Soviet authorities in endeavouring to extend their influence over Persia, Afghanistan and China may ultimately cause them to clash with India, or with Japan in Manchuria or China. The Bolshevists have recently sought to gain their ends by propaganda and by fostering internal disorders, rather than by an open resort to arms. The final point

of which to take note is the departure from the Tsarist precedent of distributing non-Russian elements in the population over the whole army, so that they served in units away from their own homes. Under the territorial organization described above, the troops are localized, and the formations and smaller units have thus assumed a national or racial character, if the system, as de scribed on paper, is carried out in its entirety. This obviously tends to efficiency and to higher moral, as experience in other countries has proved. On the other hand, if ever that very un settling phrase (born of the Versailles Conference) "self-deter mination on the principle of nationality," which has caused so much bloodshed and general disturbance in the world, should come into vogue in the territory of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the central control over all military forces, now rigidly enforced, might become more difficult to maintain.

See also the League of Nations Armaments Year Book (Geneva, 1928), and information published in Izvestia on various dates, espe cially on May 22, and Sept. 23, 1925. (G. G. A.) Navy.—With the Revolution the Russian navy, which cannot be said to have attained a very high order of efficiency at any time, fell into a state of complete disorganization, but in recent years efforts have been made to restore discipline and to put some of the ships into a semblance of good condition. The Red fleet, as it is now called, consists of the Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian, Far East, Arctic and White Sea naval forces. The Baltic Fleet, which is much the largest, consists nominally of : three battleships, four cruisers, three divisions of five destroyers each, nine submarines and a number of miscellaneous craft. The Black Sea Fleet consists of :—two cruisers, four destroyers, six submarines and some miscellaneous craft. The remaining squad rons are composed only of small craft.

Every ship has been renamed, some several times over, to mark some Communist occasion or to commemorate some Red leader. The greatest secrecy is observed with regard to the move ments and doings of the Red fleet, even in Russia itself. It is the exception that allusion is made to a ship's name in print. When accounts are given of manoeuvres they endeavour to exaggerate the number of ships engaged and the importance of the events.

Personnel.

The ships' companies consist mainly of conscripts who are taken on for four years. About 25% re-engage for an additional year, and this may be repeated until they are 3o years of age. Petty officers, or starshinas, are specially selected and can serve up to 4o years of age. Officers were abolished when the Bolsheviks first came into power, but it was soon obvious that without them the navy could not function at all, with the result that they were re-introduced under the new phrase "the com manding staff." This is divided into junior, middle and senior categories. Candidates for officer rank undergo a preliminary training at a preparatory school, from which they are sent to the naval school for three years. The most successful candidates go on to a naval academy. Ostensibly their rank is not recognized and everyone is addressed as "comrade," but in fact this, like many other Bolshevik decrees, has been proved an absolute farce, and the officers wear uniforms much like those in other navies, while the middle and senior ranks live in a separate wardroom and have cabins to themselves.