Strategy

Relation to Policy.—To break down the distinction between strategy and policy would not matter much in cases where the two functions were combined in the same person as with a Frederick or a Napoleon. But as such autocratic soldier-rulers have always been rare, and became extinct in the 19th century, the effect was insidiously harmful. For it encouraged soldiers to make the preposterous claim that policy should be subservient to their conduct of operations and, especially in democratic coun tries, it drew the statesman on to overstep the indefinite border of his sphere and interfere with his military employee in the actual use of his tools.

Moltke reached a clearer, and wiser, definition in terming strategy "the practical adaptation of the means placed at a gen eral's disposal to the attainment of the object in view." This definition fixes the responsibility of a military commander to the government by which he is employed. His responsibility is that of expending most profitably to the interest of the higher war policy the force allotted to him within the theatre of operations assigned to him. If he considers that the force allotted is inade quate for the task indicated he is justified in pointing this out, and if his opinion is overruled he can refuse or resign the com mand, but he exceeds his rightful sphere if he attempts to dictate to the government what measure of force should be placed at his disposal.

On the other hand the government, which formulates war policy, and adapts it to conditions which often change as a war progresses, can rightly intervene in the strategy of a campaign not merely by replacing a commander in whom it has lost confidence but by modifying his object according to the needs of its war policy. While it should not interfere with him in the handling of his tools it should indicate clearly the nature of his task. Thus strategy has not necessarily the simple object of seeking to overthrow the enemy's military power. When a government appreciates that the enemy has the military superiority either in general or in a par ticular theatre, it may wisely enjoin a strategy of limited aim. It may desire to wait until the balance of force can be changed by the intervention of allies or by the transfer of forces from another theatre. It may desire to wait, or even to limit its mili tary effort permanently, while economic or naval action decides the issue. It may calculate that the overthrow of the enemy's military power is a task definitely beyond its capacity, or not worth the effort, and that the object of its war policy can be assured by seizing territory which it can either retain or use as bargaining counters when peace is negotiated. Such a policy has more support from history than military opinion recognizes and is less inherently a policy of weakness than its apologists imply.

It is, indeed, bound up with the history of the British Empire and has repeatedly proved a life-buoy to Britain's allies and a per manent benefit to herself, JlQwever unconsciously followed, there is ground for enquiry whether this unmilitary policy does not deserve to be accorded a place in the theory of the conduct of war.

But the more usual reason for adopting

a strategy of limited aim is that of awaiting a change in the balance of force, a change often sought and achieved by draining the enemy's force, weakening him by pricks instead of risking blows. The essential condition of such a strategy is that the drain on him is disproportionately greater than on oneself. The object may be sought by raiding his supplies, by local attacks which annihilate or inflict disproportion ate loss on parts of his force, by luring him into unprofitable attacks, by causing an excessively wide distribution of his force and, not least, by exhausting his moral and physical energy. Such a strategy is popularly called Fabian, after the illustrious Roman who thereby thwarted Hannibal's designs in Italy. More strictly it was a Fabian war policy, and this closer definition sheds light on the question, previously raised, of a general's independence in carrying out his own strategy inside his theatre of operations. For if the government has decided upon a Fabian war policy the general who, even within his strategic sphere, seeks to overthrow the enemy's military power may do more harm than good to the government's war policy. Usually a war policy of limited aim imposes a strategy of limited aim, and a decisive aim should only be adopted with the approval of the government which alone can decide whether it is "worth the candle." Scope of Strategy.—The nature of war, the objects for which it is waged, and the policy which should govern the conduct of war, are outside the scope of this article. These subjects are dealt with in the article WAR, and for more extensive analysis the reader may be referred to Clausewitz's volumes "On War," a great, if one-sided, work, whose survey has in recent times been en larged by Fuller's brilliant and profound analysis, entitled "The Foundations of the Science of War." Strategy covers the distribution and transmission of military means to fulfil the ends of policy. It is concerned not merely with the movements of armies—as its role is often defined—but with the effect. But when the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the dispositions for and control of such direct action are termed "tactics" (q.v.).