But in the strict sense of the term, Cromwell stands out as the first great strategist of modern history. Perhaps none in all history can show a consecutive series of three masterpieces com parable to the Preston, Dunbar and Worcester campaigns, for breadth of manoeuvre and skill in "unhinging" the enemy's balance. Their swift decisiveness was all the more notable be cause the First Civil War had been so drawn out, so indecisive in its course despite the prevalence of a decision-desiring spirit rare in 17th century warfare. (See GREAT REBELLION.) Conditions of 17th and 18th Centuries.—On the continent, during the 17th and most of the 18th century, warfare was as indecisive as it was continual. The common explanation is that these wars sprang from dynastic causes, that they were undertaken to gain small extensions of territory or power, and that as the professional armies of the time were expensive instruments, rulers were chary of damaging them and of risking too much for the sake of such limited aims. The development of standing armies and the high standard of training required by the development of individual firearms and the complex drill evolutions undoubtedly placed a check on the lavish use and expenditure of professional soldiers. But this check can be, and has been, exaggerated. Pro fessional soldiers formed only the backbone of the armies of the time, which were usually made up by militia men recruited by lot.
Again, common-sense, reacting from the injurious practice of pillage and devastation which had injured all parties in the Thirty Years' War (q.v.), reinforced a growing humanitarianism in protest against such gross interference with and exactions from the civil population. This feeling contributed to the development of the practice of feeding and maintaining armies from supply trains based on an organized chain of magazines. But a still greater impulse was given by example—the impressive success attained by the armies of Louis XIV. which, under Louvois' administration, embodied the essential elements of modern military organization.
Its system of supply from magazines was not inspired by mere humanitarianism but by the desire for efficiency—to avoid the constant checks on mobility and on the scope of operations which were inevitable so long as armies lived like locusts, forced to evacuate areas of country because of the pressure of their own hunger after exhausting its resources. If this system of magazines enhanced the importance of fortresses as a site for them, it also gave a new importance to and opportunity for threats to the lines of communication. The one cancelled out the other. We must seek elsewhere for the main explanation of the indecisiveness of this period of warfare.
Nor shall we find it in the limited political aims or "geographical objectives." While these often prevailed, they did not dominate the horizon of such rulers and statesmen as Richelieu, Louis XIV.
and Frederick. Their correspondence, urging energetic and decisive action, dispels such illusions.
The real explanation, more obvious and more natural, is that the military conditions of the time hindered decisive results. On the one hand was the development of fortification, field and permanent, in reply to the earlier growth of artillery. Protection caught up and outpaced the effect of weapons. It gave to the defensive a preponderance such as the development of the machine-gun revived in the 20th century. On the other hand the indivisibility of armies limited the capacity of strategy to upset this defensive balance of power. For they still moved and fought normally as a solid block, a single "piece" on the chessboard of war, a condition which limited their ability to deceive the opponent and to cramp his freedom of movement. Previous to the inaugura tion of the "divisional" organization, about 1760, by de Broglie, • only Cromwell's campaigns show a full appreciation of the strategic value of what one may call "the distribution of force for a concentrated purpose." Yet in the annals of i 7th century warfare there is one example, Turenne's winter campaign of 1674-75 (see DUTCH Waits), which shows how art might be employed to decisive result even under the handicapping conditions of the period. At a time when all manoeuvres were based on fortress pivots he cut loose from this base of operations and sought, in surprise and mobility, not only a decision but his security. It was a just calculation, not a gamble, for the dislocation, psychological and physical, created among the enemy afforded him throughout an ample margin of security.
The War of the Spanish Succession (q.v.) which lasted for 12 years, 1701-1713, was made up largely of an abortive suc cession of direct approaches or scarcely more purposeful in direct moves. It was illumined, however, by the genius of Marlborough, and the war's purposeful indirect approaches are chiefly but not entirely associated with his name. Their significant interest lies in the way they mark the several turn ing points .of the war.
Unlike Marlborough, Frederick was free from the respon sibility and limitations which are imposed on a strategist, in the strict sense of the word. For he combined in his person the functions of grand strategy and strategy. Other advantages which he enjoyed over Marlborough were the comparative scarcity of fortresses in his theatres of war and the greater scope for moving troops off the roads. Yet despite a long string of victories in battle the Seven Years' War (q.v.) was not only indecisive in its course, but saw Frederick almost stripped of resources and incapable of further resistance by 1762 when external factors came to his rescue. The cause deserves enquiry.