Although faced by the coalition of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony, with England as his only ally, Frederick had at the outset and until midway through the second cam paign, a superiority in the actual forces available. In addition he had the asset of a central position. This enabled him to practise what is commonly called the strategy of "interior lines," striking outwards from his central pivot against one of the forces on the circumference, and utilizing the shorter distance he had thus to travel to concentrate against one of the enemy forces before it could be supported by the others. Ostensibly, it would seem that the further apart these enemy forces, the easier it must be to achieve a decisive success. In terms of time, space and num ber, this is undoubtedly true. But once more the moral element intrudes. When the enemy forces are widely separated each is self-contained and tends to be consolidated by pressure. When they are close together they tend to coalesce and "become mem bers one of another," mutually dependent in mind, moral and matter. The minds of the commanders affect each other, moral impressions are quickly transfused, and even the movements of each force easily hinder or disorganize those of the others. Thus if the antagonist has less time and space for his action, the dislocating results of it take effect more quickly and easily. Further, when forces are close together the enemy's mere diverg ence from his approach to one of them may become an unexpected, and therefore truly indirect approach to another. In contrast,
when forces are widely separated there is more time to prepare to meet, or avoid, the second blow of the army which is exploiting its central position.
Frederick consistently used his central position to concentrate against one fraction of the enemy. And he always employed tactics of indirect approach. Thereby he gained many victories. But his tactical indirect approach was normally only in the sphere of logistics and for all their executive skill, these manoeuvres were narrow. The opponent might be unable to meet the following blow, owing to the rigidity of his mind or his functions, but the blow itself did not fall unexpected by him.
As Frederick's roll of victories lengthened, his prospects and his. resources diminished, until by 1759 he could do no more than passively block the enemy.
If many lessons are to be culled from Frederick's campaigns, the main one would appear to be, in a sentence, that "His in directness was too direct." Or, to express it in another way, that he regarded the indirect approach as a matter of pure mobility, instead of a combination of mobility and surprise. Thus, despite all his brilliance, his economy of force broke down.
Thirty years later the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars gave Napoleon Bonaparte the opportunity to make the greatest of all developments in the physical sphere of strategy.
In this development he exploited and combined the assets latent in three fresh conditions. The first condition arose from the composition and spirit of the Revolutionary armies. (See