With Hannibal and Scipio tactical art reached the highest level of ancient times, perhaps of all times, and if strategy was still handicapped by its means, certain phases of the war are most illuminating. We have already dwelt upon the Trasi mene episode. Thereafter both sides adopted a war policy of indirect approach to a political rather than a military end. Roman strategy, under the direction of Fabius, was too convinced of Hannibal's military superiority to risk a military decision, and while seeking to avoid this, aimed by military pin-pricks to wear down the endurance of the invader and coincidently prevent his strength being recruited from the Italian cities or from his Car thaginian base. Hannibal, either from doubt as to the wisdom of testing the resisting power of the walls of Rome itself or from subtler reasons, spent the succeeding years in trying to loosen Rome's hold on her Italian allies and to weld them into a coalition against her. Victories were merely a moral impetus towards this goal. The superiority of his cavalry gave his tactical instrument an assured advantage if he could lure the enemy to battle on the plains. He succeeded once at Cannae (q.v.), but otherwise Rome's inflexible resolution in pursuing her own strategy of evasion at any sacrifice combined with the conditions of the age, with his own comparative weakness, and with his situation as the invader—of a primitively organized land—to thwart his aim. When Scipio later replied by a counter-invasion of Africa he found the more highly developed economic and social structure of Carthage an aid to his plans.
But before this, the Italian theatre had witnessed an example of strategy which is an historical landmark. Nero's Metaurus (q.v.) operation is the first clear case of what in strategical jargon is commonly called "interior lines," a term which certainly does not explain itself. It may perhaps be more clearly defined as using a central position between two enemy forces to fall upon one of them with the bulk of one's force. At its best this strategy is an indirect approach whereby one enemy force is bluffed into passivity while the other, isolated, is crushed. If Nero's was the first exam ple, it has hardly been surpassed.
Scipio's operations began in Spain, Hannibal's strategic base and source of reinforcements, and by first depriving the Carthaginian armies there of their local base, Cartagena (q.v.), he led up to the complete overthrow of the Carthaginian power in Spain. Then, instead of attacking Hannibal in Italy, as his seniors wished and so many of his predecessors had tried in vain, Scipio sailed for Africa. There, while still in small force, he repeatedly trapped and broke up the forces of Carthage without hazarding any direct advance on the fortified city but exploiting his military successes to lop off its supply areas and allies.
To reinforce these forms of moral suasion he advanced to Tunis, in sight of Carthage, as "a most effective means of striking the Carthaginians with terror and dismay." Coming on top of the other indirect forms of pressure it was sufficient to dislocate the Carthaginians' will to resist, and they sued for peace. But while awaiting ratification in Rome, the provisional peace was broken when Carthage had news of Hannibal's return, and of his landing at Leptis. In such circumstances, an orthodox general would either have taken the offensive, in order to prevent Hannibal reaching Carthage, or have stood on the defensive to await relief. Instead, Scipio moved swiftly against Carthage's main source of supplies from the interior, and thus lured Hannibal to an area of his own choosing, where Hannibal lacked the material reinforcement, stable pivot, and shelter in case of defeat which he would have had if the battle had taken place near Carthage. Still Scipio was not content, but drew Hannibal to a camping ground where the Carthaginians suffered from lack of water and to a battle-ground in the plain where Scipio's newly gained advantage in cavalry could have full play. He had taken the first two tricks; on the battlefield of Zama (q.v.) he was enabled to take the rubber by tactically overtrumping Hannibal's former "cavalry" trump. The bloodless surrender of Carthage followed.
In the West during the Middle Ages the military spirit of feudal "chivalry" was inimical to art, although the drab stupidity of its military course is lightened by a few bright gleams. King John of England had a real insight into grand strategy', and Prince Edward, later Edward I., produced a masterly example of mobility in exploiting a central position in the Evesham (q.v.) campaign. The 13th century was also marked by the paralyzing lesson taught by the Mongols to European chivalry. Slight as our knowledge of events it is sufficient to trace the outline of strategic conceptions as grand in scale as they were subtle in calculation. (See further MONGOL CAMPAIGNS.) Dawn of Modern History.—On entering the domain of modern history, we find that the Renaissance extended its in fluence to military affairs and that the regained inspiration of classical examples gave an invigorating impulse to the conduct of war.