Strategy

Although strategy may aim more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely, yet the two elements react on each other. Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement. For a movement which is accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise, even though it be unconcealed; while surprise smoothes the path of movement by hindering the enemy's counter-measures and counter-movements. As regards the relation of strategy to tactics, while in execution the borderline is often shadowy, and it is diffi cult to decide exactly where a strategical movement ends and a tactical movement begins, yet in conception the two are distinct. Tactics lies in and fills the province of fighting. Strategy not only stops on the frontier, but has for its purpose the reduction of fighting, to the slenderest possible proportions.

Aim of Strategy.

This statement may be disputed by those who conceive the destruction of the enemy's armed forces as the only sound aim in war, who hold that the only goal of strategy is battle, and who are obsessed with the Clausewitzian saying that "blood is the price of victory." Yet if one should concede this point and meet its advocates on their own ground, the statement would remain unshaken. For even if a decisive battle be the only goal, all recognize that the object of strategy is to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less proportionately will be the fighting.

The perfection of strategy would therefore be to produce a decision—the destruction of the enemy's armed forces through their unarming by surrender—without any fighting. History pro vides examples where strategy, helped by favourable conditions, has practically produced such a result. Caesar's Ilerda (q.v.) campaign was one, Cromwell's Preston campaign (see GREAT REBELLION) another, while in recent times there have been the operations which culminated at Sedan (q.v.) in 1870 and between Galilee and the hills of Samaria in 1918. (See PALESTINE, OPERA TIONS IN.) It rests normally with the government, responsible for the grand strategy of a war, to decide whether strategy should make its contribution by achieving a military decision or otherwise. And just as the military is but one of the means to the end of grand strategy—one of the instruments in the surgeon's case—so battle is but one of the means to the end of strategy. If the conditions are suitable, it is usually the quickest in effect, but if the con ditions are unfavourable it is folly to use it.

Let us assume that a strategist is empowered to seek a military decision. His responsibility is to seek it under the most ad vantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic position so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision its continuation by a battle is guaran teed to do so. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may either be the enemy's dissolution or his disruption in battle. Dissolution may involve some partial measure of fighting but this has not the character of a battle. Famous examples, be yond those already quoted, from history include Hannibal at Tras imenus (q.v.), Turenne's last campaign in Alsace (see DUTCH WARS), and Napoleon's Ulm campaign. (See NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS.) Among clear cases where disruption was an inevita ble sequel to the strategic advantage previously gained one may instance Scipio's campaign of Ilipa (q.v.), Cromwell's of Wor cester (q.v. and also GREAT REBELLION), Napoleon's of Jena, Grant's of Vicksburg (q.v.).

Action of Strategy.

How is the strategic dislocation pro duced? In the physical, or "logistical," sphere it is the result of a move which (a) upsets the enemy's dispositions and by com pelling a sudden "change of front" dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces; (b) separates his forces; (c) en dangers his supplies; (d) menaces the route or routes by which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base or homeland. A dislocation may be produced by one of these effects but is more often the consequence of several. Differentia tion, indeed, is difficult because a move directed towards the enemy's rear tends to combine these effects. Their respective influence, however, varies and has varied throughout history ac cording to the size of armies and their complexity of the organiza tion. With armies which "live on the country," drawing their supplies locally by plunder or requisition, the line of communica tion has negligible importance. Even in a higher stage of develop ment, a small force has less dependence on the line of communica tion and enables supplies to be transported with it for limited periods. The larger an army and the more complex its organi zation the more prompt and serious in effect is a menace to its line of communication.