In May, the head quarters of Marmont were at Salaman ca, of Drouet at Aguaza, and of Soult at Seville. Lord Wellington was posted at Fucnte de Guinaldo. His Lord ship, at this time, formed a plan to cut off the communica tion between the French army of Portugal, and that before Cadiz ; and, for this purpose, by a series of masterly ma noeuvres, he made himself master of the bridge of Alma raz, on the eastern side of the province of Estremadura. Here again Marshal Marmont was too slow in his motions, for he did not arrive till the bridge was in the possession of the English. The next object of Lord \Vellington was Salamanca, before which some French troops were posted, but these retired on his Lordship's approach. Marmont, however, though he was not able, or did not deem it prudent, to attempt preventing the loss of Salamanca, resolved to attempt its recapture. Accordingly, he collected his ar my on the Douro, betwixt the 16th and 19th of June, and moved forward on the 20th. Lord Wellington did not re fuse battle; but Marmont again retreated, retaining, how ever, a communication with some forts in the neighbour hood of the city, which still held out. Against these forts Lord 'Wellington directed all his efforts, and having redu ced them, he pushed forward against Marmont. The lat ter retired, crossed the Douro, and took up a strong posi tion on the bank of that river. This position appeared to Lord Wellington so strong, that, in order to draw Mar mont away from it, he moved in such a direction, as seemed to threaten Madrid. Thc French general also, about the same time, endeavoured to carry into execution a scheme for cutting off the communication between the British ar my and Ciudad Rodrigo ; and, for this purpose, having been reinforced, he moved in such a manner, as to threaten the left of the British. Lord Wellington, on seeing this, retreated a little, so as to render it secure ; and Marmont being thus foiled, attempted to turn the right. Lord Wel lington now manoeuvred in such a manner, as would not only protect it, but enable him to take advantage of any blunder which Marmont might commit. Thus several days were spent ; Marmont constantly manoeuvring to turn the right of the British, and Lord Wellington, making correspondent movements, in order to defeat his object. At last, Marmont, in his anxiety to out-manonvre the Bri tish army, neglected the proper defence of his own, extend ing his line to the left, so far as to weaken the main body considerably. This fault Lord Wellington instantly per ceived, and took advantage of it. The centre and left of the French were attacked with such successful and impe tuous bravery, that they were soon beaten. The right would have as speedily shared the same fate, but it was re inforced by the troops that fled from the left, and held out till it was attacked in front, when it also gave way. It was now dark, but the French were pursued ; and, during the battle and pursuit, suffered so severely, that only a few es caped to Valladolid. Marmont himself was wounded early in the battle.
Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid with the army of the centre, in the hope of being able to join Marmont before his engagement with Lord Wellington ; but, on learning the issue of the battle of Salamanca, he retreated in such a manner, as he trusted would draw off his Lordship from the pursuit of the defeated army. In this also he was dis appointed, and Madrid was now abandoned to its fate. Nor was this the only result of the battle : Soult withdrew from the south of Spain ; and the siege of Cadiz, which the French had continued so very long, was raised. The ob ject of this general, as well as of Marmont, was now to compel Lord Wellington to abandon Madrid, of which he bad taken unmolested possession ; and as they advanced with superior forces, and in such a direction as threatened to cut off his Lordship's communication with the other British forces in Spain, he evacuated the capital on the 1st of September, leaving a force under General Ilill, which he hoped would be able to protect it ; but Soult having joined Joseph Bonaparte, the English general found him self under the necessity of abandoning Madrid to its fate.
Lord Wellington, thus compelled to quit the capital, re solved, if possible, to bring Marmont to an engagement ; but previously, it was necessary to reduce Burgos. About the middle of September, operations were commenced against this place. The commander, fully sensible of its
importance, and that, till it Was reduced, Lord Welling ton could not safely advance against Marmont, defended it with great skill and bravery. Little or no impression had been made on it, when his Lordship learnt that Souham, who had succeeded Marmont, was approaching with a large force, and that General Hill, after the loss of Madrid, was closly pressed by Sault. This intelligence induced his Lordship to abandon the siege ; and, in his retreat, he was closely followed by Souham ; and General Hill re treating in such a direction as to join his Lordship, and be ing followed by Soult, in a short time the two British and the two French armies were united. As, however, the lat ter were much more numerous than the former, they oblig ed Lord Wellington to continue his retreat to the confines of Portugal.
At the close of the campaign, the French armies, exclu sively of those which were wholly occupied by the desulto ry warfare of the Spaniards, consisted of about 104,000 men ; of these, 72,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry were un• der the command of Soult, who directed the armies former ly under the command of Joseph Bonaparte and Souham. Suchet, in the south of Spain, had with him 18,000 infan try, and 4,000 cavalry, to oppose the Spaniards there, and an Anglo-Sicilian force, which had lately landed. Oppos ed to the French armies, were about 70,000 British, Ger mans, and Portuguese. But of the French, a large pro portion consisted of young conscripts. With respect to artillery, the French were superior. The numerical force of their cavalry was also greater, but they were individual ly inferior to the British.
We have already mentioned the causes of the dispute between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte. As the discussions that took place in 1811, did not promise an amicable adjustment, Bonaparte prepared for war, by re taining possession of the Prussian fortresses in the north of Germany, and sending large bodies of troops there. Nor was the Emperor Alexander idle ; he endeavoured, indeed, to prevent the recurrence of hostilities ; but finding that impracticable, he used his utmost endeavours to render the resources of his vast empire available, in the event of a war with France, and he courted the friendship of Bri tain. The organization of the army was also improved. By these measures the Emperor Alexander saw himself, at the end of 1811, possessed of forces amounting to nearly 400,000 men, 300,000 of which he could bring against the French. When the dispute between France and Russia began, the forces which Bonaparte could have spared, in the event of an immediate war, were comparatiVely few; he therefore protracted the negotiation, till he had as sembled a more numerous, and, in every respect, a better equipped army, than he had ever before led into the field. The contingent of the confederation of the Rhine was aug mented. The King of Saxony was called upon to join in the war, on the ground that Russia threatened the Polish possessions, which Bonaparte had given him. From the southern extremity of Europe, Murat marched his Italian troops. The King of Prussia reluctantly contributed near ly all his army ; and Austria was called upon to fulfil her engagements, by which, in the event of a war, she was to support France. All the best troops that Bonaparte had in the Peninsula, were marched to the north of Germany. In short, all Europe, from the Pyrenees to the Baltic on its western side, and from the extremity of Italy to the same sea on its eastern side, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the confines of Poland, was leagued, under Bonaparte, against Russia. For such an immense army, about to in vade a country nearly barbarous and desolate, it was neces sary to provide enormous stores of provision, ammuni tion, &c. These were all brought up to the north of Ger many, and such arrangements for their conveyance made, as Bonaparte expected would furnish him with a regular and full supply, till the Emperor Alexander was intimidat ed into submission. For there can be no doubt, that he expected, by the formidable nature of his preparations, or, at most, by the decisive blow which he firmly believed he should soon be able to strike, that Alexander would sue for peace, on such conditions as he chose to give.