On the 9th of May, Bonaparte having collected an army of at least 400,000 men, set out from St Cloud. On the 6th of June he crossed the Vistula. On the 22d of that month, be formally declared war against Russia ; and two clays af terwards he crossed the Niemen, and entered the Russian territories.
Hitherto the Russians had made little or no resistance ; but as they had marked out the first line of defence on the banks of the Dwina, it was supposed that there they would seriously oppose their invaders. The plan on which they had resolved to act was, however, different. Knowing the impetuous activity of Bonaparte, and that he had been ac customed to astonish and intimidate by the rapidity of his movements, and by advancing into the very heart of the counsry which he invaded, they hoped to draw him on into the interior of Russia, far limn his resources, and to places where he could not support his army by plunder and con tributions. They also anticipated the effects of a Russian winter, if he should be mad enough to continue in it till this season. In order that this plan should be carried into complete and successful execution, it was necessary that the inhabitants and sol ,iers of the invaded country should be such as the Russians were, both of them incapable of being seduced by the arts of the French,—even deaf to the promises of liberty, when that blessing was to come from an enemy. In short, the attachment, both of the Russian peasantry and the Russian army, to their Emperor and their country is so strong, that no temptation, no difficulty, can possibly shake it. But though the plan of the Russians was to draw Bonaparte into the interior of their vast, deso late, and barbarous empire, yet they at the same time de termined to oppose him wherever they could do it with ad vantage, and thus weaken him as he advanced.
Such was the plan of the Russians, and they acted up to it with a patriotic perseverance which does them infi nite honour. Bonaparte, indeed, was successful, in so far as driving back the Russians and advancing constituted success : he even succeeded in dividing one of the Russian corps from the main army. But as he advanced he found no signs of intimidation on the part of the Emperor; no proof of attachment or submission from the people; and he must have been sensible that he was leaving his re sources far behind, while he could not hope for regular and sufficient supply from a country never well cultivated or fertile, and now laid waste and deserted by the inhabitants as he proceeded. Those discouraging circumstances, how ever, did not appear so manifestly while he was in Poland and Lithuania, as the inhabitants of these districts, not at tached to Russia, and regarding Bonaparte as their libera tor, received him with gratitude and joy. On the 28th of June, he entered \Vilna, which he did not leave till the 17tb of July. His transactions during this stay are not clearly known ; but though he was stationary, the different divi sions of his army were on the advance. His plan now be gan to unfold itself, and he seemed to be aiming at once on the destruction of the main Russian army, and the occu pation of Petersburg. On the latter enterprise, a corps under the command of Marshal Macdonald was sent. The rest of his army followed the line of the retreat of the Russians.
At Drisna, the Russians had an entrenched camp ; but as the corps which Bonaparte had succeeded in separating had not yet come up, this was abandoned, and a position at \Vitepsk occupied. On the 24th of July, they arrived here, one of their corps having been previously dispatched to the north to cover Petersburg. On the 25th, 26th, and 27th, three battles took place ; the Russians fought ob stinately; and having succeeded in weakening the French, again retreated. In the mean time, Marshal Davoust, who had been sent after the Russian corps which was separated from the main army, came up with it; and brought it to ac tion : but the result was not favourable to him, and lie found himself so weakened that he was not able to prevent its rejunction. The French army which had marched on the route to Petersburg, was equally unfortunate. The plan of its general was to cross the Dwina, come round upon Riga, and thus cut off the communication with the capital.
But in consequence of his losses on the 30th and 31st of July, in two very severe actions, he was obliged to recross that river, and the communication between Petersburg and the main Russian army was thus rendered secure. This army, on leaving Witepsk, retreated on Smolensk, Bona parte still following them ; but on account of the nature of the country, and the extreme difficulty of procuring provi sions, he was obliged to disperse his different corps at a considerable distance from each other; he also began to experience another serious inconvenience. In other coun tries which he had invaded, he had been directed in his march, either by accurate maps, or by the information and guidance of the peasantry ; but of this part of the Russian empire, there were no maps sufficiently accurate and mi nute for his purpose, and the peasantry fled at his approach. He thus advanced, ignorant of his route, and of the situa tion of his adversaries ; and from these causes we find, even in the French bulletins, frequent acknowledgments that dis astrous surprises took place. But the army suffered most from fatigue and want of provisions ; so much so, indeed, that Bonaparte could not move from Witepsk till the mid dle of August. From this place he advanced to Smolensk, where he at length hoped to bring the Russians to a deci sive engagement. They did wait for him here, but only till they had acted on their regular plan ; for after having fought the French with great steadiness, and caused them great losS, they again retreated. Soon afterwards, the com mand of the grand Russian army was given to Kutusoff, who resolved to improve upon the plan of his predecessor, the Baron de Tolly, by offering a more steady and perse vering resistance to the enemy, but still retreating, even after success. On the 18th of August, the French having thrown a bridge over the Borysthenes, crossed that river ; and as it was now evident that the Russians meant to re treat in the direction of Moscow, Bonaparte endeavoured to cut them off from that place. In this attempt, however, he did not succeed at this time ;;:and the divisions who were employed on this occasion suffered severely. The Russian general continued his retreat, till he arrived at Borodino, within a short distance of Moscow. Here the position was so extremely favourable for defence, though it did not cover the capital, that he resolved at length to try the issue of a general engagement with the French. Bonaparte, though he could have reached Moscow without fighting, preferred attacking Kutusoff. The force on each side was nearly equal, amounting to about 120,000 men ; for alrea dy the French, by the obstinacy of Russian defence, the incursions of the Cossacks, who continually harassed their march, and the losses occasioned by disease, fatigue, and inadequate food, were reduced to this comparatively small number. The position of the Russians, naturally very strong. had been further strengthened by art ; their line was protected by two heights, crowned with redoubts at 100 paces from one another ; and the ridge was covered with artillery and infantry, for the purpose of supporting their centre. At six o'clock in the morning of the 7th of Sep tember, Bonaparte commenced the attack, by attempting to carry the Russian line by main force. The contest was murderous, but the issue unfavourable to the French ; and while they were thus occupied, nearly 30,000 Cossacks cut their way into the centre of their camp, carrying confusion, disorder, and dismay, along with them. Bonaparte next ordered that an attack should be made on the heights ; and this, after a most sanguinary contest, was partially suc cessful. While these operations were going on in one part of the army, in another part the Russians were the assailants, and drove back the French. Thus the engage ment continued with varying success till night ; and though the French were undoubtedly masters of one part of the field of battle, yet, in other parts, they were so much beaten, that Bonaparte judged it prudent to draw off his forces.