The Russian general, having thus succeeded in the great object of the campaign, which was to weaken Bona parte as much as possible, and at the same time to draw him farther into the country, resolved to abandon Moscow to its fate; and this he was the more disposed to do, as the French army after the battle had been reinforced by a corps under Marshal Victor. Bonaparte now saw the capital of Russia within his reach : and though, by the persevering refusal of the Emperor Alexander to treat, he could hard ly expect that the possession of it would bring him to terms, yet he looked forward to it as a place of refuge against the severity of the Russian winter, and as the probable de pository of those articles of provision and refreshments, which his army so much wanted. How great then must have been his mortification and disappointment, when, just as he was entering Moscow, he beheld the flames consu ming it ! The patriotic governor, and no less patriotic inha bitants, nobly sacrificing their venerated city,—their own homes and property, rather than that the French should derive any advantage from them.
Of the hopelessness of the situation of Bonaparte and his army, at this time,--it is scarcely possible to form an idea : he had indeed conquered Russia, if that could be called conquest, which consisted in advancing into the in terior of a country, after most severe and obstinate fight ing, where no provisions were to be had, where all fled from his approach, and in reaching the capital of that country, only to behold it in flames. The winter was ap proaching,--a Russian winter,—he was at the distance of 500 or 600 miles from a hospitable climate, and from his resources ; on all sides of him were an enraged peasantry, and an army accustomed to the climate, acquainted with the country, and constantly increasing ; whereas his army could receive no increase ; nor even continue at its present force, diminished as it must daily be by fatigue, want of provisions, and the severity of the climate. In this dread ful crisis, Bonaparte contiued his usual and favourite sys tem of deception. His bulletins, calculated to deceive his subjects, represented the climate of Russia as mild, the stores of Moscow as amply sufficient for all the wants of the army, and the peasantry as rejoicing in the presence of their invader. Notwithstanding the approach of winter, he lingered in Moscow, in the vain hope that the Emperor Alexander would agree to peace ; but he knew too well that the possessor of the ancient capital of Russia was in fact at his mercy ; and he positively refused to negotiate.
At length, the proud and obstinate spirit of Bonaparte gave way, and he resolved to retreat ; but even this was re presented in his bulletins as only a lateral movement on Petersburgh. His resolution, however, was formed too
late: had he left Moscow as soon as ever his army was re freshed and prepared for retreat, and before the approach of winter was so near, he might have escaped the unparal leled disasters which Mel him ; but by delaying it till the middle of October, lie rendered it impossible for him to proceed far, before the severity of a Russian winter would attack his troops, while he gave time for the enemy to com plete their operations for harassing them. These prepara tions, indeed, were extensive. On every side the Russians were collected ; and especially immense numbers of Cos sacks, admirably calculated for this mode of warfare.
Before Bonaparte could leave Moscow, it was necessary to drive back the grand Russian army, which occupied the Kalouga road, by which he meant to proceed ; this Murat, who commanded the cavalry, attempted; but he was de feated with dreadful loss. In consequence of this defeat, Bonaparte was compelled to abandon his intention of re treating by the route of Kalouga ; but in order to deceive Kutusoff, he began his march in that direction, and after wards turned off on the road to Smolensk. He himself marched with the van of his army, surrounded by the Im perial gaurds : the Viceroy of Italy brought up the rear.
As soon as Kutusoff was informed of the route which the French army had taken, he began his march in a pa valid line, leaving it to the other divisions of the army, and especially the Cossacks, to hang on the rear and the flanks of the enemy. No words can paint the misery and suffer. ings of the French during this retreat. " Scarcely had they, worn out by a clay's march, along broken and deep roads, during which they were constantly obliged to be (idler on the alert, or actually fighting, lain down on the wet and cold ground, to obtain a little rest or sleep, when the Cossacks rushed into their camps, and before the men could prepare themselves for resistance or defence, many were killcd—all were thrown into confusion and dismay, and their artillery and stores carried off." While they were thus exposed to the sudden and irregular attacks of the Cossacks, Kutusoff seized every opportunity of bring ing them to battle. On the 24th of October, he attacked them most vigorously ; the French fought with desperation, but their strength was at length worn out, and they were compelled to retreat with the loss of 16 pieces of cannon. After this defeat, Bonaparte pushed forward before his army towards Smolensko, the Imperial guard alone accom panying him in his rapid and disgraceful flight.