Bonaparte finding himself unequal to contend with both the allied armies, pursued his usual plan of directing his whole force, first against one singly, in the hope if he succeeded, of overwhelming the other : and as Blucher had separated himself to a considerable distance from the rest of the allies, Bonaparte resolved to follow him. Be fore, however, he did this, he made a rapid and unex pected movement to the north of Nogent, where he attack ed a Russian corps, and took the whole of them prisoners. On the 14th of February, having joined Marmont, he ad vanced against Blucher, who being inferior in numbers, and particularly in cavalry, formed his infantry into squares, and retreated. Bonaparte followed him, but notwithstanding his attacks were almost incessant and very desperate, he made little or no impression, not one of the squares being broken. In order to intercept the retreat of Blucher, Bo naparte had ordered a corps of cavalry to push forward and get into his line ; but Blucher forced his way through it, by opening a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. At night he reached Etoges, but here he was assailed by a body of infantry, which had penetrated through bye roads on his flanks and rear ; he was therefore again under the necessity of renewing the attack, and was again success ful. In the mean time, the entrenched camp, which Bo naparte had formed for the protection of his army of re serve at Soissons, was assailed by General Winzingerode with such impetuosity, that nearly 3000 men were taken,. and the town itself was entered.
While Bonaparte was pursuing Blucher, the grand army put itself in motion on the left. On the 11th of February, a division of it carried by assault the town of Sens, 82 miles south-east of Paris, and afterwards joined the Bavarians under General Wrede. Other divisions of the allies ad , vanced nearly in the same direction ; so that by the mid dle of February, they had spread themselves about 40 miles along the course of the Seine. Marshals Victor and Oudi not, to whom the protection of this important river had been entrusted, alarmed at the advance of such superior numbers, abandoned the left bank, and destroyed the bridges; these, however, being soon re-established, Prince Schwart zenberg, the commander in chief of the allies, fixed his head quartet s at Bray. The allies, however, had now spread themselves so much, and thereby so weakened their line, that Bonaparte, returning quickly from the pursuit of Blucher, gained some advantages over part of the grand army, and in consequence of this the commander in chief united the whole of it behind the Seine. Part of it was posted near a bridge over this river ; this Bonaparte re peatedly attacked, but was repulsed three times with great slaughter. As, however, it was of the greatest importance for him to gain this position, he renewed the attack the fourth time, and obtaining possession of the bridge, passed over a considerable part of his army.
Blucher, though he retreated before Bonaparte, no soon er found that his adversary was gone against another part of the allies, than he resolved again to advance ; his object evidently being to press on. if possible, to Paris itself.
After having prevented Oudinot from crossing the Seine, and obliged Marmont to retreat, even after his junction with Macdonald, he pushed forward in such a manner as to render the allies masters of the whole line of the Marne for above 80 miles. Bonaparte now found himself under the necessity of again turning his principal attention to Blucher ; for it is observable, that whenever the French armies in this campaign were commanded by any of his marshals, they were unsuccessful. Bonaparte alone seem ed to be able to procure them the chance of success. It was therefore absolutely necessary, that he should march with the utmost rapidity alternately from the grand army of the allies to Blucher, and from Blucher to the grand ar my. At this time, his object was to prevent the junction of this general with Winzingerode ; but being foiled in his project he could not retreat without a battle. Between the 4th and the 9th of March, various skirmishes took place between his troops and those of Blucher ; on the latter day, the Prussian general determined to give battle at Laon ; he was, however, anticipated by Bonaparte, who, taking ad vantage of a thick mist, attacked his right and centre, and obliged him to fall back to the very walls of Laon. As soon, however, as the mist disappeared, Blucher's army re gained the ground which it had lost ; and a severe contest ensued on their right and centre. The most important part of the engagement, however, took place on the left. of Blucher's army, which the French attacked under a heavy cannonade. But Blucher immediately reinforcing his left with two divisions, and ordering his whole army to advance, the French were not only repulsed, but actually borne down, and thrown into very great confusion, retreat ing towards Rheims. In this engagement Bonaparte lost upwards of 70 pieces of cannon; and the number of pri-, soners was immense. •.
The negociations at Chatillon were Mill going on, the allies, notwithstanding their successes,•adheribo. to their former proposal to treat with Bonaparte, as the Emperor of France. When he directed Can-. lincourt to listen to their terms, but as soon as ever he gained the most trifling advantage, he displayed his cha racteristic haughtiness, and actually behaved as if the allies were in his power. He seems, even at this time, to have calculated on the lukewarmness of Austria ; and it is not unlikely that the negociations were kept open longer than they would otherwise have been, and better terms were of fered to him, in consequence of the connection between him and the Emperor of Austria. He might be strength ened, too, in this belief, from the circumstance that the Austrian army hitherto had done very little for the com mon cause, Blucher not having been supported, as he might, and ought to have been, by Prince Schwartzenberg.