The whole of the allies now approached Dresden in different directions ; but Bonaparte, not cured of that ob stinacy which had occasioned the ruin of his army at Mos cow, persevered in remaining in Dresden till he found that the allies, by directing their principal efforts towards Leipsic, would completely cut him off from France, unless ho quitted it. On the 7th of October, therefore, he left Dresden in company with the King of Saxony, and took up a position in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. About this time he was deserted by the King of Bavaria, who ordered 55,000 of his troops under General \Vrede to act with the Austrians. The allies having collected their respective armies round Leipsic resolved to attack the French in va ious points. Several very severe battles took place in con sequence of this, in all of .s hich the French were defeated ; and at length they were obliged to concentrate their whole force in the immediate suburbs of the town. On the 16th of October, the grand army of the allies made a general attack to the south of it ; but after a dreadful slaughter, they could not succeed in dislodging the French. The 17th was chiefly occupied in preparing for a renewal of the contest. On the morning of the 18th, the different ar mies of the allies advanced from the t illages round Leip sic, for their grand attack on the city. During the battle, some Saxon and Westphalian regiments abandoned Bona parte, and went over to the- allies. Few contests are on record, that have been more dreadful or more decisive than the battle of Leipsic ; the result of which was, that the French lost, in wounded, and prisoners, 40,000 men, and 65 pieces of artillery : seventeen German battalions also deserted from thom and joined the conquerors. On the morning of the 19th, the King of Saxony sent a flag of truce to the Emperor Alexander, requesting him to spare the town ; but an immediate assault was ordered, and by eleven o'clock the allies were in possession of it, two hours after Bonaparte had made his escape. In it were taken the rear guard of the French, amounting to 30,000, and their sick and wounded, nearly 2'2,000, besides their magazines, artillery, and stores.
The retreat of the French was marked by the most ex treme confusion and disorder ; and if we take into account, that it was made at a more favourable season of the year, sod through a country better adapted to a retreating army, it cannot be deemed less disastrous or disgraceful than the vetreat from Russia. The line of their retreat was on Frankfort : they were followed by the Prussian General D'York, while the combined Austrian and Bavarian army was posted at Harlan to intercept them. Here, on the 29th of October, a partial engagement took place, in which the French were successful. On the 3Ist Bonaparte fixed his head quarters at Frankfort ; and on the 2d of November he arrived at Mentz, whence he proceeded shortly after wards to Paris.
On the 14th of November, he replied to the address of the Senate, in language of apparent frankness, acknow ledging his disasters, but appealing to the French nation for support under them. Two decrees were immediately passed, one imposing additional taxes, and the other order nt levy of 300,000 conscripts, as the enemy had invaded the frontiers on the side of the Pyrenees and the not th, and as those of the Rhine and beyond the Alps were threaten ed. The nanaral effect of his •ei.erses now began to ap
pear : a revolution broke out in Holland, which, being as sisted by the English, terminated in separating that country from France. Hanover also was entered, and liberated by the Crown Prince of Sweden. Bremen and Ernhden were recovered. The Viceroy of Italy, unable to cope with the Austrians, abandoned Trieste and the Dalmatian coast ; and Dresden and Stettin, with their numerous garrisons, surrendered to the combined forces.
The allied sovereigns, who had assembled at Frankfort, published a declaration on the 1st of December, laying open their views with regard to France. Against that country they did not make war, but against the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte, to whom they had already offered fair and honourable terms of peace, but in vain, It was for the advantage of Europe, that France should be indepen dent and great. This they did not wish to prevent ; so far from it, if they succeeded in their plans, they would leave her so ; but they were also determined that their states should, for the future, he also independent,—no longer lia ble to the tyranny and ambition of Bonaparte. The last twenty years had witnessed unparalleled calamities heaped on Europe : They trusted they had now in their power to put an end to these calamities, and they were resolved to do so. This declaration, so moderate and liberal, displeas ed Bonaparte. There was nothing in it on which he could lay hold, as manifesting an intention to injure the honour or weaken the just power of France ; he therefore replied to it in general and ambiguous terms, in his speech before the Legislative Body on the 19th of December, maintaining, that the allies alone were to blame if peace had not been concluded, as he had adhered to their prelimi nary basis ; adding, however, that if peace were made, it must be on terms consistent with honour.
In the month of December, the allies crossed the Rhine and invaded France. This operation was performed with little or no opposition at various points, not a single French army appearing in the field to defend the frontier. The strong Fort of Iluningen, in Alsace, was invested, and the allied troops spread over that provinceandFranche Compte. Under these circumstances, Bonaparte issued a decree on the 26th of December, announcing the mission of senators, or councillors of state, into the military divisions, to act as commissioners extraordinary, armed with powers to provide and organize the means of defence ; and thus, in fact, sus pending all the magistracies, and other authorities in the country, and extending the immediate agency of military despotism to every part. There were thirty commission ers appointed, who were to be attended by as many law of ficers. These efforts, however, were unavailing, and their result proved at once, that the French people were wea ried out with calamity, and were disposed to regard the al lies rather as friends than foes, and that the authority and power of Bonaparte ware drawing to a close ; for he must have expected, either that the people would have risen of their own accord, when called upon to defend their coun try, or that he possessed the means of compelling their services on this occasion ; neither of which took place to any considerable extent.