In order to bring the affairs of this part of France to a conclusion, we shall proceed with our narrative of them, premising, that about this time Bonaparte had been forced to abandon the government of France, and Louis XVIII. hail been acknowledged king. Intelligence of these events had been immediately transmitted to Lord Wellington and Soult, but it unfortunately did not arrive in sufficient time to prevent another battle. Soult had taken up a strong position near Toulouse; on the 8th of April, part of Lord Wellington's army moved across the Garonne ; between this river and the canal of Languedoc were the fortified heights, that formed the chief strength of the French posi tion: his Lordship resolved at once to storm these in front, and to turn the right of the enemy, while a tete du pant, which they formed on the canal to protect their left, should be threatened. The 9th of April was spent in preparing for these attacks ; and on the 10th they were carried into execution. They were in all points so well planned, and so admirably executed, that at the close of the day the French were' completely hemmed in, the allies having established themselves on three sides of Toulouse, and the road to Carcassonc being the only one left open. In the night of the I 1 th, Soult drew off his troops by this road ; and Lord Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph the following morning. The close of the campaign in the south of France was marked by one unfortunate event: Before Ba yonne, which Sir John Hope invested, the French had a fortified camp, from which they made a sortie at three o'clock of the morning of the 13th of April. The piquets of the British army were driven in, and Sir John Hope, in his gallant attempts to support them, came unexpectedly on part of the French : his horse, which was shot dead, fell upon him; and in this situation he was made prisoner.
Although the allies in the north and cast of France had at different times, since the commencement of the cam paign, reached within a short distance of Paris, yet they had always been obliged to fall back, in consequence partly of a want of concert, and pat tly of the wonderful rapidity of Bo. naparte's movements, who, with a force decidedly inferior, contrived to pass from one point to another, so quickly and unexpectedly, as sometimes to defeat, and almost always to retard the plans of the allies. As soon, however, as Austria began to act in a more decided manner, he was rendered sensible that his fate could not be much longer protracted, unless he had recourse to some desperate ex pedient, and that expedient completely succeeded. On the 23d of March, the army of Prince Schwartzenberg directed its route to Vitrey, which was in possession of the Prussians. Bonaparte also marched on the same place, for the purpose of uniting with Ney and Macdonald, who were advancing from St Dizier ; but the Austrians hav ing reached the place before the French, he threw him self into their rear, while he formed a communication with the army of Blucher. Perhaps at the time Bonaparte found himself obliged to adopt this measure ; perhaps it was the deliberate consequence of a concerted plan ; for, whoever has studied his campaigns must know that he often obtained success, by doing those acts, which, by their very boldness and rashness, so astonished and perplexed his opponents, that from the effects which they produced on them in this respect, their success in a great measure originated. In this case, the object of Bonaparte, if his
measure was preconcerted, which most probably it was, was to get into the rear of the allies ; and threaten their com munication with Germany. It may be urged that his force was not adequate to destroy the communication ; but it must be recollected, that he could receive reinforcements from the garrisons of the towns on the frontiers, provided nothing occurred to prevent his reaching them. It is not likely, however, that he would have abandoned Paris to its fate by thus getting into the rear of the allies, and leaving the road to the capital open to them, had he not believed that the measures taken for its safety were per fectly adequate ; for he must have known, that whoever possessed Paris possessed France, so much influence does the capital possess over the provinces. The defence of this city had been .entrusted to Marmont, under whose command the national guards, and such other troops as could be spared for this object, were placed. The allies, disregarding the position of Bonaparte in their rear, re solved to strike a grand and decisive blow, by advancing in a body to Paris. There can be no doubt, that in it they had a strong party ; even some of Bonaparte's favourites and former advisers, perceiving that their lives and all they had gained in his service were put in extreme jeopardy, by his rashness, resolved to abandon him and court the fa vour of the allies. The mass of the population too, were at. least indifferent about him ; they did not, therefore, re gard the approach or probable entry of the allies as any evil or disgrace, and consequently resolved not to oppose it, especially as their opposition would have been fruitless. The army of the allies which advanced against the capital of France, amounted to upwards of 200,000 men. On the night of the 24th, three divisions of the French arrived at Vitrey, in the hope of joining Bonaparte there ; but they were immediately attacked by the allies, and driven back. This is only one proof among many others, of the imper fect intelligence which the French possessed, even in their own country ; and indicated, perhaps, as much as any ether circumstance, the decline, not only of the authority, but of the popularity of Bonaparte. In consequence of similar want of intelligence, both respecting the situation of Bonaparte, and the advance of the allies, a convoy, consisting of 5000 men, who were protecting a large quantity of provisions and other necessities of the utmost importance to Bona parte, were met by the allies, and after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender.