if, then, our duty as moral agents be perfectly coinci dent with our best interests, we may safely assume ex pediency, in the enlarged sense in which we have consi dered it, as a sure criterion of virtue : for it is impossible but that which is most conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of man, must also be agreeable to the will of God, who, in all the arrangements of his provi dence, has obviously consulted our happiness.
If we admit that this is a fair criterion, we may per haps he able to throw some light on the much agitated question, "To what principle in our nature we are to ascribe the feeling of moral approbation." For the ques tion will then be reduced to this, What is the principle which enables us to decide respecting our best interests ? And this question will be answered by considering what principle, or principles, are employed in comparing dif ferent actions, in anticipating consequences, in contrast ing the effects of different gratifications, and in taking into view the general interests of man, as a social, ra tional and accountable being. Lest we should err in assigning to one principle what, in fact, we consider to be the results of several, we say, in general, that these operations arc to be ascribed to the intellectual part of our nature : for we do not pretend to be acquainted with any principle but reason, which can show us the obliga tion to obey any law. Where visible authority is inter posed, fear would compel obedience, even when the law is unreasonable: yet even here we cannot exclude the province of reason, which compares the different results of obedience and disobedience, and compels us to adopt the course most likely to ensure the least injury, or the highest satisfaction.
Conscience is generally supposed to be the chief agent in these decisions : and its power is indeed great ; it acts with a force which is thought inconsistent with the nature of a secondary or factitious principle, and is appealed to as a sovereign arbiter in all discussions about right and wrong. It may always be safely trust ed,when enlightened by knowledge and guided by rea son : but without their assistance it is a dangerous, and often a destructive adviser ; clearly evincing that it has no independent jurisdiction, and is possessed of no in fallible certainty of decision. It is merely a mental ha bit, arising out of the circumstances of our nature, and strengthened by the most powerful associations, and the most interesting recollections : and is disciplined by constant use, till it acts with a rapidity and force which makes us forget every thing but the emotions which overwhelm us, Suppose we should wish to enforce any one of the moral virtues, we can derive arguments both from the positive command of the Supreme law-giver, and also from many accessary.circumstances which recommend
present obedience, independent of more remote views of advantage. Let us see, for example, how we would recommend the virtue of patience, from considerations of a moral nature. In the first place, we feel that im patience renders us unhappy : this is a hint from our own nature, to teach us to repress our headlong pas sions, and to wait patiently for the desired consumma tion. In the next place, we see that impatience does not promote, but rather retard, the accomplishment of our wishes : here reason lends its suggestions in aid of our feelings, to strengthen the great moral lesson of patient endurance. But this is not all ; the same lesson is enforced by the whole order of nature, and we are actually trained to it by the usual economy of provi dence. No man expects to reap on the same day in which he sows; no man expects all the time to be an nihilated which lies between him and enjoyment : he is compelled to wait ; and he cannot but see that it is best to do it patiently. We perceive that a certain portion of time, and a certain quantity of labour, are necessary for the production of certain effects, and that cheerful application is the best antidote against the irksomeness of labour, and the tedium of hope deferred. We see also that time is necessary for the evolution of the plant, and for its advancement to strength and beauty ; and that we should completely blast our hopes, did we not patiently wait for the process and period of fructi fication. How beneficent, then, is our law-giver, who presents so many inducements to observe the precepts which he has enjoined, and who in fact makes the sys tem of nature, and the arrangements of his providence, monitors to point the way to happiness and duty. By what arguments do we enforce temperance ? Does any moral sense tell us how much we should eat and drink ? No: but a rule no less certain is given us by the au thor of our nature : for we feel excess to be hurtful to our health, or we feel that it impairs our faculties, and gives undue strength to our passions ; or we perceive that it will ruin our fortune, and thus ultimately destroy all our means of enjoyment. Any one of these reasons is sufficient to enforce temperance, and to show us that it is a virtue sanctioned by the wisdom of the Supreme Law-giver. Nor are we without arguments for this vir tue drawn from the constitution of nature : for the earth produces enough for the temperate subsistence of its present inhabitants ; but were we to double the con sumption, one half must be starved, or the whole be in adequately fed.