All that we are anxious to establish at present is, that we are trained, to a certain extent, in the practice of morals by the very constitution of our nature, and that of the external world, before reason shows the ex pediency of a moral rule ; and that a foundation is laid for the ideas of moral approbation or disapprobation, in the simple feelings of liking or aversion, which have been produced in our minds by conformity or noncon formity to the laws imposed on us by the author of our nature; which laws, in the first instance, we blindly obey, or heedlessly violate, till experience extends our knowledge, and shows the immoveable basis on which God has established the practice of virtue.
We arc far from wishing to fritter down the moral feelings, and reduce them to mere operations of intel lect : we arc anxious, on the contrary, to preserve en tire the enthusiastic love of the fintchrum et honestum ; we wish to see it so firmly established in the heart, that it may act with intuitive quickness, and instinctive ac curacy : and God has taken care that it shall do so, un less voluntarily and obstinately resisted : for we are trained to it every day ; and the mind is as little sensi ble of any effort in distinguishing between the ordinary principles of right and wrong, as when it distinguishes by the ear the notes of a well known tune. Thus ha bit acts as the auxiliary of reason, and supplies the place of those instinctive principles which some con tend for as necessary to produce the idea of moral ap probation. This habit is neither the result of reason nor of accident; it arises out of the constitution of our nature, and the circumstances in which we are placed : and the office of reason is, to ascertain whether it has been legitimately formed, or has grown out of miscon ceptions of the human mind, and erroneous views of the nature of things. Did not our passions exercise an undue influence, and distort, as it were, the arrange ments of providence, our habits would all be regular, and would be formed according to the law of nature, which is the law of God. But since there are so many things to mislead us, reason must exercise an impartial scrutiny, and endeavour to distinguish between those associations which are natural and those which are spu rious; and between those habits which are accidental, and those which are founded on the immutable order of things.
To favour the opinion that a moral sense is necessary to give the idea of moral approbation, it has been al leged that the reasoning faculties cannot give us any idea either of the beautiful or of the good.* To be sure, reason does not produce the idea of the sublime or beautiful, but it enables us to analyse the principles on which it depends : and, in the same manner, good ness and moral beauty are not the creatures of our rea son : it only recognises them as established by the law of heaven, as agreeable to tile nature and circumstances of man, and as founded on habits which these circum stances necessarily produce.
But the fancy of some moralists is, that after reason has shown a measure to be consistent with the general good, and to harmonize with the general system, a par ticular sense is farther required to give the perception of moral beauty. This is similar to the whim which
we have endeavoured to explode from intellectual phi losophy ; (See CONCEPTION and LoGic,) viz. that after the rcason,or whatever power it may be called, has col lected the parts of an idea, or conception, into one whole, yet still a distinct faculty is required to act as gentleman usher, and introduce this stranger to the presence of the mind. We have shown that certain objects presented to the senses, are found at once to be agreeable or disagreeable. Two well proportioned pillars please the eye—two distorted or irregular ones olfend it—harmonious sounds are agreeable to the car, discortant ones are displeasing. But it often happens that the objects of perception are presented to us in such a complicated form, that we can, at first, discover neither beauty, nor i egularity, nor harmony : by a pro cess of reasoning, and patient investigation, however, we discover at last beautiful arrangement, and mutual subserviency, and adaptation of parts. The mind is then enabled to take in the whole at one glance, in consequence of the connection which reason has estab lished among the parts; and can pronounce on the beauty or deformity of the tout ensemble with as much readiness as on simple proportion, when presented to the eye.
The same thing, we believe, takes place in our judg ments respecting the merit or demerit of actions. \Ve cannot but perceive, for instance, that cruelty is wrong ; we dislike it when practised on ourselves, on our chil dren, on our relations, or our friends: and, with these feelings, it never can be an object of moral approbation in any circumstances; for we soon acquire a general abstract dislike of any quality that is particularly offen sive to us. In consequence of this, our judgments are often infected by prejudices which have arisen out of our own particular circumstances, and which give an undue bias to our opinions on general questions in mo rals. This, however, is only the abuse of that princi ple which leads us to decide, with almost intuitive readiness, on the merit or demerit of actions ; and which has its foundation in the liking or aversion which we feel, when we ourselves arc the objects of these actions. But perhaps the character of actions is not, at first sight, very apparent ; we have, perhaps, complicated motives to examine, and a variety of cir cumstances to consider, before we can form a just esti mate of the action subjected to investigation. We dis cover at last, however, we shall suppose, that cruelty or injustice lie at the root of the whole, and that every part may be resolved into these principles : in these circumstances, our earliest and most powerful associa tions lead us to pronounce a decided disapprobation of those qualities which we have been trained to dislike, which we hate when exercised towards ourselves, and which we soon learn to hate with abstracted unmixed dislike, in whatever circumstances they may appear.