Hitherto our attention has been directed almost solely to those great general principles which God has estab lished in the constitution of out nature, or the arrange ments of his providence, to direct us in that course of duty which is most consistent with his will, and with our own happiness; and we have endeavoured to show that we are evidently directed, and to a certain extent forced into the path which we ought to follow, in ful filling the will of Heaven, and prosecuting our own happiness. Our object has been to show that the prin ciples of morals, so far from being accidental or conven tional, are fixed and immutable ; varying occasionally so far as the exhibition of outward actions is concerned, but permanent in their nature and character. Our in stincts, our appetites, our bodily powers, our mental faculties, together with the whole constitution of na ture, point to the same goal, and conspire to produce the same important results. Experience and observa tion confirm these obvious intimations, by showing us that what we ought to do, is always most consistent with our happiness and interest, and that whenever we vio late the invariable order prescribed and confirmed by so many sanctions, the transgression never fails to bring its own punishment along with it, and to remind us of the eternal law by which our moral actions and feelings should be regulated, and shall one day be judged.
But whilst our doty is thus enforced by so many considerations, it must at the same time be remember ed that all our feelings have a tendency to excess; that every passion seeks its immediate and direct gratifica tion ; whilst such indulgence is in general utterly sub versive both of happiness and moral order. Hence the unceasing conflict between our passions and our reason, in which the latter is so often worsted ; and hence all those moral evils which desolate the world, which in troduce guilt into the conscience, and misery into the abodes of men. To obviate these inconveniences, is the object both of mural studies, and religious instruc tions, though these frequently prove incffi ctual to cor rect the inveterate habits arising out of vicious indul gence. There is, however, no natural impossibiiity of doing so. Any vicious habit may be corrected, if mo tives sufficiently powerful are suggested. Let a man be convinced of the odiousness and criminality of vice; let him be persuaded that its evil consequences do not terminate in the present life, but shall be continued in the world to conic ; and show him at the same time a practicable method of escaping these evils, and it is im possible to doubt that he will readily embrace it. Men continue the slaves of sin, only because they do not see its enormity, or because they reckon their emancipation hopeless. We conceive that moral reasoning may be highly useful in enlightening the mind with regard to the first of these errors. It is more peculiarly the busi ness of religion to remove the second; and although it does not fall within the province of this article to dwell particularly on the sanctions of religion, yet, as we think that they are most powerfully enforced by the judicious
.application of moral reasoning, we shall he happy if our speculations can in any degree be made subservient to this important end.
After the general view which has been given, we pro ceed to consider more particularly the various pm inciples which impel the mind to action, or which influence its determinations ; and in this investigation we shall neces sarily be called to attend to the moral estimate of the ac tions which result from these principles.
We have seen, that though an invariable rule is point ed out by the constitution of our nature, and the ar rangements of providence, yet there is no principle in our nature which directs us to the invariable observance of this rule. IF there were such a pi inciple which in clined us irresistibly to the performance of duty, we should cease to be moral agents, and accountable beings. The very idea of a moral action implies that there is a choice between motives, and the greater the struggle, the more glorious is the victory when good principles prevail. There is even among the lower animals a sort of balancing of motives arising from experience and education. A lion, for example, has always a disposi tion to eat a roan when he is hungry ; in situations, how ever, where he has an opportunity of being acquainted with the power and resources of man, he rather wishes to avoid him ; and we have heard of a single Alcor put ting a lion to flight with a stick. The natural propen sities of the animal are, in this instance, repressed by fear ; and he, no doubt, reckons the risk more than suf ficient to counterbalance the expected advantage. A dog has a natural propensity to worry a cat ; but a few whippings will restrain him, and teach him to live with the animal, for which he seems to have a natural antipa thy, on amicable terms. But this species of discipline does not, in the smallest degree, approach to moral culture. Punishment is associated with the action, and this induces a fear of committing it; but we have no grounds whatever to suppose, that the animal can see any thing like 'natal impropriety in the action ; or that that there is any thing resembling conscience to restrain him.
We grant that there is just as little moral worth in human conduct, when it is disciplined solely by fear, or any other principle distinct from the perception and love of virtue. No action proceeding from any other source can ever be the object of moral approbation ; and this forces us again to refer to the will of God as the great standard of moral action, and to the idea of our accountableness to him, as the grand sanction by which moral obligation is enforced ; for we hold it to be utterly impossible to perceive the beauty and obli gation of virtue, without perceiving that the Being who has established this fair order of things is entitled to our obedience, and that we must be accountable to him for our actions.