Is not this the origin of that sympathy which forms such a remarkable feature in human conduct, and whose influence on our moral perceptions Dr. Smith has so beautifully illustrated ? Taking sympathy in its most ordinary sense, as a feeling extended towards those who endure suffering, it obviously arises out of our own private feelings. Suppose the suffering to arise from cruelty or injustice, is not our sympathy for the sufferer excited, primarily, by our antipathy to the offence by which he suffers ? There is an ingenerated abhorrence of the crime, and this elicits our affections and exertions in behalf of the sufferer. \Ve believe this to be the real origin of our sympathy, in the sense in which we have at present understood the word ; and we think it would not be difficult to show that it has a cognate origin, in whatever acceptation the word can be used. It. is not, then, as Mr. Stewart alleges, a principle superadded to our moral constitution, as an auxiliary to the sense of duty ; sympathy is a name in vented to describe that particular effect which the sense of our own injuries or sufferings produces on our feel ings, when we contemplate the injuries or sufferings of others ; in which case our hatred of the injury makes us espouse the cause of the sufferer, and teaches us to adopt him as our ally in repelling the evils which be set humanity. We are perfectly sure of his concur rence, and rejoice to have found a person animated by our own views and feelings, and bound to us by a power ful common tie.
We are aware that sympathy is generally considered as a mysterious original power, which instinctively prompts the heart to feel for the miserable. This no tion is disproved by the fact, that those who suffer least, have always the least sympathy ; and were there any wholly exempted from suffering, we have reason to conclude that they would be monsters of inhumanity ; unless they were trained to a kind of artificial benevo lence, and thus taught to relieve sufferings, which they neither can sympathize with, nor comprehend. They, on the other hand, who have suffered most, have always most tenderness of heart, and feel the most anxious de sire to relieve the afflicted.
Hand ignara mall miscris succurrere disco We hold, then, that all those things which are morally wrong, are either offensive to our feelings, or injurious to our interests. This is a safeguard to our virtue, pro vided by the wisdom of Heaven; and the very dislike of cruelty or injustice, is tantamount to moral disapproba tion : for though, in many cases, there may be dislike, without moral disapprobation, yet this is only when mo ral agents are not concerned. A voluntary offence must always be viewed with marked disapprobation, as being an offence against the comfort and security of human nature, and against the general laws which God has ap pointed to regulate our feelings.
It is sometimes, indeed, extremely difficult to con vince men that certain species of moral evil are hurtful to their interests ; because perverted feelings counteract the influence of conscience and reason, and keep the mind in a state of torturing suspense between inclina tion and duty. These are moral Idola, which prevent
the mind from recognising the obligations of virtue, in the same manner as the Idola tribes, &c. prevent it from discerning the obvious conclusions of right rea son. But let the passions be lulled asleep, and let the injurious tendency of any practice to which we arc ad dicted, be then demonstrated, and it will instantly be viewed with moral disapprobation, or rather with com punction, because we feel that it is a voluntary injury which we have inflicted on ourselves ; and self-con demnation aggravates the unpleasant feelings which al ways accompany moral disapprobation. There are fewer obstacles to the exercise of a sound judgment in estimating the conduct of others : we disapprove, with instinctive readiness, of what is vicious, and commend, with equal promptitude, what is salutary and useful ; not from any selfish views of benefit or injury, but be cause we have actually acquired an abstract love or dis like of certain qualities which have affected us ; and that not accidently, but by the constitution of our na ture, and the arrangements of Providence.
mity in morals might be expected, if the principles which lie at the foundation of them are thus general, and fixed immutably in the constitution of things. In answer to this, we may observe, that though there are numberless circumstances which diversify the aspect of moral conduct, yet we are acquainted with no instan ces in which the ordinary principles of morals are re versed. We know of no nation in which a mother does not love her own child, or in which a son does not, in some way or other, honour his parent. We hear in deed of some tribes in which it is customary for chil dren to put their aged parents to death. Supposing the fact to be fully ascertained, it would not militate against our assumption of filial duty as a general law of our nature. \Ve may easily conceive that this unnatu ral practice arises from a mistaken sense of duty, and that the son reckons it an act of piety to terminate or prevent the sufferings of his aged parent.--We are told that, in Sparta, theft was reckoned a virtue : No such thing ; but dexterity and adroitness were recloned use ful qualifications, as being akin to the stratagems of war, to which the whole policy of the state was made sub servient. Theft was punished there, as it is in every other place, where a distinction of property exists ; but he who stole, not from necessity or inclination, but to sharpen his powers of stratagem and cunning, was com mended, as these qualities were deemed useful to the state.--In many nations, the sexual intercourse is ex tremely loose ; yet we know of none in which the prin ciple of appropriation does not obtain, and in which the relations of husband and wife are not recognized.