But a brute is incapable of any researches; inonem Co pia fecit. Why should he compare, abstract, or gene ralize ? Man does so only from necessity ; in the case of the brute, this necessity does not exist ; for instinct directs him at once to the object best suited to gratify his desires ; and beyond this he cannot form a concep tion or a wish.
A few instances have been adduced of variable in stinct, with a view to prove that human reason is no thing else but instinct capable of indefinite variations. It has been said, and we are not able to contradict it, that certain birds which build their nests among the branches of trees in ordinary circumstances, are accus tomed so far to vary their plan, as to form pensile nests, hanging from the branches, in countries infested by monkies. But we have the strongest reason to suspect a variety of species in this instance. It is certain, how ever, that a monkey exhibits considerable variety of ac tion ; and when he cannot crack a nut with his teeth, he takes a stone to assist him. We have also heard that a crow has been known to take a shell-fish up into the air, and drop it among rocks, in order to obtain the meat within. These instances, in so far as they are well authenticated, evidently advance a step beyond the precincts of instinct. In the case of the monkey, how CN er, it may have proceeded from imitation, for a mon key is the most imitative of animals ; and if he had ever seen a human being have recourse to such an expedient, it would be readily imitated. Besides, the bands of a monkey are such important organs, and so constantly employed, that such a discovery as cracking a nut by mechanical means, must have occurred ; and if it occurred once, it would be remembered. In the ease of the crow, also, it might naturally happen, that she would accidentally drop a shell, and descending to recover it, she might find it broken, and the meat ac cessible ; and we see no reason to doubt that the expe riment might be repeated, on the same principle as an animal will repair a second time to the place which has yielded him the most agreeable food. We can sec little more semblance of reasoning in the case of the crow, than there would be in that of a horse, who, having strayed accidentally into a field affording comfortable pasture, should repair to it again next day, and should seek out the very gap through which he had accident ally gained admission. There is nothing in all this but a simple exercise of memory, without which animals could not exist or be rendered subservient to the use of man. Had they no power of locomotion, so as never to
be put in the way of danger, or did every place afford sub sistence, and other gratifications, with equal facility, in that case, even memory would not be necessary ; and being unnecessary, it would not be imparted, for nature bestows no superfluous gifts ; but needing it, as they ob viously do, for their preservation and their comfort, it is bountifully conferred ; and being modified by the dif ferent habits of different animals, it exhibits many singu lar and surprising phenomena.
This much, then, we allow to the lower animals ; and we cannot but be filled with astonishment, when we see them unconsciously accomplishing works which reason can scarcely comprehend, and which require the acutest researches of man to discern the important purposes in dicated by their structures and their plans. We are forced to subscribe to the maxim, Deus est brutorum anima, in so far, at least, as to perceive that the wisdom and goodness of the Almighty Parent are most distinctly displayed in the unconscious instinctive operations of the lower creatures.
Instinct goes a very short way in regulating human conduct : it is useful to man, chiefly as regulating the functions necessary to vitality ; but in so far as his con duct is guided by instinct, he is a necessary, and not a moral agent. To make man accountable, it is necessa ry that good and evil should be set before him, and that he should have the liberty of choosing between them. The choice is often difficult ; because inclination draws one way, and reason and conscience another ; and our strongest feelings are frequently opposed to the most obvious calculations of prudence and duty. Moral vir tue consists in a man's preferring the latter ; for it is then that he gains a victory over himself, and resists the propensities that would lead him astray. The low er animals are altogether incapable of forming such conclusions, or of being influenced by such motives. The prospect of immediate punishment may teach them to repress certain propensities ; but they cannot per ceive this to be right. On the contrary, there can be no doubt that they grumble at the necessity which com pels them. But the human mind recognises a law whose excellence it acknowledges ; and the human heart never feels such genuine satisfaction as when it sacrifices an evil propensity at the shrine of virtue and of wisdom.