Above all, the sense of religion, arising naturally at least, if not necessarily, out of the circumstances and constitution of man, tends to strengthen the power of moral obligation, and to afford an intelligible and univer sally applicable rule of duty. That it is absolutely ne cessary appears from this, that no nation has ever been able to do without it ; and in every state of society reli gion has always been assumed as the sanction of morals. That it is so, must be admitted on every rational system of morals; for if there is a God who created all things, and established those laws which we feel ourselves bound to obey, we must evidently consider his will as the sovereign rule by which we ought to regulate our con duct. And if we set such considerations aside, we con fess that we cannot perceive, by any powers of reason that we possess, any principle that will make a man forego evident advantages, and submit to serious priva tions, merely from a sense of duty : and we are more and more convinced that the sense of duty is an unin telligible phrase, or a principle without foundation, un less it he rc,alvcd into obedience to the divine law. A sense of interest may make a man avoid certain vices, such as gluttony, intemperance, and the like ; but to disc.hai ge tie rdative duties, a man must love his neigh bour as himself; and we know nothing that can produce this. feeling but the conviction that God is the common father, governor, and judge of all.
The moral duties arc alike binding on all, and no rank or condition can claim exemption from laws which, being founded on the nature of man, and the will of God, must necessarily be of universal obligation. The circumstances of individuals, however, are extremely various, and almost every man, from his particular situ ation and relations in society, will be called more fre quently to the exercise of some moral duties than others. For these he acquires a fondness, and often displays a peculiar proneness to the performance of them. This is said to be the effect of habit, a quality which, whilst it gives additional security and facility to virtue, is not without some tendencies of an opposite character, against which we would do well to he on our guard.
The man who has been trained by habit to the exer cise of a particular virtue, is very apt to view it with overweening fondness ; and to be harsh and uncharit able in judging of others who do not show the same readiness and facility in the performance of it. The man who is distinguished by any virtue not exactly in the common line of practice, is always sure of an ample share of admiration. We think him something above the ordinary level of mortals, because he seems to do with case and pleasure what would cost others much difficulty and pai to accomplish.
If the estimation of the world, in this respect, be not altogether correct, it is at least salutary in its influ c nee, and we are more anxious to prevent undue ela tion in those who are thus distinguished, than to teach men to withhold the mead of praise from any thing that bears the appearance of virtue. In a rigid estimation of the subject, however, a man cannot reckon himself entitled to very high praise for the performance of du ties to which he has been trained by a long course of discipline, or by powerful associations.
Dr. Reid has assigned some mysterious influence to habit, and has exalted it into an original principle of our nature. " It appears evident," says he, " that as, without instinct, the infant could not live to become a man, so, without habit, man would remain an infant through life, and would be as helpless, as unhandy, as speechless, and as much a child in understanding at threescore, as at three." He afterwards observes, " no man can show a reason why our doing a thing fre quently should produce either facility or inclination to do it." This is certainly putting habit out of its place, and winking it usurp the province of a more important prin ciple. How is it possible for this ingenious author to make out his position, that, without habit, a man would be as much a child in understanding at threescore as at three ? Would not the memory retain the impressions which it had received, the knowledge which it had gained, and the facts which had passed in review be fore it, without any dependence on the power of habit ? And, as we think habit not absolutely indispensable for the acquisition of knowledge, neither do we think that its influence over the human mind is absolutely unac countable ; at least, we think it may easily be referred to an ulterior principle.
In fact, we consider habit merely as one of the ordi nary phenomena connected with memory and the asso ciation of ideas ; and on this principle we think its power may easily be accounted for. Whatever has been once before the mind, will find a readier admission when presented a second time ; for this plain reason, that it was at first a stranger, but is new recognized as an acquaintance. We might have had some difficulty at first, in understanding it, and it might have cost us a good deal of trouble to discover all its bearings and tendencies ; but thescs difficulties being once removed, never recur ; and the fact, or the feeling, or whatever it may be called, being treasured up in the memory, is added to the general stock of knowledge, and becomes, as it were, a new point from which we start in search of ulterior improvement.