Most of the ancient philosophers, with the exception of Epicurus and his followers, believed in the immorta lity of the soul. But many of them held the doctrine in a sense that rendered it inconsistent with a state of re wards and punishments in a future world; for they con ceived the soul to be essentially immortal, as being an emanation from the divine nature, into which they sup posed that it was again absorbed, when separated from its earth-born companion. Such an opinion as this ne cessarily destroyed any influence which the doctrine of immortality could have in repressing vice, or encourag ing virtue, or alleviating misfortune ; for if the soul is to have no distinct consciousness, and no separate exist ence after death, it could not be more materially affect ed even by annihilation; and on these principles we should be forced to subscribe to the opinion of Lucre tins, who strenuously endeavours to establish the mate riality and mortality of the soul.
Nam si tantopere est animi mutata potestas, Omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rertnn; Non, opinor, id ab letho jam longiter errat.
All the ancient philosophers who held the immortality of the soul, believed also in its pre-existence, or rather in its self-existence and eternity ; having an idea that, if it had a beginning, it could not be necessarily immortal. Modern philosophers have been affected by this argu ment, and have, in consequence, been disposed to give up the idea of the natural immortality of the soul ; as cribing its indestructibility to the decree of its Creator, and not to any quality inherent in itself. We certainly are not disposed to affirm, that the soul inherits immor tality as an independent attribute. But we have no he sitation in affirming, that we can have no idea, from any thing we observe in the visible world, of the annihilation of any created substance. We see dissolution, separa tion, or division of parts, or alteration of form and figure; but by no process to which any material substance can be subjected, do we perceive any thing that approaches to annihilation. If a miracle was necessary to call matter into existence, we conceive that a miracle would he no less necessary to produce its annihilation and ex tinction.
On these principles, then, we do not think it quite evident that every thing which is created must be ne cessarily mortal. We ought rather to infer, that it has received an existence which nothing but a miraculous interference of divine power can destroy. But, what ever may be thought of the natural durability of mate rial substances, it is evident that the soul is not compos ed of matter, and therefore cannot be affected by any of the accidents which seem to dissolve or to destroy it.
The soul is conscious of feeling, thinking, judging, rea soning, qualities which it is not even possible to conceive to belong to matter. All the properties of matter may be reduced to extension, figure, colour, bulk, hardness, softness, and the like, which have no more resemblance to any of the known properties of mind, than a sunbeam has to the earth which it enlightens. Since, then, it is not possible to institute any comparison between the pro perties of mind and matter, it is evidently illogical and inconclusive, to argue that the soul must fall with our material bodies. The body is corrupted, changed, and disorganized, by the division or dissolution of its parts. This is the only idea that our senses present to us of death. But it is not even possible to conceive that the mind can be subjected to such a process ; for it is not composed of parts: it is indivisible and indiscerptible, and cannot be affected by any of the accidents which alter or derange a material and divisible substance.
Another argument for the soul's immortality may be drawn from the faculties with which it is endowed. It is evidently possessed of powers capable of indefinite improvement we can scarcely form an idea of any limits which can be sct to its advancement. This im provement of the soul, however, is scarcely begun in the present world : a man has barely time to look about him, and contemplate the attainments to which he may aspire, when he is cut off in the very commencement of his ca reer of improvement, and prevented from making those advances in virtue and knowledge, of which he feels his nature to be susceptible.
Now, we may reasonably ask, why such extensive ca pabilities should be given to the soul, if it is to be ex tinguished before they are evolved ? It is a common ob set vation, that God does nothing in vain ; that there is nettling superfluous, unnecessary, or redundant, through all the works of nature ; that every animal has organs and instincts adapted to its necessities and its uses; and is never furnished with faculties or propensities for which there is no adequate exercise or enjoyment. We may naturally conclude, then, that those faculties in man which enable him to contemplate the divine nature, and to resemble the divine perfections, are intended for a higher sphere of existence, where they will be fully un folded and fully gratified ; which is by no means the case in the present world.